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Disagreement on Corporate Spin-Offs News. Major Professor: Dr. Chong Soo Pyun.  
This study analyzes temporal trading volume surge associated with a firm’s public 
announcement of its spinoff divesture. Combining Miller (1977)’s static difference-of-
opinion (DO) model with Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic DO model, this study 
investigates the effects of investors’ differential interpretations of spinoff announcements 
on price changes for 221 corporate spinoffs in the U.S from 1964 to 2005. We measure 
the ex-ante level of DO as the degree of DO about a firm’s value in a typical trading day 
prior to a spinoff announcement, and the event level of DO as the changed level of DO 
triggered by investors’ differential interpretations of its spinoff announcement. We find 
that spinoff announcements spark a sudden and sharp increase in the level of DO. This 
increase is positively correlated with abnormal returns generated by the announcements. 
Consistent with the notion of investors’ limited attention, the ex-ante level of DO is 
negatively related to disagreement shock. Further, defining the ex-ante level of DO as 
disagreement factor, we validate its statistical significance after controlling for other 
known determinants for these returns in the entire study period. For the first study period 
between 1964 and 1991, we confirm the results of prior studies on the effects of a change 
in industrial focus and the relative size of a spun-off on the abnormal returns. For the 
second study period from 1992 to 2005, all these factors are found insignificant. Only 
variable that consistently accounts for the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal 
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Introduction and Overview 
Trading volume behavior around an informational event typically display 
abnormally high level of trading volume on the date of the event and gradual attenuating 
or declining trading volume during a period, usually a few days, following the event.  
This behavior is not easily explained by the traditional asset pricing models based on the 
assumption of rational expectations in which agents share common priors and interpret 
information homogeneously. Departing from this assumption of rational and 
homogeneous agents, Banerjee and Kremer (2010) develop a dynamic difference-of-
opinion model in which investors have heterogonous beliefs and interpret information 
differently. In particular, focusing on a change in the level of disagreement induced by an 
infrequent, yet a material event, Banerjee and Kremer’s model is able to explain those 
patterns in trading volume without assuming exogenous noisy processes typically 
employed in noisy rational expectations models.    
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of changes in the levels of 
differences of opinion (henceforth DO) on stock prices around corporate spinoff 
announcements. We apply Banerjee and Kremer’s idea of changes in DO levels to 
Miller’s (1977) static DO model to predict prices changes. Guided by dynamic DO 
models, we measure several (trading) volume-based proxies for what we define as the ex-
ante level of DO or the disagreement factor of a sample firm, which reflect the level of 
disagreement about the firm’s value on a typical trading day prior to its spinoff 
announcement. Alternatively, we consider the disagreement factor as a firm-specific 
characteristic defined by heterogeneous investors. We document that these proxies 
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account for a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns generated 
by the announcements using a sample of corporate spinoffs announced during a 41-year 
period from 1964 to 2005. This finding results because changes in the levels of DO occur 
in the manner that is consistent with the notion of limited attentions on the part of 
investors. Moreover, controlling for other known sources for the abnormal returns 
reported in the literature on corporate spinoffs, we find that these sources are no longer 
associated with the abnormal returns for our 41-year of study period. Only disagreement 
factor is able to consistently account for the cross-sectional variation in these returns.  
Our choice of spinoff announcements is motivated by Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2007). They note that the announcement of an acquisition effectively increases 
the shares of an acquirer for trading (i.e., the float), which implies a shift in the supply 
curve of the acquirer’s stock in Miller (1977)’s model. This increased float has to be 
absorbed by investors who hold less optimistic opinions about the bidder. Thus bidders 
with higher levels of DO (i.e., steeper slopes of the demand curves) should earn lower 
abnormal returns. Consistent with this implication, Moeller et al. document a negative 
relationship between the levels of DO and acquirer abnormal returns for the case of 
equity offer but not cash offer. In contrast to an acquisition announcement, a spinoff 
announcement made by a firm does not involve an increase in its float, yet has a potential 
to incur substantial disagreement among investors about the prospect of the firm1. This 
                                                            
1 Miller (1977) illustrates an example in which a steelmaker and a meatpacking firm individually 
will be valued higher than a merged firm (i.e. a meatpacking-steelmaking firm) in his model. He explains 
that those who have high opinions about either meatpacking or steelmaking firm alone would not value the 
merged firm as high as they do for a standalone firm. Thus, less optimistic investors will buy the shares of 
the merged firm.      
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allow us exclusively look at changes in the level of DO and its implications on price 
reactions days surrounding spinoff announcements.  
Our analytical framework is based on a simple adaptation of a change in the level 
of DO into Miller’s model. In this model in which short-sales constraints are binding, it is 
the level of DO about the value of a firm that causes the demand curve for the firm to be 
downward sloping. Thus, the slope of the demand curve increases with disagreement 
about its value among investor. If the firm’s announcement of spinoff spurs large 
disagreement among investors, this event raises the slope of the demand curve. We 
interpret this jump in the level of DO as a change in the slope of demand curve. To 
measure a change in the level of DO, we consider a two-period setting: the pre-event (the 
250-trading-day period before the announcement of a spinoff) and the event period (the 
3-trading-day period around the date of the announcement). From each period, we 
estimate the ex-ante and the event level of DO for the firm.  
We propose the following three hypotheses.  Hypothesis 1 states that the event 
level of DO should be larger than the ex-ante level of DO. As a baseline test for 
Hypotheses 2 and Hypothesis 3, we test whether there is a sudden increase in the level of 
DO sparked by a spinoff announcement. Given that the level of DO spikes up, which 
implies a (upward) shift in the slope of the demand curve (i.e., a steeper slope), in the 
event period, Hypothesis 2 states that the disagreement shock should be positively 
correlated with announcement abnormal return. The disagreement shock defined as the 
difference between the event and the ex-ante level of DO is also translated to the 
magnitude of a change in the slope of the demand curve. Hence, sample firms with 
greater disagreement shocks relative to their ex-ante levels of DO are expected to earn 
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larger abnormal returns. Finally, Hypothesis 3 states that the ex-ante level DO is 
negatively correlated with the disagreement shock. This proposition is based on the idea 
of limited attention which states that cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to 
only a subset of information (e.g., Hirchleifer & Teoh, 2003; Peng & Xiong, 2006). 
Because of this type of cognitive constraint, a firm that is out of investors’ attention, 
perhaps due to infrequent coverage by the media, would have a low ex-ante level of DO. 
In other words, it is less susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations by investors because 
it is rarely reported by the media. However, when the announcement of a spinoff, which 
is very likely to receive wide and intense media coverage, becomes publicly, a firm 
characterized by a lower ex-ante level of DO is expected to incur larger disagreement 
relative to its ex-ante level of DO than is a firm with a high ex-ante level of DO. 
For the construction for proxies for the ex-ante and the event level of DO, we note 
that as the event period lasts for three days, a proxy for both levels of DO should be 
comparable to properly estimate a change in the level of DO. That is, since the latter 
reflects the changed level of DO on the announcement date of a spinoff, the former 
should reflect the normal level of DO on a typical trading day prior to the announcement. 
We use daily trading volume turnover as a basic variable for estimating a proxy for 
disagreement. Our use of trading volume is based on recent developments in dynamic DO 
models in which disagreement is the key variable that drives the positive correlation 
between trading volume and overpricing (e.g., Hong, Scheinkman, & Xiong, 2004; 
Scheinkman & Xiong 2003). In other words, the level of trading volume for a firm 
contains information about the degree of investor disagreement about the firm’s value. 
Specifically, we follow the estimation methods developed by Garfinkel (2009). The focus 
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of his methodology is to isolate a part of trading volume after controlling for the other 
parts related to the market-wide and the mean level of firm-specific trading volume or 
information-related trading on a particular day. We refer these estimators as the (trading) 
volume-based measures of DO (VDO). We employ five different VDOs including daily 
volume turnover, and estimate them each day during the pre-event and the event (see 
Section 4.C for the measurement details of VDOs). Our preliminary analysis of statistical 
characteristics of daily estimates of VDOs shows that these estimates in the pre-event 
period have stable normal distributions. This result allows us to properly take an average 
of daily estimates of a VDO in the pre-event period, and meaningfully define it as a 
proxy for the ex-ante level of DO or an ex-ante DO proxy. Similarly, we define the three-
day mean of daily estimates of a VDO in the event period as a proxy for the event level of 
DO or an event DO proxy.  
It is commonly accepted in the investment literature that a high level of trading 
activity is widely regarded as a sign of a stock’s market liquidity (e.g., Brennan, Chordia, 
& Subrahmanyam, 1998; Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998). Because our ex-ante DO 
proxies are based on VDOs that are essentially geared to estimate extra portion of trading 
volume, we attempt to establish our ex-ante DO proxies as an indicator for the level of 
DO rather than for liquidity. Comparing with five popular proxies for liquidity (i.e., 
dollar trading volume, firm size, the effective spread, and the standard deviation of return 
residuals), we find that none of our ex-ante DO proxies (except volume turnover) is 
related to these liquidity proxies. Interestingly, we also find that the ex-ante DO proxy 
based on volume turnover is strongly positively related to the effective spread and the 
residual standard deviation. This result is the opposite of the notion that high volume 
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turnover is a sign of liquidity. But dollar trading volume has the expected signs with the 
effective spread and the residual standard deviation as a proxy for liquidity. Apparently, 
volume turnover (i.e., a ratio of the number of share traded to shares outstanding), or our 
basic ingredient for estimating the other VDOs, contains information more than, or 
perhaps other than market liquidity about the sample firms.  
In addition, we check the robustness of our ex-ante DO proxies by comparing 
them with the extant DO proxies (i.e., breadth of ownership by Chen, Hong, & Stein, 
2002; the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts by Diether, Malloy, & Scherbina, 
2002); the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on the long-term earnings growth by Moeller 
et al., 2007). We find that our proxies are not significantly related to these extant 
disagreement proxies. One exception is the relationship between the ex-ante DO proxy 
based on volume turnover and the dispersion of analysts’ long-term earnings growth for 
which we find a significant correlation. Since the dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts is often used as a proxy for liquidity by researchers, we show that it is more 
closely related to liquidity at least in our sample. In particular, dollar trading volume is 
highly negatively correlated with the dispersion measured based on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, consistent with the notion that they both represent liquidity. However, volume 
turnover is not related to the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, but it is 
significantly associated with the dispersion in analysts’ long-term earnings growth. Thus, 
our results suggest that the information content of volume turnover is the degree of 
disagreement among investors about the value of a sample firm.  
Furthermore, we find that the ex-ante DO proxy based on volume turnover has a 
significant negative correlation with the pricing indicators (i.e., book-to-market ratio and 
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earning-to-price ratio). Consistent with the central prediction of DO models, this result 
lends further support for our ex-ante DO proxy that it captures the cross-sectional 
variation in the degrees of overpricing, or the ex-ante levels of DO, of the sample firms. 
For ex-ante DO proxies based on the other four VDOs, though their correlations with the 
liquidity proxies are non-existent, their relationship with the extant DO proxies is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, given their strong relationship with the ex-ante DO proxies 
based on volume turnover, their empirical relevance as proxy for disagreement will be 
validated by testing the hypotheses.     
The test results of the three hypotheses are as follows. For Hypothesis 1, we find 
that there is a sudden increase in the level of DO in the announcement period (i.e., the 
event level of DO). The mean values of ex-ante DO proxies are about zero. However, 
event DO proxies spike up such that their mean values hover about 0.65. Indeed, the 
announcement of a spinoff is a significant information event that invokes huge 
disagreement among investors. Measuring the disagreement shocks (i.e., ex-ante level of 
DO minus event level of DO), we find that they are significantly and positively related to 
announcement abnormal returns as it is postulated in Hypothesis 2. This result 
substantiates our analytical setup that a change in the level of DO triggered by a public 
announcement of a spinoff can be interpreted as a shift in the slope of a demand curve in 
Miller’s framework. Moreover, this evidence suggests that the VDOs employed in this 
study adequately capture investor disagreement. That is, by extrapolating the ex-ante and 
the event level of DO from daily estimates of VDOs, we are able to examine the effect of 
a change in the level of DO on price reactions around the spinoff announcement. Finally, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that the lower the ex-ante level of DO, the greater 
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the disagreement shock. Across the sample, the correlation between the ex-ante levels of 
DO and the disagreement shocks is negatively significant regardless of the choice of a 
VDO. More importantly, this result implies that it is a negative correlation between the 
ex-ante level of DO and the disagreement shock that gives rise to a negative correlation 
between announcement abnormal returns and the ex-ante levels of disagreement. We find 
the evidence in support of this implication. Therefore, the ex-ante level of DO can be a 
potent determinant that can be helpful in understanding for the cross-sectional variation 
in the abnormal returns.  
In Part 2, we broaden our investigation by extending the bivariate analyses in Part 
1 to multiple regression analyses. We test whether the cross-sectional variation in 
announcement abnormal returns can be accounted for with our key variable, the ex-ante 
level of DO, when controlling for other known sources for these returns reported in the 
literature. We rename the ex-ante level of DO as disagreement factor in Part 2. We select 
the following three factors or determinants that have received strong empirical coverage 
as the sources for the abnormal returns: relative size which is a portion of a parent’s 
assets assigned to its spun-off subsidiary, the level of information asymmetry ex ante, and 
focus factor which indicates whether a (parent) firm split up a related or unrelated 
subsidiary to its core business (i.e., focus-increasing or non-focus-increasing spinoff). 
Note that since spinoff announcements have shown to generate, on average, positive 
abnormal returns—we also verify this stylized fact in Part 1, these returns are often 
referred to as wealth gains or wealth effects. 
Prior to multivariate analyses, we examine two control variables individually: 
information asymmetry and focus factor because we find that the evidence for the effect 
9 
of both variables on wealth gains are inconclusive in the literature. Our preliminary 
analysis of information asymmetry finds that there is a significant deterioration in all the 
proxies that we employ for information asymmetry from the pre-spinoff to the post-
spinoff period. Moreover, this exacerbation in information asymmetry is more severe for, 
and limited to, focus-increasing firms. Our finding rejects the information hypothesis 
proposed by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), while it is consistent with the 
result of Huson and MacKinnon (2003). For focus factor or industry focus hypothesis, we 
show that there is no difference in wealth gains whether a sample firm is engaged in 
focus-increasing or non-focus-increasing spinoff with our full sample. But, noting that 
most of empirical studies on the industry focus hypothesis cover the spinoff 
announcements made before the year of 1992 (e.g., Daley, Mehrotra, & Sivakumar, 1997; 
Desai & Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999), we confirm the hypothesis 
that only focus-increasing firms earn significantly positive abnormal returns, while non-
focus increasing firms’ abnormal returns are, on average, not statistically different from 
zero for the first study period from 1964 to 1991. However, in the second study period, 
we find no statistically significant differences in abnormal returns between focus-
increasing and non-focus-increasing firms. Investors’ responses are equally positive to 
both types of spinoff.   
In cross-sectional regressions with the full sample, we find that announcement 
abnormal returns are significantly negatively related to disagreement factor after 
controlling for the known determinants for these returns. This result validates the 
implication of Hypothesis 3 in which we suggest disagreement factor as a potent 
explanatory variable for the abnormal returns. Moreover, disagreement factor adds 
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explanatory power as large as that provided by all the control variables combined. The 
economic effect of the relationship between disagreement factor and the abnormal return 
is substantial. For instance, when there is one standard deviation increase (from the mean) 
in disagreement factor, the abnormal return decreases roughly by 1.11%. However, 
confirming the results of the preliminary analyses of information asymmetry and focus 
factor, we find that these determinants no longer explain the abnormal returns for our full 
sample of spinoffs.  
We also analyze the relationships between disagreement shock and the control 
variables (including disagreement factor) because the information content of some of 
these variables can be the sources engendering disagreement in the announcement period. 
We show first that disagreement shock is larger for a firm with a lower disagreement 
factor in the confirmation of Hypothesis 3. Second, disagreement shock is also larger for 
a firm that has a lower level of information asymmetry ex ante, that engages in focus-
increasing spinoff, and that splits up a larger portion of its assets to its spun-off subsidiary. 
If investors perceive that a firm is mired by a higher level of information asymmetry, they 
seem to inhibit expression of their disagreement and refrain from trading based on their 
own interpretations. 
Finally, in the sub-period analysis, our regression results substantiate the findings 
of previous studies in that focus factor and relative size jointly explain the cross-sectional 
variation in announcement abnormal returns for the first study period from 1964 to 1991. 
But in the second study period from 1992 to 2005, these two determinants become 
insignificant. In both sub-periods, we find no evidence for the information hypothesis that 
the level of information asymmetry ex ante is not related to the abnormal returns. Only 
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variable that remains significant in both study periods is disagreement factor, which 
consistently negatively related to the abnormal returns, and thus account for a significant 
faction of the cross-sectional variation in these returns. 
Our study adds to the literature largely in two distinctive ways. First, many 
empirical studies test the implications of DO models—mainly Miller (1977)’s proposition 
that the overpriced stocks due to investor disagreement forecasts low expected returns—
in a static cross-sectional asset-pricing test at an aggregate market level (e.g., Chen et al., 
2002;  Diether et al., 2002; Piqueira, 2006). However, we focus on a particular corporate 
event, namely the announcement of a spinoff, and show the relevance of Miller (1977)’s 
framework to which we adopt a change in the level of DO (Banerjee & Kremer, 2010) for 
understanding the joint behavior of trading volume and overpricing around the 
announcement. Furthermore, our results suggest that information content of daily trading 
volume turnover is about either more than, or other than, conventionally accepted proxy 
for the market liquidity of a stock. Thus, a firm-specific level of DO in the pre-event 
period as well as in the event period can be inferred from trading volume turnover.   
Secondly, our study adds to a recent development in the application of DO models 
to corporate finance. For example, Moeller et al. (2007) study the effect of the level of 
DO about a bidder on its abnormal return around the acquisition announcement, while 
Chatterjee, John, and Yan (2012) examine the effect of the level of DO about the target’s 
equity value on the takeover premium that a bidder has to pay for the target. These 
studies focus on changes in the float (or the supply curve), assuming no changes in the 
demand curve. In contrast, our investigation of spinoffs sheds light on potential effects of 
changes in the demand curve induced by heterogeneous interpretation on various 
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significant corporate events (e.g., earnings announcements) since these events also tend 
to generate similar patterns: excessive trading volume on the event date and a gradual 
decline of trading volume over a few days after the event date.  
More importantly, the prior literature has examined sources for wealth gains 
generated from spinoff announcements (i.e., motives for spinoffs) based on the 
assumption that managers act rationally to maximize the shareholder value—most likely 
because their compensations are tied to this, and thus rational investors react positively to 
spinoff decisions. However, these motives—value creation through a spinoff by reducing 
information asymmetry, by focusing on core business, or by splitting up a large portion of 
assets to a spun-off— at best have limited power to explain wealth gains. In particular 
none of these motives are related to announcement abnormal returns associated with 
spinoffs occurred since 1992. But, our key result suggests that understanding behavioral 
characteristics of investors proves to be critical for analyzing the effects of their reactions 
to the announcement of a spinoff on price changes. As we show, not only because 
investors have different priors and interpret information differently, but also because they 
react to the announcement in the manner that is consistent with the idea of limited 
attention, disagreement factor can account for a significant fraction of the cross-sectional 
variation in announcement abnormal returns. In this sense, our research is related to a 
branch of behavioral corporate finance which emphasizes the effect of investor behavior 
that is less than fully rational (Baker & Wurgler, 2012). 
One interesting implication of the dissertation that we will tackle in future 
research is whether managers engage in a spinoff to create value or more correctly 
overpricing by catering to investors who hold the most optimistic views on either a parent 
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or its subsidiary. The presence of disagreement among investors implies that the sum of 
the parent’ and the subsidiary’s value as separate entities can be greater than the current 
value of the combined firm. If informed managers are aware this situation, they will 
exploit such less-than-rational investor behavior to increase the firm’s value. A research 
on this topic would show that not only does investor disagreement have a temporal 
impact (triggered by the announcement of a spinoff) on contemporaneous overpricing, 
but also might affect the long-term values of the parent and the spun-off subsidiary.  
Restatement of Miller’s Analytical Framework 
We consider Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic model in the context of 
Miller (1977)’s static model. As the former model is focused on a change in the level of 
difference of opinion driven by an information-driven event, we interpret this sudden 
change in disagreement among investors as a change in the slope of the demand curve for 
a stock in Miller’s framework.  
Figure 1 illustrates how the market price of a stock is determined in Miller’s 
model in which the main two constructs are the existence of disagreement among 
investors and short-sale constraints. Suppose, in period t, a fixed number of firm A’s 
stock is available for trading at  (i.e., the float). Within the traditional asset-pricing 
paradigm in which investors have an identical estimation of the expected return from the 
stock, or they agree on its value, its market price is set at P0. The demand curve for the 
stock is flat because there is no disagreement regarding the value of the stock among 
investors. However, the presence of disagreement induces a downward-sloping demand 
curve shown as Curve A in the figure, and the price is set at PA. Now, Stock A is owned 
by the optimists (i.e., a small subset of the entire investor population) who have the 
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highest valuation for the stock. Consequently, PA is greater than P0 because PA reflects 
the valuation of those optimists rather than that of the average valuation of investors.  But, 
under no restrictions in short sales, the price would fall back to P0.  
Figure 1. Price Reactions from a Change in the Level of Differences of Opinion in the 
Announcement Period 
 
Assume further that we have firm B which is identical to firm A in characteristics, 
but it differ only in the degree of disagreement in investors’ belief such that investors 
disagree less about the value of firm B than they do about that of firm A. If there are no 
differences of opinion or no short-sales constraints, stock B would also be priced at P0. 
But, those constraints are a market reality, and thus the pessimists are unable to arbitrage 
mispricing away by selling the stock short due to high costs of or institutional constraints 
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against engaging in short-sales.2 However, compared to firm A, a lower divergence of 
opinion for firm B reduces the steepness of its demand curve, or the slope of its demand 
curve at ( ) shown as Curve B, and therefore the market price of firm B is 
determined at PB. Note that PB is lower than PA because firm A has lower level of 
disagreement than does firm B.  
We define  (where i = A or B) as the parameter for the level of DO in a 
period prior to the announcement of a spinoff and label it as the ex-ante level of DO. 
Suppose that the announcement cause investors to interpret information content of the 
announcement heterogeneously, thereby increasing the level of disagreement, or causing 
a jump in disagreement since this announcement can be reasonably regarded as an 
infrequent, but a significant information event that invokes widely differential 
interpretations from investors. We define this elevated level of disagreement as , 
which we label as the event level of DO. In turn, changes in the levels of DO 
(   ) for both firm A and B implies corresponding changes in the slopes 
of their demand curves. 
Therefore, by adapting a change in the level of DO (from the pre-event to the 
event period) into Miller (1977)’s model, we derive testable hypotheses by examining 
relationships between and , and their effect on prices during the 
announcement period. Hereafter, we will use the level of DO and the slope of a demand 
                                                            
2Hong et al. (2006) state that the assumption of investors (even large institutions such as 
mutual funds) who face short-sales constraints is eminently plausible. They report that there are 
about 70% mutual funds that are prohibited to take a short position as stated in in SEC Form N-
SAR (Almazan, Brown, Carlson, & Chapman, 2004). Moreover, a majority of equity mutual 
funds (79%) does not use any synthetically devised short position, for example, with options and 
futures (Koski & Pontiff, 1999). 
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curve (in the absolute magnitude) interchangeably since the “downwardness” in the slope 
arises only in the presence of DO.  
Testable Hypotheses 
In this study we follow the SEC definition of a corporate spinoff: the creation of 
an independent public company from its parent firm. This form of divesture involves 
neither a dilution of equity nor a transfer of ownership from the current equity holders. 
Therefore, the shares of the spun-off unit are distributed to the current shareholders of the 
parent firm on a pro rata basis and there should be no change in the supply of the shares 
(i.e., the float of the parent) unless there is hoarding of stocks by corporate insiders or 
informed investors who anticipate an imminent corporate spinoff. Additionally, there 
should be no abrupt and significant change in the demand a priori for the parent firm’s 
stock by the firm’s existing shareholders. 
In contrast to an acquisition, a spinoff does not involve an increase in the float, 
and yet a public announcement of corporate spinoff has all ingredients for substantial 
disagreement among investors.3  If a spinoff announcement by a sample firm spurs a 
large disagreement among investors about the prospects of the firm following the 
divesture, the announcement raises the slope of its demand curve in the context of 
Miller’s model in a two-period setting encompassing  a pre-announcement and a post-
announcement periods. This in turn allow us to analyze a change in the level of DO and 
its implications on price reactions days surrounding a spinoff announcement based on 
                                                            
3 Miller (1977) illustrates an example in which a steelmaker and a meatpacking firm 
individually will be valued higher than a merged firm (i.e. a meatpacking-steelmaking firm) in his 
model. He explains that those who have high opinions about either meatpacking or steelmaking 
firm alone would not value the merged firm as high as they do for a standalone firm. Thus, less 
optimistic investors will buy the shares of the merged firm.      
17 
Miller’s (1977) proposition that given the constraint of short sale, the price of the stock 
will reflect the valuation of the optimists while that of pessimists is not registered into the 
price since they stay away from the market.  In this study, we use a sample of 235 firms 
which announced a spin off during the 41 year period from 1964 to 2005 to test the 
following hypotheses (The sample selection criteria are detailed in Section 5.A). 
Hypothesis 1. The level of DO in the event period should be larger than that in the pre-
event period.  
Provided that firm A (in Figure 1) announces its decision to spin off one or more 
of its business units, consider a situation where investor would re-evaluate the firm’s 
value by without disagreement. More specifically, the announcement does not induce a 
change in the level of DO, or and . In this case, there would be an upward 
shift in its demand curve shown as Curve A0, given that spinoff announcements generate 
wealth effect. Then, its price is set at PA0 when there is no change in the level of DO, but 
P01 when there is no disagreement in the first place. Suppose that the announcement also 
spurs a large disagreement among investors causing a jump in the level of DO in the 
event period. In turn, the slope of firm A’s demand curve changes so that its curve moves 
to Curve A2. We consider that the effect of a change in the level of DO on the price 
would be much larger than or dominate that of other rational factors that drives 
revaluation of the firm. Therefore, in Part 1, we focus on relationship between changes in 
disagreement and price changes. But in Part 2, we will control for other known 
determinants for price changes prompted by spinoff announcements.  
Given a sudden hike in the level of DO in the event period and assuming two 
different event levels of DO ( ) for firm A, the stock price of firm A is set 
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at  at Curve A2 and  at Curve A1 in Figure 1. Apparently, the larger the 
change in the level of DO, the larger is the accompanying change in price from the 
announcement. Note that it is the differential changes in the level of DO 
, and thus the changes in the slope of the demand 
curve (from Curve A to Curve A2 or A1), that results in the differential price changes 
. By defining the change in the level of DO (∆
) as the disagreement shock, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2.Unconditional on the ex-ante level of difference of opinion, or equivalently 
the slope of demand curve in the pre-event period, there should be a positive correlation 
between disagreement shock and abnormal return in the announcement period 
This hypothesis is a modified version of the prediction of Banerjee and Kremer’s 
(2010) model, the prediction that is solely based on the event level of DO that stock 
return is increasing in the magnitude of . But by modifying Banerjee and Kremer’s 
result into Miller’s model, we derive the size of disagreement shock by explicitly taking 
into account of . Thus we can propose a more cogent hypothesis as compared to 
Banerjee and Kremer’s model prediction. More importantly, we argue that this 
hypothesis will show that (i) whether it is disagreement that causes a downward-sloping 
demand curve and (ii) whether the interpretation of the level of DO as the magnitude of 
the slope of a demand curve is relevant for our analysis.  
We derive additional empirical implications by postulating a relationship between  
 and , and the impact on announcement returns resulted from this 
relationship. We consider the idea of limited attention (e.g., Hirchleifer & Teoh, 2003; 
Peng and Xiong, 2006) which states that cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to 
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only a subset of information. Hong and Stein (2007) suggest that if a public 
announcement of information is released in an attention-grabbing manner (e.g., a wide 
coverage by news media), perhaps because of weighty consequence of information 
content of the announcement, these investors’ reactions will result in large responses in 
price and trading volume. Limited and sporadic attention of investors also implies that a 
firm with less frequent arrival of news or limited coverage by the media prior to the 
announcement could be a firm with a low level of DO. In the DO model of Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003) in which investors interpret news differently, a greater stimulus of the 
news results in higher disagreement and more trading, as investors’ valuations fluctuate 
more. Thus, if a spinoff announcement is released in an attention-grabbing fashion, we 
propose that relative to the ex-ante level of DO, a firm characterized by a lower ex-ante 
level of DO will trigger a greater level of differential interpretation of the announcement 
than a firm with a higher ex-ante level of DO. In other words, the disagreement shock, or 
the magnitude of a change in the slope of the demand curve, would be larger for a “lower 
disagreement firm” than for a “higher-disagreement firm.”  
Hypothesis 3. The ex-ante level of DO is negatively correlated with the disagreement 
shock in the event period 
The importance of this hypothesis is that no correlation between the two variables 
would suggest that , or the pre-event slope of the demand curve, has no 
connection to price changes in the announcement period. Then, as discussed for 
Hypothesis 2, announcement abnormal returns depend only on the slope changes caused 
by spinoff announcements, or the sizes of the disagreement shocks, ∆ . However, if 
there is a negative relation, it implies that a firm with a lower or a flatter pre-
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event slope of the demand curve will incur a greater magnitude of ∆  or a change in the 
slope. Furthermore, if a lower-disagreement firm is affected by a greater disagreement 
shock (i.e., a larger jump in the level of DO during the event period relative to its ex-ante 
level of DO) than a higher-disagreement firm, then the former should earn a higher 
abnormal return than the latter. 
Therefore, we draw an important implication for the cross-sectional variation in 
abnormal returns in the announcement period, which is resulted from the posited 
relationship between the ex-ante level of DO and the disagreement shocks. If   
and ∆  are negatively correlated, this relationship suggests a negative correlation 
between the ex-ante level of DO and the abnormal returns. Thus, the ex-ante level of DO 
can be a significant factor for understanding the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal 
returns. 
Methodology 
A. Empirical Issues and Event-Study Design. Testing the hypotheses developed in 
the preceding section, our primary focus is to define a proper measure that captures the 
level of DO in the pre-event and the event period, namely and . To 
examine an empirical relationship between the ex-ante and the event levels of DO 
requires that a proxy we use should have comparability, especially for measuring a 
change in the level of DO. Since  should reflect the level of DO in the 
announcement day of a spinoff,  should be measured to mirror a normal degree 
of disagreement in an ordinary trading day. When these conditions are met, we can 
properly estimate the disagreement shock or the magnitude of a change in the slope of the 
demand curve from the pre-event period to the event period. 
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However, the extant proxies developed to measure disagreement (breadth of 
ownership in Chen et al., 2002) and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts in 
Diether et al., 2002) are infeasible within our analytical parameters. First, the data used 
for both proxies are recorded in a low frequency (monthly for the dispersion and 
quarterly for breadth of ownership). Second, these two proxies—breadth of ownership 
and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts—are employed in testing the predictive 
power of the level of DO for stock returns in the Miller (1977)’s static setting, implying 
that they may not be able to capture a change in disagreement driven by a flash 
information event such as a sudden public announcement of a corporate spinoff. 
However, the progress in the literature (Harrison & Kreps, 1978; Hong et al., 
2006; Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003) that develops dynamic models with disagreement 
provides theoretical ground for using trading volume to derive the level of investor 
disagreement. These models generate a speculative component in prices (i.e., bubble or 
overpricing) accompanied by excessive trading volume and volatility when investors are 
overconfident (i.e., a source of disagreement). Hence, the main prediction of these 
dynamic models is a positive correlation between the level of trading volume and the 
degree of overpricing. That is, the higher the level of disagreement or the greater the 
volatility in disagreement, the more intensive the trading activity and the higher the price. 
In other words, trading activity contains information about the level of DO regarding the 
value of the stock in question among investors.  
Strictly speaking, there is no theoretical ground in Miller’s (1977) static model for 
mapping trading volume to divergence of opinion, because investors do not change their 
initial positions until liquidation (Hong & Stein, 2007). However, dynamic DO models 
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provide an alternative venue for studying the effect of disagreement on the joint behavior 
of volume and overpricing. Due to the importance of these dynamic models for our study, 
we review studies on dynamic disagreement models in the next section. But for now, 
based on the prediction drawn from these dynamic models, that is a positive correlation 
between trading volume and overpricing, we use daily trading volume turnover as a basic 
ingredient for the estimation of both and . Furthermore, we follow 
Garfinkel (2009) whose model isolates a part of volume turnover after controlling for the 
known determinants of trading volume, such as market-wide trading volume and average 
level of firm-specific trading volume. We refer to these estimators as the volume-based 
measures of DO (VDO). We employ five different VDOs including daily volume 
turnover and estimate them each trading day during the pre-event and the event period 
(see Section 4.C for the details for the measurement of VDOs). 
To measure and , we define the pre-event period as a 250-trading-
day period ending 11 trading days prior to a spinoff announcement date or the window of 
(260-AD, 11-AD) where AD is the announcement date. The event period is defined as a 
three-day period surrounding AD, the window of (AD-1, AD+1). To measure  , 
we extrapolate it by computing the mean of daily estimates of a VDO over the pre-event 
period. Thus, for firm i, the ex-ante level of DO is defined by  
_ ∑ ,                                                       (3) 
Similarly, we estimate  by calculating the three-day mean of daily estimates of a 
VDO over the event period.  
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∑ ,                                                           (4) 
Recall that our purpose is to derive the value of  that reflects the degree of 
disagreement among investors about a firm’s value on a typical trading day. With 
sufficient data points (250 observations for a VDO) that have a well-behaved stable 
empirical distribution, which we will show in Section 7, we argue that the mean of daily 
VDO estimates in the pre-event period properly captures the representative or normal 
level of DO in the ordinary trading day. 
B. Literature Review for Measuring Disagreement with Trading Volume. Harrison 
and Kreps (1978) publish the initial work on speculative markets in a dynamic setting 
with heterogeneous agents. In their model, under the assumptions of heterogeneous 
expectations and no short-sales conditions, they demonstrate that speculative behavior 
(i.e., bidding up the price) is engendered by the anticipation that an agent can resell a 
stock to other more optimistic investor at a higher price in the future. The equilibrium 
price reflects not only the valuation of the optimist but also the resale option so that he 
pays above his own valuation in anticipation of future capital gain. While their model sets 
a ground for overpricing of an asset in a speculative market with agents with divergent 
opinions, it does not provide a theoretical connection that link asset price and trading 
volume.  
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong et al. (2006) extend the insights of 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) and analyze the link between price and trading volume in 
dynamic setting in which heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints are the main 
ingredients. Specifically, Schinkman and Xiong (2003) develop a model in which 
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overconfident investors’ speculative behavior leads to overpricing of a stock, increased 
trade frequency and ensuing excessive price volatility. In their model the mechanism by 
which trading volume is generated is through the crossing effect that occurs whenever the 
valuation of the stock by other investors exceeds a current owner’s valuation. This effect 
is intensified when some exogenous factors, for example frequent arrival of news about 
the stock, exacerbate disagreement among investors. In turn, constrained by the market 
reality of short-sale restrictions, the stock will be more overpriced. The key insight in 
their model is that the level of DO is not a variable that is exogenously given, but rather 
endogenously driven in a dynamic setting, and it is being manifested in trading volume. 
Therefore, the central prediction of dynamic DO models is that trading volume is 
positively correlated with the extent of overpricing. This pricing implication of trading 
volume, hence, gives a basis for using it for estimating the level of disagreement.  
Following the theoretical work of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Mei, 
Scheinkman, and Xiong (2004) empirically investigate the joint effect of heterogeneous 
beliefs and short-sale constraints on trading volume and price with a unique data set from 
Chinese stock markets from 1994 to 2001.4 With a sample of 73 Chinese company stocks, 
they find that monthly share turnover of Class A shares are 4.7 times larger than those of 
Class B, and at the same time the average premium (i.e.,    
  
1) for 
Class A shares is 422%. In a regression analysis, controlling for risk and liquidity, they 
                                                            
4The data consists of 73 stocks that have twin shares (i.e., Class A and B) with equal 
payoffs and voting right. During the sample period, short sales were illegal, there were no 
derivative market for equity, and the reopening of the stock market was a fertile ground for 
speculative trading similar to the IT boom in the U.S in the late 1990s  due to a dominant 
participation of less experienced individual investors. Class A shares were only available for 
domestic investors, while Class B only for foreigners. 
25 
report a significant and positive correlation between A-share turnover and A-share 
premium over B-share: monthly A-share turnover explains on average 20% of the cross-
sectional variation in the A-share premium. Their findings lend empirical support for the 
implications of dynamic DO models in that trading activity driven by disagreement is 
positively related to overpricing and, thus, it explains the cross-sectional variation in 
overpricing.  
Intuitively, large trading volume might simply be a manifestation of a liquid stock. 
According to the liquidity premium hypothesis, a stock with low trading costs is expected 
to have high trading volume and low return. There is a large body of literature studying 
the effect of liquidity on stock returns. Some representative works from this area include 
Datar et al. (1998) on trading volume turnover, Brennan et al. (1998) on dollar trading 
volume, and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) on bid-ask spreads. Among them, using 
trading volume as a proxy for liquidity, Brennan et al. (1998) examine the effect of non-
risk factors on expected stock returns. Controlling for the known non-risk factors (size, 
momentum, price, and book-to-market ratio), they document a significant and negative 
relation between risk-adjusted returns and dollar trading volume. Moreover, Amihud 
(2002) shows that stocks with higher illiquidity (measured by the ratio of daily return to 
daily trading volume) have higher returns in the subsequent period. In other words, stocks 
with higher trading volume tend to be stocks with lower illiquidity. So, these stocks earn 
lower future returns than do stocks with lower trading volume.  
These studies suggest that there are two competing explanations for the link 
between trading volume and contemporaneous changes in price. In DO models, higher 
trading volume due to a higher level of disagreement causes overpricing, hence 
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forecasting a lower return. In liquidity-based models, stocks with low trading costs are 
liquid assets. Thus, all else equal, these stocks are expected to have high trading volume 
and low returns. On the other hand, illiquid stocks are expected to have low trading 
volume and high returns because investors require compensation for the liquidity risk 
inherent in these stocks (Hong & Stein, 2007). 
Piqueira (2006) attempts to isolate the implications of DO models from the 
liquidity hypothesis. Noting that the standard measures of liquidity (i.e., proportional 
quoted and effective bid-ask spread) perform poorly in a cross-sectional regression of 
stock returns, she derives a measures of illiquidity that better reflects information 
asymmetry (i.e., price impact) than the bid-ask spread normally does. Controlling for 
illiquidity as well as size, book-to-market, and momentum, she shows that monthly 
volume turnover in the current month (de-meaned by the average turnover over previous 
three months) is negatively related to stock returns in subsequent months for a sample of 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks for a period from 1993-2002. Specifically, she finds that one 
standard deviation increase in monthly turnover forecasts 0.75 % decrease in monthly 
stock returns for NASDAQ samples and 0.35% for NYSE samples. When annualized, a 
predicted decline in expected returns is equivalent to roughly to 9% for NASDAQ and 
4.25 % for NYSE stocks. Furthermore, even among liquid stocks, a group of NYSE 
stocks in the largest size quintile, turnover still enters significantly in the cross-sectional 
regression. If turnover is a proxy for liquidity, she argues, the effect of turnover on 
returns should be negligible among very liquid stock.  
C. Volume-Based Measures of Differences of Opinion (VDOs). In the previous 
section, we review theoretical and empirical DO literature that provide rationale for using 
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daily trading volume as a proxy for the level of DO among investors for a given stock. It 
stands to reason that an empirically more relevant proxy for the divergence of opinion 
from trading volume can be measured if we can isolate a portion of trading volume 
generated from disagreement.  This would also require a testable equilibrium model of 
trading volume, which is still in quest in the literature.5   
While there is a lack of a testable equilibrium model for trading volume, Gafinkel 
(2009) develops statistical measurements for the level of DO using trading volume, 
which he refers to as volume-based measures of DO (VDO). Using the propriety data on 
investors’ orders for stocks in NYSE, he constructs a benchmark for the level of DO for 
each sample based on the notion that the optimal order submission strategy (i.e., limit vs. 
market order) and the optimal price requested (in the case of a limit order) are directly 
related to private valuations by investors or their reservation prices (Handa, Schwartz, & 
Tiwari, 2003).6  Thus, he argues that a distance between the requested prices on two 
adjacent orders can be used for measuring the divergence of opinion on the value of a 
stock. Using a sample of NYSE stocks from January to March 2002, he finds that the 
volume-based measures of DO have the highest power in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation of the benchmarks relative to other DO proxies such as return volatility or the 
                                                            
5Though Lo and Wang (2000) develop a model for trading volume within a framework of 
traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), it only captures trading volume generated by 
portfolio rebalancing needs. They concede that a complete or a unified model would have to 
incorporate such factors as information asymmetry, idiosyncratic risks, transaction costs, and 
other forms of market imperfections. 
 
6 Following an order executed at price A, either a market order will hit the current bid or 
ask quote, or a limit order will be submitted. If the incoming order is a market order, Garfinkel 
(2009) assumes the requested price equals to price A, implying no divergence on the valuation of 
the stock. In the case of the incoming limit order with the bid or ask price worse than the current 
quote, the distance between the previous trade price and limit order price mirrors divergence on 
the value of the stock. 
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dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Further, his principal component analysis 
shows that only the volume-based measures contribute to and correlate positively with 
the first common component of the benchmark.  
Following Garfinkel’s (2009) estimation methods, we start with daily volume 
turnover of a stock which is defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded to the 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the trading day. We further transform it by 
taking the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover (henceforth log turnover), denoting 
it as LNTOi,t .7  From LNTOi,t, we subtract the market-wide log turnover (MKLNTOi,t), 
which gives the market-adjusted log turnover or MATOi,t. To measure the market-wide 
log turnover for day t, we compute a value-weighted average of daily log turnovers of all 
ordinary common stocks in NYSE and AMEX.8  Following Tkac (1999), we further 
correct for the on-average level of idiosyncratic aspects (or the on-average firm-specific 
deviation from the market turnover) of a firm’s trading volume by subtracting the average 
of MATOi,t over a 200-day period prior to day t from MATOi,t. Hence, we have the first 
VDO, which we call it the unexplained volume and label it as UVi,t .9  It is given by 
                                                            
7Lo and Wang (2002) show that the most proper measures for trading activity is volume 
turnover under a reasonable assumption that all investors hold the same relative proportion of 
risky assets all the time (i.e. two fund separation theorem). Hence, they argue that it provides the 
sharpest empirical implications. 
 
8Tkac (1999), deriving volume implications by extending on a traditional ICAPM model , 
shows that 20% of a sample of large NYSE and AMEX stocks have volume turnover ratio that 
are not significantly different from that of the market. In addition, she finds that about half of the 
sample stocks exhibits significant positive time-series correlation between the samples’ turnovers 
and market turnovers. Her results suggest that adjustment for the market-wide trading volume is 
appropriate when studying the behavior of individual stocks’ trading volume. 
 
9While MATOt roughly measures trading volume generated by firm-specific factors, those 
factors may include some factors other than difference of opinion, notably idiosyncratic liquidity 
(i.e., unrelated to the market-wide trading volume) and trading motived by investors with private 
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,  ,  ∑ ,   , ,  , (5)  
For the second VDO, we employ a market model for log turnovers analogous to a 
market model for stock returns. A support for the use of the model comes from the work 
of Tkac (1999) and Lo and Wang (2002). In particular, building an equilibrium model for 
turnover assuming a K-funds separation theorem, Lo and Wang show that turnover has a 
linear K-factor structure. And their principal component analysis for turnovers of 
NYSE/AMEX stocks for the period from 1962 to 1996 show that the first component 
explains between 70% and 85% of the variation in turnover. Thus, we estimate a one-
factor market model for log turnover over the 200-day period as in the measure of the 
unexplained volume.  
,   , ,   ,   ,              (6) 
where REDSi,t is a residual part of volume for firm i on day t. A close look at equation 6 
reveals that it is similar to the unexplained volume in that the intercept term captures the 
on-average portion of turnover specific to the firm. However, the coefficient ,  
captures the firm-specific sensitivity to the market-wide turnover.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
information.  This implies that UVt  is a measure of a deviation of those aspects from the normal 
level (i.e., a 200-day moving average of MATO) on day t. Therefore, we concede that the 
unexplained volume is not a perfect measure of the portion of trading volume due to difference of 
opinion, being not able to attribute it entirely to trades engendered by investors with differing 
opinions. Nevertheless, given the evidence of Garfinkel (2009) and the lack of an equilibrium 
model for trading volume, we consider the unexplained volume to be a proper proxy for investor 
divergence of opinion. 
 
10Recall that we subtract the market turnover in calculation of the unexplained volume, 
thereby implicitly assuming the beta in the market model equals to one. However, by estimating 
the beta for each sample stock with the market model, we consider it could be more empirically 
based than the unexplained turnover (Tkac, 1999). 
30 
Finally, the third VDO is the standardized unexpected volume. As Garfinkel 
(2009) notes, UV and RESD assume that new information about stock i arrived on day t, 
which changes investors’ mean valuation of the stock and stimulate trades, has the same 
effect on trading volume on day t as in our estimation period of (t-200, t-1).To control for 
the effect of the arrival of new information on trading volume on day t, we estimate the 
following equation: 
,  , , , ,  ,  ,   ,   
,
,
                            (7) 
This model is built on the empirical evidence that trading volume is related differently to 
price changes, depending on the sign and the magnitude of a price change (e.g., Karpoff, 
1987; Kim & Verrecchia, 1991, 1994). We assume a linear relationship between price 
changes and trading volume, which is captured by ,  and ,  for positive and negative 
price changes respectively. The superscripts on the absolute value of a daily return 
indicate whether the return is positive or negative on day t. The intercept captures the 
mean level of liquidity-driven trading volume specific to the firm. Hence, , represents 
the portion of trading volume that is not related the average level of the firm’s liquidity 
and the information effect on trading volume due to the arrival of news. Finally, we scale 
,  with the standard deviation of the residuals ( , ) to get the standardized unexplained 
volume or SUVi,t on day t. 
Sample of Corporate Spinoffs 
A. Sample Selection. We draw the initial sample of firms that successfully 
completed spinoffs from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) distribution 
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file for the period between 1991 and 2005.11 In the CRSP distribution file, the firms that 
engage in spinoff are identified with one of the following four distribution codes: 3762, 
3763, 3764, and 3765. There are a total of 255 distribution records with those codes in 
the initial sample of which 13 cases have two distribution records for the same spinoff.12  
After taking account of the double entries of spinoffs, our sample consists of 242 spinoffs. 
Among those spinoffs, approximately 96% (232 out of 242), have the distribution code of 
3763. This code is identified as tax-free spinoff in CRSP. We focus on non-taxable 
spinoffs or 232 sample firms in this study to maintain homogeneity of the sample.  
We extend our sample by combining the sample collected by Vijh (1994) for the 
period between 1964 and 1990, which is comprised of 113 parent firms that spin off 121 
subsidiaries. To maintain integrity of the sample, we follow the sampling procedures of 
Vijh (1994) as closely as possible. His sampling procedure requires identifying clean or 
bona fide spinoffs from the initial sample. Thus, a spinoff is defined as a corporate 
divesture decision that involves separation of a subsidiary or a division from its parent 
firm by distributing the shares of the subsidiary to the current shareholders of the parent 
on pro-rata basis. The separation is such that the parent firm does not hold any shares of 
the subsidiary; 100 % of ownership is transferred to the current shareholders of the parent, 
and the subsidiary is established as an independent publicly traded company in the 
market after the completion of spinoff. To select the firms that meet the definition of a 
                                                            
11Since the distribution file does not report the announcement date, we instead use ex-
dates recorded in the distribution file as the cut off for removing the firms whose ex-dates precede 
the year of 1991. It is because we extend our sample by combining Vijh (1994)’s sample that has 
the last records of the ex-dates in 1990. Therefore, our sample starts with firms that have the ex-
dates of spin-off distribution in 1991 and ends in 2006.  
 
12 A distribution may involve both cash and share or two spun-off units. 
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clean spinoff, which requires the detail of a spinoff transaction, we search articles on 
Dow Jones News Wire and the Lexis-Nexis database by querying the name of a sample 
firm and using the keyword: spin off or spin-off. We eliminate firms that meet any of the 
following criteria:  
1) The announcement date or the detail of a spinoff transaction is not available.  
2) A spinoff distribution is actually new issuance of another class of share by the 
same firm.  
3) Spinoffs involve distribution of the shares of other publicly traded firms that 
are not subsidiaries of parent firms.  
4) Spinoffs are equity carve-outs in which firms engage in an initial public 
offering of a fraction of the total shares of a subsidiary to be spun off, and later 
the remaining fraction is distributed to the current shareholders.  
5) Either a parent or a subsidiary is merged or acquired by another firm 
immediately after spin-off.  
6) The spinoff is partial in which a parent holds a portion of ownership of its 
subsidiary.  
7) The sample stocks with CRSP share code other than 10 and 11 (common stocks 
of firms incorporated in the U.S) are discarded. The eliminated stocks include 
ADRs (American Depository Receipt), Units, and SBIs (Shares of Beneficial 
Interest).13 
                                                            
13The key variable for our study is trading volume that is the base ingredient for 
measuring proxies for DO. In the literature that studies trading volume (e.g., Chordia, Roll, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2011; Lo and Wang, 2000), securities other than ordinary equities are usually 
removed due to different trading characteristics that make it difficult to interpreting their trading 
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For the initial samples, the ex-dates and the distribution or the payment dates, and 
the record dates are unambiguously recorded in the CRSP distribution file, coinciding 
with the dates reported in media coverage. Because the announcement dates of spinoffs 
are not recorded in CRSP distribution file, we identify the announcement dates of the 
sample firms by searching relevant articles in Dow Jones News Wire and the Lexis-Nexis 
database up to two years before the ex-dates. Imposing the seven elimination criteria 
above, we identify the final sample of 120 parent companies of which 9 sample firms 
spin off two independent subsidiaries in a single instance, hence creating a total of 129 
subsidiaries. Finally, combining Vijh (1994)’s sample which covers the period from 1964 
to 1990, our final sample consists of 233 parent firms that announced and successfully 
completed the spin-offs of 250 independent subsidiaries for the sample period from 1964 
to 2006. 
B. Sample Distribution. In Table 1, we report the distribution of the sample firms 
over the study period. The study period is divided into the seven sub-periods, each of 
which lasts for five years except the first sub-period that lasts for seven years. Few 
spinoffs occurred before 1976. However, the activity picked up in the subsequent years, 
and peaked during the 5-year  
period from 1986 to1990 with 53 announcements reported. In the final three sub-periods, 
the spinoff activity declines from the peak, and seems stabilize at 30 to 40 range 
afterwards.  
Out of 221 samples, 173 firms are listed on either NYSE or AMEX (about 78% of 
the sample) and 48 firms on NASDAQ at the time they publicly announced spinoff. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
volume in usual sense. Therefore, to make sure of the comparability of the volume-based DO 
proxies across the sample, we choose only ordinary equities. 
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Table 1. Sample of Spinoffs from 1964 to 2005 
The table reports the number of spin-offs for the seven five-year sub-periods over the entire sample period from 1971 
to 2005; the first sub-period spans seven years from 1964 to 1970. The initial sample of 255 firms is drawn from CRSP 
distribution file for the period from 1991 to 2005, and only non-taxable (distribution code of 3763) spin-offs are 
selected. The sample elimination criteria are applied to the initial sample (See Section 5.A). After applying the criteria, 
we have 120 parent companies. Combining with Vijh (1994)'s sample of 101 parents†, which covers the period from 
1964 to 1990, the size of the sample becomes 221. The announcement dates and the details of spin-offs are identified 
by searching relevant news reports in Dow Jones News Wire and Lexis and Nexis database. Exchange listings for the 
parents are by the spinoff announcement dates and for the subsidiaries by the ex-dates. We classify a parent firm as a 
focus-increasing spinoff if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of the spun-off. Otherwise, we classify 
it as a non-focus-increasing spinoff. 
Time period Announcement NYSE/AMEX NASDAQ Change in Focus 







1964 - 1970 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 1 0% 
1971 - 1975 7 (7) 5 (6) 2 (1) 6 1 86% 
1976 - 1980 17 (17) 10 (8) 7 (9) 14 3 82% 
1981 - 1985 30 (35) 20 (18) 10 (17) 23 7 77% 
1986 - 1990 53 (56) 45 (29) 8 (27) 36 17 64% 
1991 - 1995 30 (32) 26 (16) 4 (16) 24 6 78% 
1996 - 2000 39 (43) 33 (31) 6 (12) 27 12 67% 
2001 - 2005 44 (47) 33 (29) 11 (18) 19 25 43% 
Total   221 238 173 138 48 100 149 72 67% 
†Among the sample firms in Vijh (1994), the subsidiaries of nine parent firms have their first trading dates preceding 
the spinoff announcement dates. This suggests that those spinoffs are either a distribution of a publicly traded firm 
owned by a parent or a distribution of the carved-out shares. Since they fall into the sample elimination criteria, we 
discard those firms. In addition, three more firms are removed because they were either merged or acquired prior to the 
ex-dates.  
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Table 1 also presents the numbers of subsidiaries separated from their parents. While 205 
firms spun off one single subsidiary, 15 firms created two subsidiaries, and one spun off 
three subsidiaries, making the total number of the subsidiaries to 238. As can be observed 
in the Table 1, more subsidiaries are listed on NASDAQ than either NYSE or AMEX.  
In the last column, we report the percentages of the parents that engage in focus-
increasing spinoffs. It is well known in the spinoff literature that a firm experiences a 
positive price response upon the announcement of spinoff when the firm separates a 
subsidiary that is unrelated to the main business of the parent. Daley et al. (1997) initially 
document significantly larger announcement abnormal returns  
for focus-increasing firms than for non-focus-increasing firms. Desai and Jain (1999) 
further investigate the effect of focus-increasing spinoffs on long-term stock performance 
as well as operating performance. They find that focus-increasing spinoffs have 
significantly higher long-run abnormal stock returns and improvements in operating 
performance than non-focus increasing spinoffs. Following Desai and Jain (1999), we 
define a focus-increasing spinoff as a firm that creates a subsidiary whose two-digit 
primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the parent. 
Otherwise, we classify a firm as a non-focus-increasing spinoff.14  In all sub-periods 
except the last, a majority of the sample is a focus-increasing or cross-industry spinoff. 
The preponderance of focus-increasing spinoffs in the sample suggests that refocusing 
strategy is one of primary motivations behind spinoff decision, and thus investors 
respond to this type of corporate re-structuring positively as documented in the literature. 
                                                            
14 Desai and Jain (1999) define two alternative measures of “industrial focus”; a change 
in the Herfindahl index calculated using sales, and the change in the number of segments from the 
year before the announcement to the year of the completion of the spinoff. They report that about 
90% of their samples are insensitive to the definition of focus used.   
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C. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample. To draw a broad picture of the sample 
characteristics, in Table 2 we present the descriptive statistics for the market 
capitalizations (i.e., firm size) of the sample. For a (parent) firm, the pre-spinoff size is 
the product of its price and shares outstanding by the end of the month prior to the month 
of the spin-off announcement (henceforth month-1). Likewise, the post-spinoff size of the 
parent and its subsidiary is measured as of the end of the month of the ex-dates 
(henceforth ex-date month). Because the sample period spans 41 years, the usual sense of 
firm size in terms of raw dollar value might be misleading. For this reason, in each year 
we assign a sample firm—based on its size by the end of the year prior to the spinoff 
announcement year—to one of the size deciles. The size deciles are formed based on 
market capitalizations of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms in CRSP by the same year 
end.  
In terms of the size deciles, only about 9 % of the sample is included between the 
second and the fifth decile, while the rest (91 %) are all clustered in the sixth and the  
tenth decile. Moreover, 54 % of the sample belongs to the largest size decile, showing 
extreme skewness in the distribution of firm sizes. In Table 2, therefore we segment the 
sample firms into the two size categories: Group-large for firms in the tenth decile and 
Group-small in the remaining deciles (i.e., decile nine to two) respectively. We also 
deflate sizes with the GDP deflator, setting year 2005 as a base year. 
Before spinoffs, for Group-large the mean of firm sizes (pre-spinoff sizes) is 
$12.8 billion and the median is $4.3 billion, suggesting that even in the largest decile 
there is an extreme positive skewness in the distribution.  The mean of pre-spinoff sizes 
in the remaining deciles is $496 million, which is only 3.9 % of that of Group-large. By 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S 
firms from 1964 to 2005.The market capitalization of a parent firm is computed as 
follows: (1) by the end of the month prior to the month of the spinoff announcement (i.e., 
the pre-spinoff parent size) and (2) by the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs 
(i.e., the post-spinoff parent size); the market capitalization of the subsidiary is calculated 
as in (2).  A sample firm based on its market capitalization by the end of the year prior to 
its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles constructed with the same 
year-end market capitalizations of the universe of NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms. The 
parent firms are further classified either as Group-large to which the firms assigned to 
decile 10 belong or as Group-small to which the firms assigned to decile 2 to 9 belong. 
The combined market value is the sum of the post-spinoff parent size and the subsidiary's 
size. Relative size-pre is the ratio of the market capitalization of a subsidiary to the pre-
spinoff parent size. Relative size-post is the ratio of the market capitalization of a 
subsidiary to the combined market value.     
  Obs Mean Median Min Max Std
Panel 1: Mkt. capitalization by the end of the month  prior to the spinoff-
announcement (in millions 2005 dollars) 
Group-large (decile 10)† 105 12,813 4,308 401 148,517 23,187
Group-small (decile 2-9) 115 496 240 10 6,792 786
Panel 2: Mkt. capitalization by the end of the month of the ex-date (in millions 
2005 dollars)‡ 
Group-large† 
Parents 105 11,979 3,762 154 120,750 22,413
Subsidiaries 1,780 671 43 14,581 2,653
Combined  13,759 4,897
Group-small 
Parents 115 371 155 2 3,161 517
Subsidiaries 211 85 2 1,953 357
Combined    582 274      
Panel 3: Relative-size ratios 
Relative size-pre 
Group-large 106 0.250 0.124 0.004 3.041 0.388
Group-small 115 0.500 0.371 0.020 2.560 0.452
Relative size-post 
Group-large 106 0.207 0.117 0.005 0.962 0.231
Group-small 115 0.375 0.324 0.021 0.907 0.257
†The market value of Lucent Technology deceased by $122 billion from month-1 to ex-
date month (as a combined firm). Thus, including it makes the change in the mean of the 
market value of Group large -$217 million. Because of the undue influence of Lucent 
Technology’s loss in market value, Lucent Technology is excluded in calculation of the 
statistics for Group-large in Panel 1 and 2.                                                                                                     
‡The subsidiaries of 16 parent firms did not begin to be traded by the end of the month of 
38 
the ex-date. In these cases, we use the market capitalizations by the ends of the months in 
which they started to be traded. 
   
ex-date month, the mean of the post-spinoff sizes of the parents in Group-large decline by 
about $834 million (approximately 6.5 %) from month-1, while that of the parents in 
Group-small decrease by $125 million (approximately 25.2 %). The larger percentage 
decline in the mean size of Group-small suggests that smaller firms tend to spin off a 
larger portion of their assets to their newly created subsidiaries than do larger ones. 
When comparing the mean of the pre-spinoff sizes of the parents with that of the 
post-spinoff sizes as combined firms (i.e., the sum of the market capitalization of the 
parents and their subsidiaries by ex-date months), the market values of the sample firms 
in Group-large and Group-small increase on average by $946 million and $86 million, 
respectively, from month-1 to ex-date month.  Though the average dollar value gain in 
market value for Group-large from month-1 to ex-date month is about 11 times greater 
than that of Group-small, the percentage gain (i.e., the change in the average market 
value from month-1 to ex-date month divided by the average market value of the sample 
as of month -1) of Group-small (about 17.3 %) is more than two times larger than that of 
Group-large (about 7.4 %).  Hence, this observation seems to suggest the role of firm size 
in market value gain. That is, smaller firms tend to spin off larger portions of assets, and 
experience much greater proportional increases in their market value from month-1 to ex-
date month. 
However, given the extremely skewed distribution of the firm sizes of the sample 
and the 41-year study period, the inferences drawn based on the market values of the 
sample firms might be tenuous because of the undue influence of extreme observations 
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and exogenous factors affecting the U.S stock market in general over the entire study 
period. To mitigate these concerns, instead of firm size we employ the relative size of a 
subsidiary defined as the ratio of the size of a subsidiary to the size of its parent. The 
literature on corporate spinoffs documents that abnormal returns around spinoff 
announcements are positively associated with the relative sizes of subsidiaries (e.g., Hite 
& Owers, 1983; Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999; Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983). 
Therefore, because of the importance of the effect of the relative size on the 
announcement returns, we consider it worthwhile to analyze it, particularly in the context 
of the firm size group (i.e., Group-large and Group small). Following Subramaniam and 
Krishnaswami (1999), we define the relative size of a subsidiary as the ratio of the market 
capitalization of the subsidiary at its ex-date month to either the market capitalization of 
its parent at month-1 (Relative size-pre) or to the combined market value of the parent 
and the subsidiary at the ex-date month (Relative size-post). 
In Panel 3, we present the distribution of the relative sizes of the subsidiaries for 
both size groups. In terms of Relative size-pre, the firms in Group-large spin off on 
average 25 % of their assets, while those in Group-small split 50%. Alternatively, when 
the relative size is measured with the value of the combined firm by the end of ex-date 
month (i.e., Relative size-post) the ratios of both groups decline to 20.7% for Group-large 
and 37.5% for Group-small. But regardless how the relative size is measured, the 
evidence suggests first that small firms spin off a larger percentage of their assets. We 
also note that Relative size-pre and Relative size-post differ only in the denominator in 
both ratios (i.e., pre-spinoff firm value versus post-spinoff combined firm value). If 
Relative size-pre is larger than Relative size-post, it indicates an increase in the 
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shareholder value of a parent firm from month-1 to ex-date month. As can be seen in 
Panel 3, the difference between Relative size-pre and Relative size-post (= 50% minus 
37.5%) for Group-small is much larger that for Group-large (= 25% minus 20.7%). In 
other words, the mean positive gain in firm value from month-1 and to ex-date month (as 
a combined firm) is far greater for firms in Group-small. Thus, in addition to the fact that 
smaller sample firms tend to spinoff a larger percentage of their assets as we discussed 
above, we conclude that the difference in the market value gain between Group-small and 
Group-large from month -1 to ex-date month strongly hints at the potentially significant 
effect of firm size on firm value. 
D. Value Gain and Firm Size effect. We explore further the relationship between 
the pre-spinoff firm sizes and the value gains of the sample firms in the cross-section of 
the sample. Note that in the previous section we roughly inferred the relationship by 
comparing averages of two size groups.  For a sample firm, we compute the value gain as 
a change in the market value (in dollar) of a sample firm from month -1 to ex-date month. 
In addition, the percentage value gain is measured by dividing the change in the market 
value by the pre-spinoff parent’s market capitalization. It is analogous to a buy-and-hold 
return earned by an investor who purchases the stock at the end of month -1, receives the 
share of the subsidiary at the payment date, and holds the share of the parent and its 
subsidiary until the end of the ex-date month.  
In Table 3, we present the mean of the market value gain in dollar and in 
percentage for Group-large and Group–small. While the market value gain in Group- 
large is as much as 12 times larger than that in Group-small, the percentage gain of 
Group-small is more than 1.8 times larger than that of Group-large. Given that the  
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Table 3. Value Gain and Firm Size 
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S 
firms from 1964 to 2005. The market value gain in dollars is measured by subtracting the 
pre-spinoff parent’s market capitalization from that of the combined firm. The percentage 
gain is computed by dividing the market value gain by the pre-spinoff parent market 
capitalization. The pre-spinoff market capitalization is the product of the share 
outstanding and the closing share price of a sample firm by the end of the month prior to 
the spinoff announcement month (i.e., month-1). The combined market value is the sum 
of the market capitalization of the parent and its subsidiary, which are measure by the end 
of the month of completion of the spinoff (i.e., ex-date month).The Spearman correlations 
in Panel A are calculated by the simple correlation between the pre-spinoff sizes and the 
percentage gains. A market model for daily returns is estimated over the pre-event period, 
(AD-260, AD-11), to compute abnormal returns in the three-day event period, (AD-1, 
AD+1) where AD is the announcement date. In Panel B, the Spearman correlations are 
between the pre-spinoff parent sizes and relative size-pre, and relative size-post. Relative 
size-pre is the ratio of the market capitalization of a subsidiary by the ex-date month to 
the market capitalization of the parent as of month-1. Relative size-post is the ratio of the 
market capitalization of a subsidiary by the ex-date month to the market capitalization of 
the combined firm (i.e., the parent's size plus its subsidiary's size) by the ex-date month. 
The statistical significance of the difference in the means and in the median is estimated 
using the parametric t-test and the nonparametirc Wilcoxon rank-sum test respectively. 
For the t-test, we assume unequal group variance. a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 
10% level, respectively. 
Panel 1. Market value gain (from month -1 to the ex-date month) and 3-day CAR 
Market Value Gain 
$ (in million)† Percent 
  Obs‡ Corr Mean Median Mean Median Positive
Group-large (decile 10) 105 980 352 14.22 7.98 59
Group-small (decile 2-9) 113 81 25 25.19 14.73 71
Difference: Group-small - Group-large 10.97 6.75b 
All samples   -0.17a 512 52 19.91 10.52  
Panel 2. Spearman rank correlation (Pre-spinoff parent size, Relative 
size) 
Pre 
Group-large  -0.28a 
Group-small -0.16c 
All samples         -0.45a     
Panel 3. Spearman rank correlation   (Market value gain in %, Relative size)  
Pre Post 
Group-large 0.14 -0.10 
Group-small  0.50a 0.14 
All samples       0.37a   0.09   
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Table 3. Value Gain and Firm Size, Continued 




  Obs‡ Corr Mean Median Positive
Group-large 105 2.46 2.12 68
Group-small 113 4.19 3.43 70
Difference: Group-small - Group-large 1.73c 1.31c 
All samples   -0.13b 3.36 2.57   




All samples    -0.42a     
Panel 3. Spearman rank correlation   (3-day CAR, Relative size)  
Pre Post 
Group-large 0.30a 0.22b 
Group-small 0.17c 0.10 
All samples    0.26a   0.18a 
† Including Lucent Technology in Group-large, the mean market value gain is -$194, 
which severely distorts the distribution. Hence, we report the mean and median of the 
market value gains in dollar by excluding Lucent Technology.                                                                     
‡ Three parent firms have insufficient data (less than 60 trading days) in estimation of the 
parameters of the market model for daily returns. These firms are dropped from the 
sample, which decreases the sample size from 221 to 218. 
 
percentage gain is more relevant as a measure of the wealth increase for shareholders, we 
test for the differences in the mean and in the median of the percentage gains between the 
two size groups and find that while the difference in the mean is not significant, that in 
the median is significant at the 5% level. 
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Since we segment the samples roughly into two size groups, we test whether the 
effect of firm size on the percentage value gain holds across the sample firms. As can be 
seen in Panel 1 in Table 3, across all the sample firms the Spearman correlation is -0.17   
and significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that the pre-spinoff parent size is 
significantly inversely related to the market value gain from month-1 to ex-date month. 
However, as it takes on average 261 and 245 calendar days for Group large and Group-
small from month-1 to ex-date month, the negative correlation between the market value 
gain and the pre-spinoff firm size might reflect notably small-firm premium among other 
confounding factors. But, the calculation of the Spearman correlation between the market 
value gain and the pre-spinoff firm size in each size group shows that only Group-large 
has a significant correlation equal to -0.20 at the 5% level, while no correlation exists for 
Group-small. It appears that the inverse relationship between the value gain and the pre-
spinoff firm size arises not because of general outperformance of small firms but because 
of the pre-spinoff firm size itself. Therefore, for the sample of spinoffs, the size of a firm 
is an important factor that affects the shareholder’s wealth at least for a period from 
month-1 to ex-date month. 
An interesting pattern which we discussed in the previous section (Panel 3 in 
Table 2) is a negative relationship between the sizes of the parents and the subsidiaries. 
Either in Relative size-pre or Relative size-post, the ratio was always higher for firms in 
Group-small. Simply put, small firms are more likely to break up a larger fraction of their 
assets than do large ones.  To examine whether this observation holds across the sample 
firms, especially for firms in Group-large, we compute the Spearman correlation between 
the pre-spinoff parent firm sizes and the relative size measures. In Panel 2 of Table 3, we 
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report the Spearman correlations for both size groups and the whole sample. Regardless 
of the measurements of Relative size, the correlations are significant at the 1% and the 10% 
level for Group-large and Group-small, respectively. For the whole sample, the 
correlation is highly negative and equals to -0.45 for Relative size-pre and -0.42 for 
Relative size-post. Thus, we confirm an inverse relationship between a parent firm’s size 
and the size of its spun-off subsidiary. 
Notice the fact, that the pre-spinoff sizes of the parent firms are negatively related 
not only with the market value gains but also with their subsidiaries’ sizes, implies a 
positive correlation between the value gains and the relative sizes of the subsidiaries. As 
can be seen in Panel 3, the percentage value gains are strongly associated with Relative 
size-pre (correlation = 0.37), though for Relative size-post the correlation is not 
significant, albeit it is found in the correct directional sign. As we discussed, the literature 
on corporate spinoff documents a positive relationship between the relative size of 
subsidiary and the announcement abnormal returns, which is often referred to as the 
wealth gain. In the same panel, we also report the correlation between the three-day CAR 
and the subsidiaries’ relative sizes (see Section 10 for the details on the measurement of 
abnormal returns). Consistent with the literature, we find that, regardless of the measure 
of relative size of a subsidiary, a strong positive correlation exists between the 
announcement abnormal returns and the relative sizes. Thus, the proportion of the assets 
that a parent firm decides to spin off have a positive effect on the announcement 
abnormal returns as well as the market value gain. 
Consequently, we argue that there exists a connection between the pre-spinoff 
size of the parent firms and the announcement abnormal returns given our finding that the 
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smaller the size of a parent firm, the larger is the size of its subsidiary. In Panel 1 of 
Table 3, we present the means and the medians of the three-day CAR for both size groups, 
and test for the differences in CAR between two size groups. On average, the firms in 
Group-small earns on average 1.73% more than those in Group-large in three days 
surrounding the announcement of spinoff. The difference in the mean is significant at the 
10% level. This inference is not influenced by outliers as the nonparametric test of the 
difference in the median also shows the same result. In addition, across the sample, the 
negative relation between CAR and the pre-spinoff firm size holds with the correlation of 
-0.13, which is significant at the 5% level. 
Therefore, we infer from Table 3 that the effect of the relative size of a subsidiary 
on the positive abnormal returns in the announcement period as well as on the value gain 
from year-1 to ex-date month originates from the same source; namely the pre-spinoff 
size of the parent firms. In other words, the positive correlation of the relative sizes with 
the announcement abnormal returns as well as with the value gain could in fact be the 
firm-size effect. 
Market Characteristics of the Sample Firms 
As we discussed in Section 4.C, daily trading volume is used as a basic ingredient 
from which daily volume-based measures of difference of opinion (VDOs) are estimated. 
Therefore, we first investigate the characteristics of daily trading volumes along with 
other relevant market characteristics of the sample firms prior to spinoff announcements. 
For each sample firm, we obtain daily data on return, price, number of shares traded, and 
the number of shares outstanding from the CRSP. While trading volume is the number of 
shares traded on a particular day, volume turnover is the ratio of the trading volume to the  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Sample Firms' Stock Market Characteristics 
This table presents the summary statistics of firm characteristics of the sample of spinoffs. 
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S 
firms from 1964 to 2005. To be included in the table, a sample firm must have at least 80% 
of daily data for the pre-event period, which is a 250-trading-day period ending 10 days 
before the announcement of a spinoff. On day t for a sample stock, daily trading volume 
is the number of shares traded, volume turnover is the ratio of daily trading volume to the 
number of the shares outstanding, and log turnover is the natural logarithm of volume 
turnover. The reported figures are the cross-sectional means of the summary statistics 
(mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) for the pre-event period. The samples 
are sorted into four size groups. Group 1, which is the smallest, consists of firms with 
size decile 1 to 6, Group 2 with size decile 7 to 8, Group 3 with size decile 9, and Group 
4 with size decile 10. A sample firm based on its market capitalization by the end of the 
year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles constructed 
with the same year-end market capitalizations of the universe of 
NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms.     
Size Group Obs† Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
Trading volume (in 1,000) 
1 23               35               48 4.43 32.62
2 37               79               79 4.51 35.35
3 41             167             158 4.23 31.30
4 105          1,295             850 3.58 25.84
All samples 206             712             484 3.97 29.39
Raw turnover (%) 
1 23 0.26 0.38 4.49 33.13
2 37 0.30 0.31 4.54 35.73
3 41 0.33 0.39 4.30 32.15
4 105 0.38 0.31 3.58 25.93
All samples 206 0.34 0.33 4.00 29.73
Log turnover 
1 23 -6.97 1.34 -0.60 1.77
2 37 -6.68 0.99 -0.25 1.11
3 41 -6.43 0.89 0.03 0.50
4 105 -6.03 0.60 0.28 0.90






Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Sample Firms' Stock Market Characteristics, 
Continued 
Size Group Obs† Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
 
Return (%) 
1 23 0.17 3.22 0.41 5.08
2 37 0.01 3.09 0.34 5.46
3 41 0.03 2.60 0.12 5.05
4 105 0.04 2.15 0.09 4.71
All samples 206 0.05 2.53 0.18 4.95
Price 
1 23 10.54 6.90 -1.60 9.50
2 37 16.85 4.23 -1.09 12.90
3 41 23.04 5.22 -0.84 10.78
4 105 40.03 5.22 0.21 -0.33
All samples 206 29.19 5.23 -0.44 5.36
†To be included in the table, a sample firm must have at least 80% of daily data during 
the pre-event period. The size of the sample decreases to 206 from the sample size of 218 
in Table 3. The exclusion of 12 samples is due to non-availability of daily trading volume 
data for NASDAQ samples prior to Nov 1, 1982. 
 
number of the shares outstanding on that day.  We further transform volume turnover by 
taking the natural logarithm of the volume turnover to get log turnover.  
The literature on trading volume tends to study exclusively NYSE/AMEX stocks, 
and suggests a separate investigation between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks.15  In 
our study we include NASDAQ firms by adjusting the overstatement of trading volumes 
on NSADAQ firms. Following Anderson and Dyl (2005), we scale down raw turnover of 
NASDAQ sample firms by 38% after 1997 and by 50% before 1997. Though this 
                                                            
15 Because our samples include firms listed on NYSE/AMEX (173) and NASDAQ (48), 
trading volumes are not comparable across the sample firms. It is primarily due to different 
market structure of these exchanges. Specifically, NASDAQ is a dealer’s market in which a 
dealer is one side of every transaction, therefore a transaction being double counted. In contrast, 
NYSE and AMEX are auction markets in which a majority of transactions are between actual 
buyers and sellers 
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procedure would make NASDAQ firms’ turnovers roughly comparable with those on 
NYSE, it is admittedly a very rough approximation. 
In Table 4, we present the summary statistics of various daily trading activity 
measures (trading volume, volume turnover, and log turnover) and of other firm 
characteristics (return and price) during the pre-event period. The sample firms are 
sorted into the four size groups based on the size decile assigned to each sample firm. 
Group 1, which is the smallest, consists of firms with size decile 1 to 6, Group 2 with size 
decile 7 to 8, Group 3 with size decile 9, and Group 4 with size decile 10. 
Consistent with the previous studies on trading volume (e.g., Llorente, Michaely, 
Saar, & Wang, 2002; Lo & Wang 2000), trading volume and volume turnover increase 
with firm size as does the prices of the sample firms despite the small sample size of our 
study. As can be seen in Table 4, across the sample, trading volume is far more variable 
than volume turnover. While the mean trading volume of Group 4 is approximately 36 
times higher than that of Group 1, it is 1.4 times for volume turnovers. 
Recall that volume turnover is a scaled version of trading volume. For a stock, 
while trading volume is a raw number of the shares traded, volume turnover is the ratio 
that measures the intensity of trading activity after taking account of all the shares of the 
stock available for trading. Even though both measures of trading activity are generally 
accepted to measure “trading activity,” the information content contained in them might 
be different as it is suggested by dissimilar distributional characteristics between trading 
volume and volume turnover across our sample firms. Furthermore, the distribution of 
daily trading volume and volume turnover are highly non-normal with positive 
skeweness and fat tails. In contrast, the distribution of log turnover approximates a 
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normal distribution with skewness and kurtosis close to zero in all size groups, though 
Group 1 and 2 exhibit modest leptokurticity. This suggests that in contrast to large firms, 
small firms tend to have extremely high as well as low level of trading activity in 
particular days during the pre-event period. 
A. Trend in trading volume. As our study covers a 41-year period, an important 
statistical issue in our analysis is whether the cross-sectional variation in volume-based 
measures of DO of the sample is stationary or non-stationary.16  For example, consider 
two hypothetical firms, which are similar in their characteristics, but different only in the 
calendar dates of their spinoff announcements. If there is a secular time trend in a volume 
turnover series, using it to examine its cross-sectional implications for temporal abnormal 
returns without controlling for the trend may lead to incorrect inferences. 
To examine a secular time trend in trading activity, we segment the study period into 
seven sub-periods, each of which spans a five-year period starting from 1971 and ending 
2005. Panel 1 of Table 5 shows the mean of daily trading volumes, turnovers, and log 
turnovers over the pre-event period for each of the sub-periods. In each of the three 
different measures of trading activity, there is a significant and clear upward trend, 
particularly for trading volume. While the average daily turnover is 0.08% in the first 
sub-period, it continues to rise over time, reaching 0.5% in the last sub-period. An 
                                                            
16 Lo and Wang (2000)’s study on trading volume of NYSE/AMEX common stocks for 
the period from 1962 to 1996 documents a upward time trend not only for the weekly log market 
turnover but also log turnovers in individual stock levels, albeit weak upward time trend. (See 
Figure 1 and Figure 3 in their paper). Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) whose sample 
period from 1993 to 2008, roughly following Lo and Wang (2000)’s study period, show that 
increase in monthly trading volume turnover is not merely an artifact of indexation and firm size. 
Specifically, they demonstrate that both S&P 500 (large cap) stocks and non-S&P 500 (small cap) 
stocks experience a positive and significant (approximately two folds on average) increase in 
turnover from the first period 1993-2000 to the second period 2001-2008. 
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Table 5. Various Measures of Trading Activity of the Sample, 1971-2005 
This table presents the sub-period means of various measures of trading activity (trading 
volume, volume turnover, and log turnover) of the sample. The sample consists of 221 
spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S firms from 1964 to 2005. 
To be included in the table, a sample firm must have at least 80% of daily data during the 
pre-event period. On day t for a sample stock, daily trading volume is the number of 
shares traded, volume turnover is the ratio of daily trading volume to the number of the 
shares outstanding, and log turnover is the natural logarithm of volume turnover. Each 
sample firm is assigned to one of seven sub-period groups based on the year prior to its 
spinoff announcement year. In each sub-period, the reported figures are the cross-
sectional averages of the means of daily trading volumes, volume turnovers, and log 
turnovers over the pre-event period. A sample firm based on its market capitalization at 
the end of the year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles 
constructed with the same year-end market capitalizations of the entire 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms. 
Period Obs 







Panel 1. All samples 
1971 - 1975 6                   17 0.08 -7.56 9.8
1976 - 1980 9                   44 0.33 -6.45 8.9
1981 - 1985 26                   66 0.24 -6.73 8.5
1986 - 1990 52                 153 0.28 -6.51 8.9
1991 - 1995 30                 207 0.26 -6.44 8.8
1996 - 2000 38                 923 0.41 -6.07 8.9
2001 - 2005 44              2,161 0.50 -5.81 8.4
Panel 2. NYSE/AMEX only 
1971 - 1975 6                   17 0.08 -7.56 9.8
1976 - 1980 9                   44 0.33 -6.45 8.9
1981 - 1985 20                   73 0.27 -6.65 8.8
1986 - 1990 44                 161 0.29 -6.48 9.1
1991 - 1995 26                 229 0.27 -6.41 9.0
1996 - 2000 32              1,014 0.35 -6.13 9.2
2001 - 2005 33              2,388 0.46 -5.77 8.8
 
increase of volume turnover in this magnitude over the study period cannot be simply 
attributed to the differential composition of the sample firms in each sub-period. Note 
that the average firm sizes, which are calculated with the size deciles of the sample firms, 
are comparable across the sub-periods, indicating the effect of firm size on turnover is 
insignificant. 
51 
In Panel 2, we present the same statistics as in Panel 1, but for NYSE/AMEX 
sample firms only. Though the number of NASDAQ firms in every sub-period is small 
relative to that of NYSE/AMEX, an overstatement of trading volume is apparent even 
after applying the adjustment factors to volume turnovers of NASDAQ firms. Particularly, 
the mean daily turnover for all sample firms is 0.41% in the sixth and 0.50% in the last 
sub-periods. However, for the NYSE/AMEX samples the mean daily turnover decreases 
to 0.35% and 0.46%. In the analyses to follow, if there is a case in which the volume 
overstatement of the NASDAQ sample firms becomes an issue as to have a material 
effect on inferences for the whole sample, we report a result for the entire sample firms, 
and NYSE/AMEX and NADSDAQ sample firms separately. 
Throughout our study, we use detrended time-series of daily log turnovers to 
measure an additional volume-based proxy for DO. During the pre-event period, daily log 
turnovers are detrended with a 200-trading-day moving average. Specifically, for a day t 
the detrended log turnover is  
,  ,  ∑ ,                                           (9) 
 
We simply use a 200-trading-day moving average to remove a trend in log turnover.17  
 
                                                            
17 Our choice of a moving average follows the detrending method of Llorente et al. 
(2002). In their study of the dynamic volume-return relation, they detrend daily log turnovers of 
individual NYSE/AMEX stocks with a 200-trading-day moving average for the sample period of 
1993-1998. Of course, because our samples are distributed over a 41-year period detrending 
uniformly by a moving average might not be appropriate. However, Lo and Wang (2000) 
document that the time-series properties of detrended turnovers are substantially different 
depending on the method used, and find that imposing structural models for detrending volume 
turnover does not render satisfactory results. Therefore, we hold on to a simple detrending 
procedure of using a 200-trading-day moving average. 
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Summary Statistics of VDOs 
As discussed in the methodology section, for each day in the pre-event period we 
estimate five VDOs (LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV). Though the VDOs are 
dynamic, changing daily, our purpose is to extrapolate the degree of divergence of 
investors’ opinion about the value of a sample firm on a typical trading day in the pre-
event period or . To do so, we proposed the mean of daily VDO estimates in the 
pre-event period as the proxy for the ex-ante level of DO. 
The cross sectional means of the summary statistics for daily VDOs estimates are 
presented in Table 6. As in Table 4, we again form the four size groups based on the size 
decile of each sample firm. The skewness and kurtosis indicate that all daily VDO 
estimates of each size group appear to approach a normal distribution. Given the 
approximate normality of the empirical distributions of VDOs, we can meaningfully 
measure the ex-ante level of DO for a sample firm from daily estimates of these VDOs as 
the ex-ante level of DO reflects the average (normal) degree of disagreement about a 
sample firm in an ordinary trading day. Therefore, the ex-ante level of DO can be 
considered as a firm-specific characteristic prior to the announcement of a spinoff. 
Nevertheless, on surface,   can be seen as the mean level of extra portion 
of daily trading volumes, hence one may argue that it indicates market liquidity. In 
finance literature, a high level of trading volume is generally associated with market 
liquidity of a stock, and is often used as a proxy for market liquidity. In Table 6, the mean 
of log turnover is increasing in firm size group. As firm size is also widely used by 
researchers as a liquidity proxy, a positive relationship between log turnover and firm 
size seems to indicate that these two variables are proxies for liquidity. However, 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Five Daily VDOs during the Pre-Event Period 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of daily estimates of the five VDOs (Volume-
based Differences of Opinion measures) during the pre-event period for the sample of 
spinoffs during 1964-2005. To be included in the table, a sample firm is required to have 
80% of daily VDO estimates in the pre-event period. On day t in the pre-event period, 
five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log 
Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is 
the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on 
that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over 
the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the 
market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is 
further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from 
a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over the control period. 
A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX 
firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model 
of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms 
of the model. The model takes daily absolute return (separately depending on the sign of 
daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the control period. The 
samples are grouped into four size groups. Group 1, which is the smallest, consists of 
firms with size decile 1 to 6, Group 2 with size decile 7 to 8, Group 3 with size decile 9, 
and Group 4 with size decile 10. A sample firm based on its market capitalization by the 
end of the year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles 
constructed with the same year-end market capitalizations of the universe of 
NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms. A reported figure is the cross-sectional mean of a 
statistic in a size group. 
Size Group Obs LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV
Mean 
1 21 -6.996 -0.025 -0.042 -0.039 -0.031
2 36 -6.682 0.008 -0.008 0.000 -0.022
3 41 -6.434 -0.044 -0.054 -0.052 -0.039
4 104 -6.027 0.027 0.006 0.008 0.031
Standard Deviation 
1 21 1.388 1.402 1.386 1.392 1.019
2 36 0.989 0.999 0.978 0.983 1.015
3 41 0.890 0.898 0.875 0.873 1.032
4 104 0.596 0.599 0.557 0.557 1.042
Minimum 
1 21 -11.346 -4.466 -4.516 -4.553 -3.605
2 36 -10.028 -3.397 -3.281 -3.343 -3.683
3 41 -9.153 -2.771 -2.627 -2.642 -3.251
4 104 -7.741 -1.671 -1.359 -1.370 -3.133
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Five Daily VDOs during the Pre-Event Period, Continued 
Size Group Obs LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV
 
Maximum 
1 21 -3.647 3.419 3.427 3.538 2.703
2 36 -3.897 2.802 2.790 2.792 2.969
3 41 -3.716 2.695 2.686 2.686 3.139
4 104 -3.979 2.079 2.052 2.050 3.573
Skewness 
1 21 -0.541 -0.435 -0.388 -0.369 -0.521
2 36 -0.253 -0.245 -0.192 -0.191 -0.290
3 41 0.034 0.054 0.139 0.132 -0.004
4 104 0.281 0.308 0.553 0.543 0.200
Kurtosis 
1 21 1.556 1.318 1.336 1.285 1.437
2 36 1.099 1.076 0.963 1.013 1.345
3 41 0.502 0.527 0.549 0.585 0.554
4 104 0.913 0.908 1.155 1.159 0.950
 
no such relationship is observed between all the other VDO estimates and firm size 
groups in our analysis. In those measures, there is no such pattern suggesting that they 
reflect liquidity. 
Finally, we check whether a secular time trend identified in log turnover exist in 
the other VDO estimates as well. If trading shares has become easier and cheaper over 
the sample period, it might as well influence trading activity driven by divergence of 
investors’ opinion. If investors were able to express their valuation of a firm by trading 
shares (i.e., more frequent changing hands between optimists and pessimists) because of 
improving trading conditions, we would observe an uptrend in a VDO as well. In Table7, 
we again assign a sample firm to one of the seven sub-period groups as in Table 4. 
Compared log turnover, which is shown to have a secular trend, the other VDO estimates  
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Table 7. Ex-Ante Levels of DO of the Sample 
This table presents the sub-period means of the ex-ante levels of DO calculated with five 
VDO (Volume-based Differences of Opinion measures) estimates during the pre-event 
period. To be included in the table, a sample firm is required to have 80% of daily 
estimates of a VDO in the pre-event period. The sample firms grouped into one of the 
seven 5-year sub-periods based on the year end prior to the announcement year. On day t 
in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period 
prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. 
Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of 
shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily 
trading volume over the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first 
subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover 
(MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD 
is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over 
the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers 
of NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a 
two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation 
of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily absolute return (separately 
depending on the sign of daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the 
control period. The ex-ante level of differences of opinion is calculated as follows: 
_ ∑ ,  for VDO = LNTOi,t, Detrendi,t, UVi,t, RESDi,t, and SUVi,t and 
t is the announcement date, For Size decile, a sample firm based on its market 
capitalization by the end of the year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to 
one of the deciles constructed with the same year-end market capitalizations of the 
universe of NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms.  
Period Obs        SIZE
1971 - 1975 6 -7.561 -0.018 -0.049 -0.028 -0.051 9.83
1976 - 1980 9 -6.445 0.140 0.068 0.032 0.156 8.89
1981 - 1985 24 -6.739 0.011 -0.022 -0.025 0.026 8.83
1986 - 1990 52 -6.511 0.019 0.034 0.039 0.011 8.87
1991 - 1995 30 -6.443 -0.036 -0.040 -0.035 -0.035 8.83
1996 - 2000 37 -6.070 0.027 -0.018 -0.009 -0.002 8.92
2001 - 2005 43 -5.796 -0.035 -0.057 -0.053 -0.017 8.44
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do not follow a similar upward trend in log turnover. This evidence suggest that a secular 
trend in daily log turnover is not a serious concern for the ex-ante level of DO estimated 
with the other VDOs in the cross-section of the sample. 
56 
In sum, we find the evidence that VDOs have a stable empirical distribution, 
which in turn allows us to measure the ex-ante level of DO appropriately. The 
preliminary evidence suggests that the ex-ante level of DO is not related to liquidity and 
void of a secular trend observed for log turnover. In next two sections, therefore we 
attempt to establish the more robust empirical relevance of the volume-based measures of 
differences of opinion first by comparing with widely-used liquidity proxies and second 
by relating to extant disagreement proxies.  
Ex-Ante Disagreement Proxies versus Liquidity Proxies 
In the next two sections, we examine further on the relationship between 
and other popular liquidity proxies as well as the relation between  and 
the extant proxies for DO. We will attempt to establish as a proxy for DO rather 
than for liquidity. 
In the literature, there are two views on the role of trading volume on stock 
returns. One view is the liquidity premium hypothesis, which states that trading volume 
contains information about a firm’s market liquidity. Therefore, firms with high trading 
volume require lower expected return than firms with low trading volume. Brennan et al. 
(1998) investigate whether non-risk factors (size, book-to-market ratio, trading volume, 
price, dividend yield and lagged returns) have marginal explanatory power for stock 
returns for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ non-financial firms for the period 1966-1995. They 
find that dollar trading volume has a strong negative effect on excess returns (over the 
risk-free rate) as well as risk-adjusted returns. Their finding implies that trading volume 
(i.e., non-risk factor) provides incremental power to explain a part of expected returns 
that are not related to the Fama-French risk factors. Thus, their study renders a strong 
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support for trading volume as a proxy for market liquidity, validating the existence of 
liquidity premiums in stock returns. 
Datar et al.  (1998) implement a similar empirical study (a cross-sectional asset 
pricing test) to Brennan et al. (1998). A major difference between these two studies is a 
method for measuring trading activity. They use monthly volume turnover (the average of 
the previous three-month volume divided by shares outstanding)  while Brennan et al. 
(1998) use dollar trading volume (monthly trading volume times monthly stock price). 
Their finding is in accord with Brennan et al. (1998) that low turnover stocks tend to earn 
higher returns than high turnover stocks. 
While it seems that there are robust empirical evidences for the role of trading 
volume as an indicator of market liquidity and its effect on returns, Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) provide an alternative view on the role of trading volume on stock returns. 
Specifically, they link the joint effect of past trading volume and past return to future 
returns from momentum strategies.  With the sample firms drawn from NYSE/AMEX 
from 1965 to 1995, they sort them first based on their past j-month returns and then 
independently sort them based on the averages of daily volume turnover for the same 
period. Thus, they form the two-way sorted portfolios. They find that conditional on past 
returns, low-volume portfolios outperform high volume portfolios regardless of their 
ranks in the past j-month returns. While this result corroborates the liquidity premium 
hypothesis, they report that returns on a zero-investment portfolio (i.e., long in the winner 
and short in the loser) in a low volume portfolio are lower than those of a high volume 
portfolio. It means that the momentum premium is higher in supposedly more liquid 
(high volume) portfolios, even though according to the liquidity premium hypothesis 
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these liquid firms (i.e., firms with high trading volume) should earn low expected returns. 
Investigating this puzzle further by implementing time-series regression based on the 
three factor Fama-French (1993), they find that the factor loadings on HML are positively 
higher for low volume portfolios than high volume portfolios regardless of their past 
performances. In other words, low volume stocks act like a value stock (i.e., high book-
to-market ratio) while high volume stocks behave like a glamour stock. Their finding 
sheds light on an alternative role of or information content of trading volume. That is, the 
level of trading activity is related to the pricing of a stock, not to market liquidity. 
Similar to Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Piqueria (2006) tests the role of trading 
volume for forecasting future returns using NYSE and NASDAQ samples for the period 
from 1993-2002.18  Controlling illiquidity in addition to size, book-to-market, and 
momentum, she shows that the coefficient of turnover is significant and strongly negative: 
one standard deviation increase in monthly turnover is translated to a decline in expected 
return of 0.34 % and 0.74 % for NYSE and NASDAQ firms, respectively. Her finding 
provides an empirical support for an alternative interpretation to liquidity premium 
regarding the role of trading turnover. That is, a firm with a higher level of volume 
turnover, or equivalently with a higher degree of disagreement about its value among 
investors, earns lower returns. She shows that lower future returns are forecasted not 
                                                            
18 She points to empirical evidences that bid-ask spread—when entered into a cross-
sectional asset-pricing regression—tends to have an insignificant or negative slope coefficient. To 
overcome the ineffectiveness of the bid-ask spread, she derives alternative illiquidity or price 
impact measures based on the theoretical model of Glosten and Harris (1988). Specifically, these 
measures are designed to capture a better estimate of the adverse selection component of a trade 
than the bid-ask spread. She documents that her illiquidity measures are positively related to 
percentage quoted and effective spread, yet they have greater variances (two times greater than) 
than the spread measures do, thereby being a better approximation of the difference in trading 
cost considered by investors. She further shows that volume turnover is not significantly 
correlated with these illiquidity cost measures.  
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because of better liquidity, but because of overpricing of stocks, which is captured by 
volume turnover.  
In summary, these studies indicate that trading volume is a multi-faceted variable 
and challenges a simplistic one-way interpretation. That is, it is used as a proxy for 
market liquidity of a stock. Therefore, it is important to not only specify what one does 
measure from trading volume but also establish the relevance of the measurement. To 
establish  as a proxy for investor disagreement rather than for liquidity, we 
compare   measured with five VDOs with other popular liquidity proxies. We 
estimate four liquidity proxies which are most frequently used in the literature: Daily 
dollar trading volume, the bid-ask spread, idiosyncratic volatility, and firm size. Except 
for firm size, we estimate the other three liquidity proxies over the pre-event period. 
For each day in the pre-event period, daily trading volume is multiplied by the 
closing price to get daily dollar trading volume. For bid-ask spreads, we employ the 
estimation method (i.e., high-low estimator of bid-ask spreads) recently developed by 
Corwin and Schultz (2011). Their estimator is based on the notion that daily high and low 
prices are most likely for buy and sell orders, respectively. Therefore, the ratio of the 
highest price to the lowest price of a day represents the fundamental volatility of a stock 
and its bid-ask spread. Assuming that the variance and the spread over two single trading 
days are constant, and that return are serially uncorrelated, the sum of each day’s high-
low price ratio over the two days should reflect twice of the daily variance and the spread, 
while the high-low price ratio over a single two-day period should reflect two days’ 
volatility and one-day spread. They subsequently derive a close form solution for the 
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spread. Hence, their estimator only requires daily high and low prices, which are readily 
available in CRSP for all of our sample firms to compute daily spread. 
In addition, we include idiosyncratic volatility of stock return as an additional 
proxy for liquidity. Over our 41-year study period, trading volume and the cost of trading 
have a strong time trend that is caused by regulatory changes and rapid technological 
developments. For the period from 1988 to 1998, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2001) document a steady decline in both quoted and effective bid-ask spreads, which 
 are accompanied by a concomitant upward trend in trading volume for NYSE stocks. 
These trends in bid-ask spread and trading volume continued after 1998 as Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam  (2011) document.19  Because a downward trend in the spread 
complicates a cross-sectional comparison of the sample firms’ spread estimates, we add 
idiosyncratic volatility of stock return to liquidity proxies. For the pre-event period, we 
estimate the market model of daily returns for a sample stock, and compute the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the regression. Finally, the sizes of the sample firms are 
the market capitalizations by the year end prior to the year in which the spin-off 
announcements are made. 
In Table 8, we present the Pearson correlations between the natural log of the 
liquidity proxies (dollar trading volume:  , firm size: SIZE, the idiosyncratic 
volatility: SIGMA, and Corwin and Schultz (2011)’s measure of the effective  
 
                                                            
19 They show that the value-weighted average monthly share turnover of NYSE stocks 
increases from about 5% in 1993 to about 26% in 2008, while, on average, the effective spread is 
about eight cents lower in 2001-2008 than in 1993-2000. Moreover, they stress that an upward 
trend in trading volume and downward trend in trading cost is a market-wide phenomenon, 
affecting all firms irrespective of their sizes. 
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Table 8. Pearson Correlations between Liquidity and Volume-based DO Proxies 
The table shows Pearson correlations between liquidity proxies:(DOLVOL, SIZE, SIGMA, 
and CSSPRD) and the proxies for the ex-ante level of DO estimated from five VDO 
(volume-based measure of differences of opinion (LNTO, Detrend, UW, RESD, and SUV) 
To be included in the table, a sample firm is required to have 80% of daily estimates of a 
VDO in the pre-event period.   is the mean of the products of daily trading 
volumes and the closing prices of a stock (DOLVOL).   is the mean of  daily bid-
ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by 
Corwin and Schultz (2011). SIGMA is the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
market model of daily stock returns estimated over the pre-event period. SIZE is the 
market capitalization of a sample firm by the year end prior to the spinoff announcement 
year. On day t during the pre-event period, each VDO is estimated, and averaged over the 
pre-event period to calculate the ex-ante level of differences of opinion ,  
, , ,   ). On day t in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as 
follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural 
logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the 
shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated 
by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. Unexplained 
Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives 
the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO 
over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily log 
turnover that is estimated over the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the 
value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume 
(SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further 
scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily 
absolute return (separately depending on the sign of daily return) as the independent 
variables is estimated over the control period. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-
trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement date. All correlations are 
calculated by taking the natural log of the liquidity proxies. The sample size is 207 for all 
the reported correlations.  
   SIZE SIGMA   
SIZE 0.91a 
SIGMA -0.34a -0.54a
 -0.05d -0.28a 0.79a
 0.67a 0.35a 0.18a 0.34a
 0.21a 0.14b 0.07b 0.09a 0.28a
 0.21a 0.14b 0.05a 0.07a 0.29a 0.96a 
 0.20a 0.13c 0.07a 0.09a 0.28a 0.94a 0.99a 
 0.21a 0.19a -0.02a 0.00a 0.22a 0.90a 0.85a 0.84a
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. 
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spread: ) and  (VDO =LNTO, Detrend, UW, RESD, and SUV) 
or , ,  , ,  . Recall that the ex-ante level of DO is the 
mean of daily VDO estimates measured over the pre-event period. 
As can be seen, all the liquidity proxies are highly correlated with expected signs. 
For example, SIGMA is positively significantly related to  (correlation = 0.79), 
while it is negatively associated with SIZE (correlation = -0.54) and  
(correlation = -0.34). Consistent with the stylized fact documented in the literature, the 
large sample firms are characterized by high trading volume, low spread, and low 
residual standard deviation of returns compared to small firms. Since we are interested in 
the information content of , we focus on the comparison of  and 
  in terms of their relationship with the other liquidity proxies. While the 
correlation between SIZE and   is 0.91, it declines to 0.35 for the correlation 
between SIZE and . Moreover, if one considers both   and  as a 
liquidity proxy, the relationship between  and SIGMA is the opposite of what one 
would expect (correlation = 0.18). As a liquidity proxy,  should be negatively 
correlated with SIGMA. On contrary,  has the expected negative sign on its 
correlation with SIGMA (correlation = -0.34). A similar inference can be made for 
 since  is negatively related with , albeit insignificantly, as a 
liquidity proxy. However, again  is significantly positively related with . 
Therefore, while  still has significant relationships with  and SIZE 
(correlation = 0.67 and 0.35),  the results in Table 8 indicate the information content of 
volume turnover, more specifically daily turnover, is not limited to or include more than 
liquidity. This finding is consistent with Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
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For , , ,  , they are all insignificantly related to the 
liquidity proxies except  and SIZE.  Yet, they are significantly related to  
and  at the 1 % level, which is expected, given that all these variables are 
essentially measured from daily trading volume. Therefore, our evidence in Table 8 
suggests that dollar trading volume is more closely associated with liquidity. But when it 
is scaled by the number of shares outstanding (i.e., ), it represents more than 
liquidity as does , , ,  . Furthermore, it renders support for our 
proposition that  does not merely capture liquidity, but it may mirror the level of 
DO among investors  
As we discuss in Section 4.B, one of the main predictions of dynamic DO models 
is a positive relation between return volatility and volume (e.g., Banerjee & Kremer, 
2010; Harris & Raviv, 1993; Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003). Consistent with this 
implication, we find that the correlation between  and SIGMA equals to 0.18, and is 
statistically significant at the 1 % level. This evidence supports DO models’ prediction if 
we regard   as a proxy for disagreement. In the case of , interestingly, the 
sign of the correlation with SIGMA reverses. As SIGMA is also widely used to measure 
information asymmetry in literature, then its negative correlation of -0.34 with   
shows its relevance as a measure of liquidity. These results point to two alternative 
interpretations or the duality of idiosyncratic volatility, which is revealed when it is 
related to   as a liquidity proxy and   as a disagreement proxy. Therefore, 
our results in Table 8 give us the confidence that the ex-ante levels of DO extrapolated 
from daily estimates of VDOs, especially , do not simply mirrors the market 
liquidity of the samples. 
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Ex-Ante Disagreement Proxies versus Extant Disagreement Proxies 
In this section, we attempt to establish empirical relevance of  as a proxy 
for investor disagreement by directly comparing them with the extant DO proxies 
developed in literature, namely the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts by Diether 
et al. (2002)  and breadth of ownership by Chen et al. (2002). 
The dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts for a given month is defined as the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates for a current fiscal 
year. Since this measure shows how diverse analysts’—market participants who are 
deemed to be an efficient information processor, yet not privately informed—predictions 
about a firm’s annual earnings, the more spread it is, the more obscure the firm’s 
information environment. Thus, it is intuitively appealing as a proxy for information 
asymmetry, and has been used widely by researchers.  In particular, Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) utilize the analysts’ forecasts of earnings in their analysis of the 
effect of information asymmetry on spinoff announcement returns. They show that, 
controlling for other known factors affecting the announcement returns, the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts is positively related to the abnormal returns of a sample of spinoffs 
from 1979 to 1993. 
However, Diether et al. (2002) suggest an alternative interpretation of the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. They posit that the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecast represents disagreement about the value of a stock rather than its level of 
information asymmetry and find that stocks with higher dispersion earn significantly 
lower future returns than stocks with lower dispersion. Their investigation is a direct test 
of Miller (1977)’s insight on the pricing of a stock. If the dispersions of analysts’ 
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forecasts on earnings reflect the level of DO among investors, a higher DO on the value 
of a stock (or the greater the slope of the demand curve of the stock) implies a greater 
upward bias in the market price relative to its true value, and hence its future return is 
expected to be lower. 
Thus, the information content of the analysts’ forecast dispersion seem open to 
dispute. Nonetheless, as our paper is closely related to Diether et al. (2002), we use it as a 
proxy for disagreement, and examine how it is related to the ex-ante level of DO. We 
utilize the Summary file from the Institutional Broker Estimate System (IBES). The 
Summary file is available in two versions, adjusted and unadjusted. Each version 
calculates monthly summary statistics (e.g. the mean and the standard deviation) of 
effective analyst forecasts on the earnings in a current fiscal year either from the adjusted 
or the unadjusted Detail file. The adjusted version uses analysts’ earnings forecasts by 
taking into account of the effect of stock splits, which IBES applies to smooth the time 
series of the forecasts. Since Diether et al. (2002) point out rounding errors in the 
adjusted Detail file—though they show that the summary statistics from both files closely 
match each other—we use the unadjusted Summary file to collect the means and the 
standard deviations of analysts’ earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts for a current fiscal 
year (IBES fiscal period=1) for a period of 12 months ending a month prior to the month 
of a spinoff announcement. Further, following Garfinkel (2009) we scale a standard 
deviation of forecasts in month m with the absolute value of the mean of forecasts 
(DISP1) in that month or with the average of a monthly stock price as of month m-1 and 
month m (DISP2). DISP1 can be excessively large when the mean of forecasts are close 
to zero. To mitigate this concern, we estimate DISP2 as well. In addition, we collect from 
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the Summary file the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on the long-term earnings growth 
(DISP3). According to IBES, it is defined as a three- to five-year forecast of the expected 
annual increase in operating earnings over a firm’s next full business cycle.  Moeller et al. 
(2007) propose this measure as a proxy for disagreement for testing the effect of diversity 
of opinion on abnormal returns around acquisition announcements.20  To be consistent 
with the method implemented for  , for each sample we calculate the 
mean of DISP1, DISP2 and DISP3 over the pre-spinoff period or 12 months prior to the 
month of a spinoff announcement.  
Finally, we add another proxy for DO, breadth of ownership. This measure is 
borne out of the theoretical and empirical work of Chen et al. (2002). Similar to Diether 
et al. (2002), the main focus for their work is based on Miller (1977) idea on investor 
disagreement and stock pricing. In search of more powerful proxy for investor 
disagreement, they demonstrate that breadth of ownership, which is defined as the 
number of investors in possession of a stock, can be a valuation indicator, hence a 
predictor for future returns. In other words, the breadth of ownership of a stock represents 
the slope of its demand curve in Miller (1997)’s model. When a small fraction of 
investors owns the stock (i.e., optimists), while other pessimistic investors are kept out of 
the market due to short-sale constraints, the price of the stock is set at the valuation of a 
small fraction of optimistic investors. Thus, as the breadth of ownership reduces, the 
                                                            
20 Moeller et al. (2007) argue that the advantages of long-term forecasts over yearly or 
quarterly forecasts on earnings are that 1) they are less affected by the timing of forecast issuance 
(or how close to a quarterly or yearly fiscal year end) and 2) that they are free of noise that are 
usually introduced to yearly or quarterly forecasts through normalization for comparison purpose 
across the sample firms. Since the long term forecasts are reported as a percentage, they are 
directly comparable across the sample firms and hence do not require any normalization. 
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Table 9. Spearman Correlations between Volume-based DO and Extant DO Proxies 
The table shows Spearman rank correlations between various proxies for the ex-ante levels of differences of opinion and the 
extant difference-of-opinion proxies. Extant proxies: BREADTH and HI is the breadth of ownership and the Hirfindahl index 
of mutual fund holdings respectively as of quarter q-1 where q is the quarter in which a spinoff is announced. DISP1 is the 
standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on the current year's earnings divided by the average of forecasts. DISP2 is the 
standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on the current fiscal year's earnings scaled by the average of the current and the 
previous month-end stock price. DISP3 is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on three- to five-year expected annual 
increase (%) in operating earnings over the firm’s next full business cycle. Over the pre-event period (i.e., 12 months), monthly 
estimates of DISP1, DISP2, and DISP3 are averaged to calculate the disagreement proxies. On day t during the pre-event 
period, each VDO is estimated, and averaged over the pre-event period to calculate the ex-ante level of differences of 
opinion , , , ,   ). On any day in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as follows 
with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume 
turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is 
calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed 
by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted 
by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that 
is estimated over the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX 
firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further 
scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily absolute return (separately depending 
on the sign of daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the control period. The pre-event period is defined as 
a 250-trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement date. BK/MKT is the book-to-market ratio calculated by 
dividing the book value of a sample firm (the sum of common equity, deferred taxes, and investment tax credit minus the book 
value of preferred shares) with the market capitalization by the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. E/P is the 
earnings of a sample firm divided by the stock price by the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. 
  Obs BREADTH HI DISP1 DISP2 DISP3      BK/MKT
HI 205 -0.77a 
DISP1 171 -0.34a 0.49a
DISP2 171 -0.38a 0.57a 0.90a
DISP3 140 -0.16c  0.12d 0.53a 0.41a
 187 0.45a  -0.61a -0.21a -0.31a 0.21a
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9. Spearman Correlations between the Volume-Based and the Extant Differences-of-Opinion Proxies, Continued 
                 Obs BREADTH HI    DISP1 DISP2 DISP3       BK/MKT
 
  187 0.13c -0.05d -0.06a -0.05a -0.04d 0.19a 
 187 0.12c -0.03d -0.02a -0.05c -0.01a 0.17b 0.93a
  187 0.10a -0.03d 0.01a -0.04b 0.01a 0.16b 0.91a 0.98a
 187 0.15b -0.08d -0.04a -0.05c -0.04a 0.19a 0.95a 0.90a 0.89a
BK/MKT 162 -0.36a 0.44a 0.52a 0.63a 0.25a -0.28a -0.02a 0.01a 0.02a -0.01d
E/P 145 -0.06a 0.15c -0.04a 0.19b -0.12a -0.18b 0.05a 0.04a 0.02c 0.04c 0.42a
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively.
69 
stock is more overpriced relative to its fundamental value since the ownership of the 
stock become more concentrated to investors with the highest valuation of the stock. 
Following Chen et al. (2002), we gather quarterly equity holdings of the mutual 
funds established in the U.S for our study period from CDA/Spectrum. The Breadth of 
ownership (BREADTHq) of a sample firm is defined as the ratio of the number of mutual 
funds that own the sample stock to the total number of mutual funds in quarter  
q. We measure it by the quarter end prior to the quarter in which a spinoff announcement  
is made. In addition, as a complementary measure to BREADTHq, we estimate a change 
in the Herfindahl  Index of mutual fund holding (HIq). For a sample stock, we compute 
the percentages of mutual funds’ holding of the stock, and square and sum them to get 
HIq. One advantage of this measure is that it reflects a degree of concentration of a 
sample firm’s share within mutual funds industry, while BREADTHq  mirrors a degree of 
ownership concentration (i.e., the number of mutual funds that own the stock). 
In Table 9,21  we present the Spearman rank correlations between the extant 
disagreement proxies (BREADTH, HI, DISP1, DISP2, and DISP3) and the proxies for the 
ex-ante level of DO measured fom daily VDO estimates (   
, , , ,  ). In the first column, as we expect, BREADTH is highly 
negatively correlated with HI (correlation = -0.77); notice that all the correlations of HI 
have the opposite sign of those of BREADTH. As the shares of a sample firm become 
more concentrated (i.e., higher HI ratio), the breadth of ownership or the number of 
                                                            
21 Obs in the first column in Table 9 shows the numbers of the sample firms in the 
correlation between BREADTH and all the other DO proxies. The number of observation changes 
because of differential availability of the data for BREADTH, HI, DISP 1 to 3, BK/MKT, and E/P 
for the sample firms. Requiring the complete data, we have 96 firms. Since there is no material 
difference between correlation computed with all the available data or the complete data set, we 
report the correlations computed with all the available data. 
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mutual funds that are in long position of the stock decreases as well. In other words, 
when the stock is owned by a small number of mutual funds relative to all existing 
mutual funds, these mutual funds also tend to have a large position in the stock. 
Observe that BREADTH and HI (in the first and second column) have the 
significant correlations with correct directional signs with DISP1 and 2, but not with 
, , , ,  . As a lower BREADTH and a higher HI implies 
a higher level of disagreement, BREADTH and HI are negatively and positively 
correlated with DISP1 and 2 respectively. Firms with a lower BREATH (HI) have a 
greater (less) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. But, this interpretation is based on the 
implicit assumption that the proxies measured from analyst forecasts on earnings 
properly capture disagreement among investors. As we addressed previously, there is a 
little consensus about the role of the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the literature. For 
the volume-based DO proxies, the correlation signs are opposite of what we expect: 
Positive correlations with BREADTH and negative correlation with HI. With the sample 
of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for a period 1979 – 1998 Chen et al. (2002) find 
that breath of ownership in level is in effect a permanent firm characteristic marked by a 
high correlation with firm size and volume turnover as well as a high first order 
autocorrelation. Thus, the correlations between disagreement proxies measured with the 
mutual fund ownership data and the volume-based DO proxies seem to reflect the fact 
that mutual funds tend to hold large, liquid stocks. 
In most cases, DISP’s correlations with  are negative, which is opposite 
of what we expect since a higher level of DISP would indicate a higher level of , 
assuming both represent a degree of disagreement about the values of a sample firm 
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among investors. However, an exceptional case is the relationship between  and 
DISP3. Consistent with Moeller et al. (2007)’s use of DISP3 as a proxy for investor 
opinion divergence, DISP3 is positively and significantly associated with  
(correlation = 0.21). As can be seen in Table 9, it is the only statistically significant 
relationship with the correct sign (as a disagreement indicator) among correlations 
between the extant disagreement proxies (including BREADTH and HI) and . 
Note also that DISP1 and DISP2 are highly correlated with , but with a opposite 
directional sign. The correlation should be positive because a higher level of DO implies 
a higher dispersion in the analysts’ forecasts and a higher value of . 
Since DISP1 and DISP2 have been widely used as a measure of liquidity, we 
examine whether the interpretation of DISP1 and DISP2 as a liquidity proxy rather than a 
disagreement proxy is more relevant. We choose dollar trading volume as a liquidity 
indicator to highlight dissimilarity between dollar trading volume ( ) and volume 
turnover ( ). Above all, we note that there is a strong trend in DISP1 and DISP 2 
over our study period. The correlation with the sub-periods assigned to the samples is -
0.35 for DISP1 and -0.48 for DISP2, while it is -0.06 for DISP3. Because of a secular 
upward trend in  and  and a downward trend in DISP1 and 2 across the 
sample firms over the study period, we control for the sub-periods in computing the 
following correlations. 
When DISP1 and DIPS2 is correlated with , we find that they are 
significantly associated, having the correlation coefficient of -0.38 and -0.43, respectively. 
In contrast, the corresponding correlations of DISP1 and DISP2 with   are 
insignificant with the correlation of -0.05 and -0.11 respectively. Moreover, consistent 
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with the interpretation of DISP3 as a disagreement proxy, DISP3 is insignificantly related 
to   (correlation = -0.05), but it is significantly positively related to   
(correlation = 0.26). Therefore, we argue that this result shows that the information 
content of  and  clearly differ in that the latter represents the extent of 
investor disagreement rather than the market liquidity of the sample firms. 
Finally, we investigate how the proxies for DO are related to pricing indicators 
(i.e., the book-to-market ratio and the earnings-to-price ratio). As we discussed in 
Hypothesis Development, if disagreement among investors causes the slope of the 
demand curve for a firm to become downward sloping (Miller, 1977), firms with a higher 
level of   and the extant DO proxies (i.e., a higher slope of the demand curve) 
should be overpriced compared to those with a lower level of DO in the pre-event period. 
For BREADTH, we expect a positive correlation with those pricing indicators and for the 
rest of the DO proxies a negative correlation. Following French and Fama (1993), we 
define the book-to-market ratio (BK/MKT) as the ratio of the book value to the market 
value of a firm by the fiscal year-end prior to a spinoff announcement year. The book 
value of the common equity is the sum of common equity, deferred taxes, and investment 
tax credit minus the book value of preferred shares and the market value is the product of 
the number of shares outstanding and the stock price by the fiscal year end. The earnings-
to-price ratio (E/P) is the earnings of a sample firm divided by the stock prices by the 
fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. 
As can be seen in the 11th and 12th row in Table 9, only  has both the correct 
negative sign and the significant correlations with BK/MKT and E/P (correlation = -0.28 
and  -0.18, respectively). However, all the other volume-based DO proxies have 
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statistically insignificant correlation with the pricing indicators. Firms with higher 
volume turnover tend to have lower BK/MTK ratios, consistent with the prediction of 
Miller (1977) and the finding of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in which stocks with low 
turnover have greater factor loading in HML than those with high turnover.22  For 
BREADTH and HI, the correlations with both value indicators are in the opposite 
direction to what we expect, reflecting a tendency that mutual funds hold glamour stocks 
(Chen, Hong, & Stein, 2002). 
All the dispersion measures of analysts’ forecasts have positive and significant 
correlation with BK/MKT, which contradicts the expected negative correlation, if they are 
a proxy for disagreement. In particular, the correlation is especially strong for DISP1 (= 
0.50) and DISP2 (= 0.61), while it declines almost by half for DISP3 (= 0.23) though 
DISP1 and DISP3 have the expected, but insignificant correlation with E/P. Therefore, 
we conclude this evidence strengthen our previous finding that DISP1 and DISP2 do not 
capture the level of DO, but rather reflect market liquidity. 
In sum, our analysis of the correlations between the extant disagreement proxies 
and the volume-based DO ( ) proxies—in an attempt to establish them as proper 
proxy for the level of investor disagreement or the slope of the demand curve for a 
sample firm —reveals the followings: First,  that involves no adjustment at all 
except scaling daily trading volume by outstanding shares, seems to reflect more about 
                                                            
22 Piqueria (2006), using NYSE and NASDAQ samples for the period from 1993-2002 
documents the correlation between volume turnover and BK/MKT of -0.06 for NYSE firms and -
0.143 for NASDAQ firms. Similarly, Chen et al. (2002), for the sample of NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks from 1979 to 1998, report the correlation of -0.10 between volume turnover and 
BK/MKT and the correlation of   -0.09 between volume turnover and E/P. Both studies use 
monthly volume turnover demeaned by a corresponding exchange trading volume.    
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the extent of diversity of investors opinion regarding the value of a stock than the level of 
liquidity. Second, as we show in the previous and this section,  , , 
 ,  are related neither to the popular liquidity proxies or to the extant 
disagreement proxies. Nonetheless, in addition to the evidence that they are highly 
positively correlated with , we argue that their empirical relevance as a proxy for 
disagreement are validated by the test results of the hypotheses in the next section.   
Disagreement and Abnormal Return in the Spinoff Announcement Period  
For the estimation of abnormal returns, we implement the standard event-study 
methodology in which benchmark parameters are measured during the pre-event period. 
We use two different benchmarks: The mean of daily stock return over the pre-event 
period (AD-260, AD-11), and the expected stock return calculated with the parameters of 
the market model for daily return estimated over the same period. During the event 
period (AD-1, AD+1), we compute a mean-adjusted abnormal return by subtracting the 
mean daily return from a daily stock return. Similarly, we calculate a market-adjusted 
abnormal return by subtracting the expected stock return estimated with the parameters 
from a daily return. The market returns in the calculation of the market-adjusted 
abnormal return is based on the returns on the CRSP value- as well as equal-weighted 
portfolio of returns for all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. To test statistical significance 
of abnormal return (AR) or three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR), we use the 
standard deviation of AR and CAR in the cross-section of the sample. Specifically, the t-
statistic for AR (or CAR) on day t is given by  
,
√
                                                            (10) 
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where  and ,  are, respectively, the sample average and the standard deviation 
of abnormal returns, which are calculated in the cross-section of  n sample firms (Barber 
& Lyon, 1997). 
The same approach is implemented for testing statistical significance of the level 
of disagreement in the event period. The statistic is given by  
,
√
                                         (11) 
where ∑ ,   
 ∑ ,  and the five volume-based measure of DO ( or VDO) are LNTO, 
Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV. On event day t,  and ,  are the sample 
average and the standard deviation of VDO, both of which are calculated in the cross-
section of n sample firms. 
Table 10 reports daily abnormal return from AD-10 to AD+10 in which AD is the 
date of a spinoff announcement. Since there is no material difference in either using the 
value-weighted or the equal-weighted market returns, we report abnormal returns 
computed with the value-weighted market returns. There is no discernible abnormal price 
reaction before AD-1. But, the abnormal return on AD-1, AD and AD+1 is significantly 
positive in both measures of abnormal return. Note that on AD+2, the market-adjusted 
AR is significantly negative at the 5% level. Following AD+2, most of days are marked 
by negative ARs. There appears to be a reversal of the returns earned during the 
announcement period in the days following the announcement. For the event window 
(AD-1, AD+1), the mean of three-day market-adjusted and mean-adjusted CARs equals 
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Table 10. Abnormal Returns in the Announcement Period 
This table reports the abnormal returns of the spinoff sample days surrounding the date of 
a spinoff announcement. The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken 
by the publicly traded U.S firms from 1964 to 2005. The sample firms are further 
required to have at least 80% of daily returns during the pre-event period. The final 
sample consists of 202 firms. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -day 
period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). A market model for daily 
returns is estimated over the pre-event period to compute a market-model adjusted 
abnormal return in an event day. The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio of returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. A mean-adjusted abnormal 
return is calculated by subtracting the mean of daily returns during the pre-event period 
from a daily return. CAR is the cumulated abnormal returns for the announcement period, 
(AD-1, AD+1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Date Obs Market-model adjusted abnormal return (%) 
Mean-adjusted abnormal 
return (%) 
-10 202 0.134 (0.833) 0.109 (0.640)
-9 202 -0.138 -(0.845) -0.134 -(0.765)
-8 202 0.169 (1.006) 0.204 (1.105)
-7 202 0.180 (1.199) 0.218 (1.314)
-6 202 -0.122 -(0.792) -0.131 -(0.842)
-5 202 -0.058 -(0.276) 0.058 (0.261)
-4 202 -0.141 -(0.808) -0.185 -(0.955)
-3 202 0.103 (0.505) 0.022 (0.104)
-2 202 0.119 (0.472) 0.157 (0.607)
-1 202 1.367 (5.230) 1.478 (5.519)
(AD) 0 202 1.647 (3.901) 1.589 (3.756)
1 202 0.439 (1.541) 0.545 (1.956)
2 202 -0.335 -(2.043) -0.254 -(1.449)
3 202 -0.127 -(0.708) -0.052 -(0.286)
4 202 -0.288 -(1.338) -0.184 -(0.809)
5 202 -0.070 -(0.304) -0.163 -(0.658)
6 202 0.142 (0.813) 0.130 (0.681)
7 202 -0.228 -(1.631) -0.190 -(1.221)
8 201 -0.214 -(1.217) -0.134 -(0.723)
9 201 0.257 (1.253) 0.158 (0.757)
10 200 0.097 (0.610) 0.127 (0.741)
CAR (AD-1, AD+1) 3.452 (6.160) 3.612 (6.400)
 
to 3.45% and 3.61% with the t-statistic of 6.16 and 6.40, respectively. Our result is 
consistent with the finding of the prior spinoff literature. For example, Veld and Veld-
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Merkoulova (2009) review 26 empirical studies on spinoff announcements, and find that 
spinoff announcements generate, on average, a 3.02% of abnormal return. In all our 
subsequent tests to follow, we focus on CARs in this event window. As can be seen in 
Table 10, a significant market reaction starting AD-1 suggests a leakage of news, partial 
anticipation of news, or delayed news reporting. Hence, we use three-day CAR around 
the announcement for testing our hypotheses. 
In Table 11, we report the cross-sectional mean of the event level of DO, or   
 ∑ , , for each day from AD-10 to AD+11. For any measure of VDO, there 
is no significant change in the disagreement level before the announcement period (i.e., 
AD-1, AD+1). However, starting from AD-1 it increases significantly, peaks in the actual 
announcement date, and then gradually declines until AD+10. Even after the 
announcement date, the level of DO is significantly larger than the ex-ante level of DO. 
This pattern in abnormal trading activity has been also observed for other important 
corporate announcements.23  In the rational expectation paradigm in which investors have 
common priors and interpret information in the same way, the same pattern does not 
emerge since investors reach consensus quickly regarding the firm value following the 
announcement (Hong & Stein, 2007). Thus, this pattern seems to suggest that investors 
continue to trade based on their own interpretations even several days after the 
announcement.  
At the bottom of Table 11, we present the test result for Hypothesis 1. For each 
sample firm, we calculate the event level of DO as the mean of a VDO over the 
                                                            
23 For example, see Figure 4 in Hong and Stein (2007) for quarterly earnings 
announcement and Table 3 in Chae (2005) for acquisition announcement. 
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Table 11. Event Level of DO in the Announcement Period 
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S firms from 1964 to 2005. The 
sample firms are further required to have at least 80% of daily VDOs (volume-based measure of difference of opinion) during 
the pre-event period. The final sample consists of 202 firms. The table presents the cross-sectional means of the event level of 
differences of opinion in the announcement period starting from 10 days before and ending 10 days after the announcement 
date (AD). Five VDOs are LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV. On any day in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated 
as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. 
Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend 
is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is 
computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is 
further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily 
log turnover that is estimated over the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of 
NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, 
which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily absolute return 
(separately depending on the sign of daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the control period. The pre-
event period is defined as a 250-trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement date. The t-statistic for testing 




, ∑ ,  
  ∑ , . On day t in the event period, (AD-10, AD+10),  and ,  are the sample average and the 
standard deviation of VDOs, both of which are calculated in the cross-section of the sample firms. The t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis. 
Date(t) Obs LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV 
-10 202 -6.27 (0.63) 0.05 (0.76) 0.04 (0.89) 0.04 (0.84) 0.07 (0.90)
-9 202 -6.32 (0.11) 0.01 (0.06) -0.01 -(0.01) -0.02 -(0.06) 0.00 -(0.05)
-8 202 -6.26 (0.73) 0.06 (0.90) 0.03 (0.81) 0.03 (0.63) 0.01 (0.16)
-7 202 -6.29 (0.49) 0.04 (0.53) 0.01 (0.44) 0.02 (0.44) -0.01 -(0.18)
-6 202 -6.37 -(0.45) -0.04 -(0.78) -0.04 -(0.43) -0.03 -(0.24) -0.07 -(1.01)
-5 202 -6.28 (0.56) 0.04 (0.66) 0.02 (0.65) 0.03 (0.61) 0.00 (0.05)
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Table 11. Event Level of DO in the Announcement Period, Continued 
Date(t) Obs LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV 
 
-4 202 -6.32 (0.10) 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 -(0.04) -0.01 -(0.04) 0.04 (0.45)
-3 202 -6.20 (1.42) 0.12 (1.72) 0.11 (1.80) 0.10 (1.71) 0.12 (1.62)
-2 202 -6.20 (1.48) 0.12 (2.02) 0.10 (2.03) 0.10 (1.99) 0.12 (1.58)
-1 202 -5.90 (4.57) 0.42 (5.65) 0.38 (5.61) 0.38 (5.56) 0.34 (4.16)
(AD) 0 202 -5.38 (10.94) 0.94 (13.86) 0.91 (13.84) 0.89 (13.46) 0.88 (10.26)
1 202 -5.65 (7.46) 0.67 (9.14) 0.63 (9.19) 0.62 (8.78) 0.77 (8.54)
2 202 -5.84 (5.99) 0.47 (7.24) 0.46 (7.71) 0.44 (7.29) 0.64 (7.82)
3 202 -6.02 (3.40) 0.29 (4.23) 0.27 (4.41) 0.27 (4.21) 0.41 (4.98)
4 202 -6.05 (3.44) 0.25 (4.06) 0.26 (4.53) 0.25 (4.29) 0.36 (4.55)
5 202 -6.01 (4.15) 0.30 (4.71) 0.29 (5.04) 0.28 (4.88) 0.29 (3.73)
6 202 -6.12 (2.39) 0.19 (2.81) 0.19 (3.09) 0.18 (2.92) 0.20 (2.67)
7 202 -6.21 (1.26) 0.09 (1.37) 0.11 (2.23) 0.10 (1.89) 0.15 (2.08)
8 201 -6.10 (2.76) 0.20 (3.21) 0.22 (4.07) 0.22 (3.86) 0.27 (3.65)
9 201 -6.14 (2.16) 0.16 (2.39) 0.18 (2.89) 0.17 (2.69) 0.20 (2.85)
10 200 -6.14 (2.18) 0.16 (2.25) 0.15 (2.53) 0.15 (2.44) 0.22 (2.66)
 -5.64 0.68 0.64 0.63 0.66
 -6.33 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Difference   0.68 (8.94) 0.67 (12.73) 0.65 (12.96) 0.64 (12.62) 0.66 (10.83)
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announcement period ( ∑ , ). As can be seen in Table 11, in support 
of Hypothesis1, the mean of the event levels of DO (i.e., ∑ ) is 
significantly larger than that of the ex-ante level of DO (i.e.,  
∑ ) in all VDOs with the t-statistics greater than 8.94. As the news of a 
corporate spinoff arrives in the market, it spurs differential interpretation among investors 
regarding the prospect of the firm following spinoff. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
the event level of disagreement is significantly larger than the ex-ante level of 
disagreement. This implies that the announcement of a spinoff trigger highly differential 
interpretation of the announcement among investors. 
Test Results of Hypotheses 
A. The Event Level of Disagreement and Abnormal Return. We first test a 
prediction of Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s model: When there is a sharp increase in 
investor disagreement prompted by a public announcement of the news, the model 
predicts that trading volume and return are increasing in proportion to the degree of 
disagreement. Therefore, firms affected by greater disagreement about the announcement 
of a spinoff (i.e. higher event level of DO) should earn higher returns. We sort the sample 
firms into the quintiles based on their estimated event levels of DO (as we defined in the 
previous section) and compute the mean of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns in 
each quintile.  
Table 12 reports the relationship between the event level of DO (henceforth Event 
DO) and the three-day CARs. Consistent with the model, as Event DO quintile increases, 
the mean of CAR rises in tandem. This positive relation between Event DO and CAR is
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Table 12. Event Level of DO and Announcement Abnormal Return 
This table presents the relations between the event levels of DO and the abnormal announcement returns. On any day in the 
pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is 
the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total 
number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the 
control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the 
market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the 
residual from a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over the control period. A market-wide 
daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is 
the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error 
terms of the model. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement 
date. On day t during the event window of (AD-1, AD+1), each VDO (LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD, SUV) is estimated, and 
averaged over the same window to calculate the event level of DO. The sample firms are sorted into the quintile based on 
the estimated event levels of DO (EventDO). In each qunitle, the mean of EventDO and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) over the event window is calculated across the samples. The t-tests for the difference in the means (Panel 1), 
assuming an unequal variance, and the Wilcoxon-rank-sum tests for difference in the medians (Panel 2) are calculated by 
using cross-sectional distribution of CARs and EventDOs. The Spearman rank correlations are the sample correlations 
between EventDOs and CARs of the entire sample firms.    
Panel 1. The mean of the event-levels of differences of opinion and three-day CARs        
LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV 
 Rank Obs EventDO CAR EventDO CAR EventDO CAR EventDO CAR EventDO CAR
(Low)1 40 -7.22 2.54 -0.31 0.64 -0.27 1.43 -0.29 1.28 -0.51 1.59 
2 41 -6.17 2.29 0.29 1.74 0.27 0.70 0.25 1.40 0.21 4.34 
3 40 -5.56 2.53 0.58 2.79 0.55 3.18 0.53 3.15 0.62 4.94 
4 41 -5.05 5.20 1.02 3.82 0.91 3.30 0.90 3.24 1.08 3.30 
(High)5 40 -4.22 4.69 1.80 8.30 1.75 8.72 1.76 8.25 1.93 3.08 
202 
Difference:       
High-Low 3.00a 2.15 2.11a 7.66a 2.02a 7.29a 2.05a 6.97a 2.44a 1.49 
Rank correlation 0.17a 0.34a  0.34a 0.32a 0.09 
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 12. Event Level of DO and Announcement Abnormal Return, Continued 
Panel 2. The median of the event-levels of differences of opinion three-day CARs        
LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV 
 Rank Obs EventDO CAR EventDO CAR EventDO CAR EventDO CAR EventDO CAR
(Low)1 40 -6.98 1.49 -0.21 0.18 -0.17 1.22 -0.20 0.92 -0.46 1.22 
2 41 -6.14 2.22 0.30 1.46 0.27 0.56 0.26 1.75 0.21 3.04 
3 40 -5.53 1.75 0.58 3.05 0.57 2.60 0.53 2.99 0.61 2.42 
4 41 -5.12 4.68 1.05 3.96 0.89 3.81 0.92 3.43 1.10 3.43 
(High)5 40 -4.33 5.72 1.71 8.58 1.70 8.58 1.65 8.46 1.74 4.74 
202 
Difference:        
High - Low 2.65a 4.23c 1.92c 8.40a 1.87a 7.36a 1.85a 7.54a 2.20a 3.52c
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.
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consistently observed for any VDO except SUV. For example, when the quintiles are 
formed based on detrended turnover (Detrend), firms in the lowest quintile—equivalently 
firms with the lowest level of disagreement on their valuation following the 
announcement of a spinoff — earn the mean CAR of 0.64%, while those in the highest 
quintile earn 8.30%. Using the unpaired t-test for the difference in the mean CAR and the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the difference in the median CAR, we find 
that the difference in the mean CAR (difference = 7.66%) and the median CAR 
(difference= 8.40%) between the highest and the lowest quintile are significant at the 1% 
level. 
In addition, we measure the strength of the relationship between Event DO and 
CAR across all the sample firms by a Spearman rank correlation. For all Event DO, 
except SUV, the correlations range from 0.17 to 0.34, and are significant at the 1% level. 
In the case of SUV, recall that SUV is intended to measure a portion of disagreement-
driven trading volume after controlling for the average firm-specific level of liquidity 
trading and trading motivated by private information (see equation 7). The measurement 
of SUV treats a whole announcement return as if it is solely driven by informed trading. 
Therefore, during the announcement period the expected daily volume turnover estimated 
by SUV might also capture a portion of volume turnover related to disagreement, which 
should be reflected on announcement returns. We find no such pattern emerge between 
CAR and SUV. 
B. Disagreement Shock and Abnormal Return. We test the second hypothesis in 
this section by combining Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s time-varying level of DO with 
Miller (1977)’s DO model. Hypothesis 2 states that there should be a positive correlation 
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between disagreement shock and abnormal return in the announcement period. If a firm 
publicly announces its spinoff decision, the announcement sparks heterogeneous 
interpretation about the news among investors, raising the level of DO to the event level 
during the event period from the ex-ante level in the pre-event period. In Miller (1977)’s 
model, it is the presence of disagreement about the valuation of the stock that induces its 
demand curve downward-sloping. Thus, in this two-period setting (i.e., the pre-event and 
the event period), a change in the level of DO implies a corresponding change in the 
slope of the demand curve. Since a spinoff announcement entails no change in the float 
(i.e., the supply curve), firms affected by a larger change in the slope of a demand curve, 
or a greater change in the level of DO, should have larger abnormal returns. Note that in 
the prior section we examined the relationship between the event level of DO and 
abnormal return. But, in this section we focus on the magnitude of a change in the level 
of DO or disagreement shock and its effect on the prices of the sample during the event 
period. 
We define the disagreement shock (henceforth SHOCK) as a difference between 
the event and the ex- ante level of DO or (∆ . As we discussed in 
Methodology section,  is measured to reflect the normal level of DO of a firm in 
a typical trading day and thus can be considered as a pre-spinoff firm characteristic. 
Similarly,  proxies for the elevated or abnormal level of DO in the announcement 
period. 
In Table 13, we sort the sample firms into the quintiles according to their sizes of 
SHOCK, and compute the mean and the median of CAR and SHOCK in each quintile. 
Under Hypothesis 2, as the mean value of SHCOK in each quintile increases, so does the
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Table 13. Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return 
This table presents the relations between the disagreement shocks and the abnormal announcement returns. The shock on the 
level of difference of opinion (DO) or the disagreement shock is calculated by subtracting the ex-ante level of differences of 
opinion (DO) from the event level of DO. The event level of DO is measured by averaging daily estimates of a VDO (VDO = 
LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the event window of (AD, AD+1). The ex-ante level of DO is measured by 
averaging daily estimates of a VDO over the pre-event period or (AD-260, AD-11). During the pre- and event period on any 
day, five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural 
logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of 
shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. 
Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted 
turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-
factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over the control period. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is 
the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms 
of the model. A daily abnormal return is a residual calculated from the market model, using the value-weighted market returns, 
estimated over the pre-event period. CAR is the sum of abnormal returns during the announcement period. The t-tests for the 
difference in the means (Panel 1), assuming an unequal variance, and the Wilcoxon-rank-sum tests for the difference in the 
medians (Panel 2) are calculated by using the cross-sectional distribution of CARs and Shocks. The Spearman rank 
correlations are the sample correlations between Shocks and CARs of the entire sample firms. 
Panel 1. The mean of disagreement shocks and three-day CARs          
LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV 
 Rank Obs Shock CAR Shock CAR Shock CAR Shock CAR Shock CAR 
(Low)1 40 -0.30 0.59 -0.37 0.80 -0.29 0.67 -0.29 0.85 -0.55 1.12 
2 41 0.29 2.59 0.28 1.61 0.28 0.99 0.26 0.40 0.21 5.43 
3 40 0.58 2.48 0.62 2.25 0.58 2.42 0.55 3.26 0.62 4.53 
4 41 1.02 3.57 1.05 5.15 0.96 4.95 0.95 4.03 1.07 2.33 
(High)5 40 1.84 8.06 1.79 7.46 1.74 8.26 1.74 8.79 1.96 3.82 
202 
Difference:      
High - Low 2.14a 7.47a 2.16a 6.66a 2.03a 7.59a 2.03a 7.94a 2.51a 2.70c 
Rank correlation 0.33a 0.38a 0.39a 0.38a 0.14b 
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively 
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Table 13. Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return, Continued 
Panel 2. The median of disagreement shocks and three-day CARs          
LNTO Detrend UV RESD SUV 
 Rank Obs Shock CAR Shock CAR Shock CAR Shock CAR Shock CAR 
(Low)1 40 -0.19 0.67 -0.27 0.67 -0.14 0.27 -0.20 0.27 -0.42 0.92 
2 41 0.29 2.54 0.28 0.96 0.28 0.96 0.27 0.96 0.24 2.79 
3 40 0.57 2.48 0.61 2.38 0.58 2.11 0.56 2.42 0.63 3.04 
4 41 1.03 3.81 1.06 5.49 0.94 4.89 0.93 4.97 1.06 3.32 
(High)5 40 1.76 8.09 1.71 8.58 1.62 8.66 1.66 8.66 1.83 4.78 
202 
Difference:      
High - Low 1.95a 7.42a 1.98a 7.91a 1.76a 8.39a 1.86a 8.39a 2.25a 3.86a 
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively 
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mean CAR. The differences in the mean CAR and the median CAR between the top and 
the bottom quintiles are significant at the 1 % level regardless of a VDO we choose to 
measure SHOCK except SUV, which is significant at the 10 % level. The sample firms in 
the top quintile on average earn about 7% more than those in the bottom quintile during 
the announcement period. Moreover, in the cross-section of the entire sample, SHOCK is 
significantly and positively related to CAR with the Spearman rank correlation ranging 
from 0.39 to 0.14. 
Frazzini and Lamont’s (2006) study of stocks returns and trading volume around 
earnings announcement offers the findings that can be interpreted within our analytical 
framework. They document that abnormal returns are on average positive, and trading 
volume increases sharply around earnings announcement dates. Since those 
announcements include both good and bad news, the on-average positive abnormal return 
(i.e., the earnings announcement premium) can be explained by disagreement shock 
resulted from a heightened level of disagreement among investors that is brought forth by 
earnings announcements. The elevated level of disagreement is also reflected in 
abnormally high trading volume during the earnings announcement period. Note that this 
event itself does not involve a change in the float as the announcement of a spinoff does 
not. As we discussed in the preceding two sections, spinoff announcements also elicit 
such market reactions as highly elevated level of trading volume and positive abnormal 
return.  
Note that the overall correlations reported in Table 13 are higher than those in 
Table 12. In particular, the correlation between SHOCK measured with SUV and CAR is 
significant at the 5 % level. But, recall that the correlation between the event level of DO 
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and CAR is insignificant in Table 12. This suggests that disagreement shock rather than 
disagreement in levels better captures the variations in the abnormal returns during the 
event period. More importantly, our result implies further that the interpretation of the 
level of DO as the slope of the demand curve is pertinent because we find a significantly 
positive correlation between CAR and SHOCK measured with any VDOs. 
Accordingly, we conclude that VDOs employed in this study adequately capture 
the degree of disagreement among investors in the pre-event as well as in the event 
period. Thus, by extrapolating the ex-ante and the event level of DO from daily estimates 
of VDOs, we are able to measure a change in the level of DO from the typical trading day 
to the event day, and its effect on announcement return. 
C. Ex-Ante Level of Disagreement, Disagreement Shock and Abnormal Return. In 
this section, we examine a dynamic relationship between the ex-ante level of DO and the 
event level of DO, and its linkage to price reactions of the sample stocks in the 
announcement period. In Hypothesis 3, we posit that the pre-event level of DO is 
negatively correlated with disagreement shock. This proposition is based on the idea of 
limited attention on the part of investors (e.g., Hirchleifer & Teoh, 2003; Peng & Xiong, 
2006) which states that cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to only a certain 
subset of information. Because of this type of cognitive constraint, a firm that, for 
example, is not frequently covered by the media would have a low level of DO. In other 
words, it is less susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations by investors. However, when 
the firm announces its plan to spin off, which is very likely to receive a wide and intense 
media coverage, this firm that has a lower ex-ante levels of DO (i.e., a low-disagreement 
firm) is expected to incur larger disagreement shock than a firm with a higher ex-ante
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Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return 
This table presents the relation between the ex-ante levels of difference of opinion (DO) and the disagreement shocks (Shock). 
The shock on the level of difference of opinion (DO) or the disagreement shock is calculated by subtracting the ex-ante level 
of differences of opinion (Ex-Ante) from the event level of DO. The event level of DO is measured by averaging daily 
estimates of a VDO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the event window of (AD, AD+1). The ex-ante level 
of DO is measured by averaging daily estimates of a VDO over the pre-event period or (AD-260, AD-11). See the Table 13 for 
the details about the measurement of VDOs. A daily abnormal return is a residual calculated from the market model, using the 
value-weighted market returns, estimated over the pre-event period. CAR is the sum of abnormal returns during the 
announcement period.  The t-tests for the differences in the means (Panel 1), assuming an unequal variance, and the Wilcoxon-
rank-sum tests for the differences in the medians (Panel B) are calculated by using cross-sectional distribution of Ex-Ante, 
Shocks and CAR. For the entire sample firms, Rank correlation 1 is the Spearman rank correlation between Ex Ante and Shock. 
Rank correlation 2 is the Spearman rank correlation between Ex Ante and CAR.  
Panel 1. The mean of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR      
LNTO Detrend UV 
 Rank Obs 
Ex 
Ante Shock CAR 
Ex 
Ante Shock CAR 
Ex 
Ante Shock CAR 
(Low)1 40 -7.69 0.79 5.47 -0.27 0.95 5.66 -0.28 0.86 5.72 
2 41 -6.72 0.82 5.15 -0.08 0.79 3.81 -0.09 0.66 3.58 
3 40 -6.25 0.67 2.84 0.01 0.64 1.91 0.00 0.67 2.60 
4 41 -5.86 0.70 2.05 0.09 0.37 1.46 0.07 0.58 1.88 
(High)5 40 -5.13 0.43 1.73 0.27 0.61 4.45 0.23 0.50 3.52 
202 
Difference:Q1-Q5 2.56a -0.36b -3.74c 0.54a -0.34 -1.21 0.51a -0.36c -2.20 
Rank Correlation 1 -0.15b -0.20a -0.15b
Rank Correlation 2 -0.19a -0.19a -0.22a 




Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return. Continued 
Panel 1. The mean of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR  
RESD SUV 
 Rank Obs Ex Ante Shock CAR Ex Ante Shock CAR 
(Low)1 40 -0.27 0.89 5.74 -0.33 0.98 4.50 
2 41 -0.08 0.59 3.44 -0.13 0.73 5.85 
3 40 0.00 0.65 2.78 0.00 0.64 1.42 
4 41 0.07 0.45 2.08 0.14 0.63 1.18 
(High)5 40 0.22 0.63 3.25 0.32 0.33 4.31 
202 
Difference:Q1-Q5 0.49a -0.26 -2.49 0.65a -0.65a -0.19 
Rank Correlation 1 -0.14b -0.22a 
Rank Correlation 2 -0.22a -0.19a 
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return. Continued 
Panel 2. The median of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR    
LNTO Detrend UV 
 Rank Obs 
Ex 
Ante Shock CAR 
Ex 
Ante Shock CAR 
Ex 
Ante Shock CAR 
(Low)1 40 -7.46 0.64 3.82 -0.24 0.80 5.77 -0.24 0.76 5.88 
2 41 -6.69 0.66 4.22 -0.08 0.62 3.72 -0.09 0.45 2.66 
3 40 -6.23 0.56 2.13 0.01 0.60 0.91 0.00 0.59 1.52 
4 41 -5.86 0.62 1.46 0.09 0.33 1.73 0.08 0.50 1.77 
(High)5 40 -5.22 0.42 1.95 0.23 0.70 2.02 0.18 0.49 1.56 
202 
Difference:Q1-Q5 2.24a -0.22b -1.87 0.47a -0.10 -3.75c 0.42a -0.27 -4.32b 
a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return. Continued 
Panel 2. The median of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR  
RESD SUV 
 Rank Obs Ex Ante Shock CAR Ex Ante Shock CAR 
(Low)1 40 -0.24 0.76 5.77 -0.29 0.87 5.22 
2 41 -0.08 0.44 2.30 -0.13 0.60 4.97 
3 40 0.00 0.59 2.21 0.01 0.67 1.46 
4 41 0.07 0.44 1.77 0.14 0.61 1.75 
(High)5 40 0.18 0.56 0.87 0.29 0.24 1.85 
202 
Difference:Q1-Q5 0.42a -0.20 -4.90b 0.58a -0.63a -3.37c 




level of DO (i.e., a high-disagreement firm). Consequently, the former should earn higher 
announcement abnormal return than the latter. Furthermore, we argued in Section 3 that 
this relationship—a negative correlation between the ex-ante level of DO and 
disagreement shock— will give rise to a negative correlation between the ex-ante level of 
DO and announcement abnormal return. 
We sort the sample firms into the quintile based on the values of proxies for their 
ex-ante levels of DO. Table 14 shows the mean (Panel 1) and the median (Panel 2) of the 
ex-ante level of DO, SHOCK, and CAR in each quintile. As can be seen, in all VDOs, as 
the ex-ante level of DO increases, SHOCK and CAR decrease. The difference of the   
mean or the median of SHOCK and CAR between the top and the bottom quintile are 
negative, but insignificant in some VDOs. In particular, the test for the difference in the 
mean CAR appears inconclusive because the mean CAR is larger in the fifth (largest) 
quintile as compared to that in the third or in the fourth quintile. It seems to suggest that 
the existence of some outliers in CAR that mitigate a negative association between the 
ex-ante DO and CAR. 
However, across the entire sample we find that the correlations between the ex-
ante level of DO and SHOCK (rank correlation 1) are significantly negative in all VDOs. 
The correlations range from -0.14 to -0.22, and are significant at least 5 % level. This 
result confirms Hypothesis 3 that low-disagreement firms tend to experience larger 
disagreement shocks—greater changes in the level of DO in the announcement period 
relative to the ex-ante level of DO—than high-disagreement firms. 
Finally, we confirm an inverse relation between the ex-ante DO and CAR, which 
is implied by a negative correlation between the ex-ante DO and SHOCK, in the cross-
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section of the entire sample by Spearman rank correlations (Rank correlation 2).  As 
reported in Table 14, the correlations range from -0.19 to -0.22 in all VDOs, and are 
significant at the 1 % level. As we postulated, it is a negative relationship between the ex-
ante level of DO and SHOCK that gives a negative correlation between the ex-ante level 
of DO and CAR. 
In other words, compared to a high-disagreement firm, a low-disagreement firm, 
or a firm with a low slope of the demand curve, sustains a large (negative) change in the 
slope in the announcement period because it is affected by a large disagreement shock 
triggered by the spinoff announcement. Thus, CARs are higher for low disagreement 
firms than for high-disagreement firms. Therefore, it follows that for our sample of 
spinoffs the ex-ante level of DO can be a potentially significant factor for explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns days surrounding spinoff announcements. 
Moreover, we argue that the-ex-ante level of DO of a firm can be considered as a firm 
specific characteristic because its measurement reflects the average extent to which a firm 
is affected by investor who have different beliefs about its value and interpret information 
differently over a period of time. Therefore, we re-define the ex-ante level of DO as the 
disagreement factor in Part Two. In that part of the dissertation, we will analyze the 
relevance and robustness of disagreement factor for abnormal gains in the announcement 
period by controlling for the known determinants that have identified in the literature. 
Conclusions 
Excessive trading volume accompanied by overpricing in the U.S stock market 
(especially the IT boom in the late 1990) and highly abnormal volume behavior around 
an information event such as earnings, acquisition, and spinoff announcements are not 
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easily explained by the traditional asset pricing models because these models have no 
role for trading volume. However, the development in disagreement models attempts to 
overcome this difficulty, and are able to explain a positive relation between trading 
volume and overpricing. Unlike these risk-based rational asset pricing models, the 
disagreement models set forth a market model in which investors have heterogeneous 
beliefs and interpret public information differently, and that investors are bounded by 
short sales restrictions.  
Building on differences-of-opinion (DO) models of Banerjee and Kremer (2010) 
and Miller (1977), we empirically examine changes in the levels of DO among investors 
and their impacts on price reactions days surrounding the announcements of corporate 
spinoffs. We use a sample of spinoffs undertaken by the U.S public firms from 1964 to 
2005. As an empirical investigation strategy, we adopt a two-period setting (i.e., the pre-
event and the event period) which allow us to estimate the ex-ante level of DO prior to 
the announcement of a spinoff and the event level of DO in the three-day period 
surrounding the announcement. The ex-ante level of DO is measured to proxy for the 
degree of disagreement about a sample firm in a typical trading day and can thus be 
regarded as its firm specific characteristic ex ante. The event level of DO mirrors the 
degree of disagreement that is triggered by differential interpretation of the 
announcement by investors. Thus, we propose and test the following hypotheses: 1) the 
announcement spinoff will spark a high degree of differential interpretation about the 
announcement, 2) disagreement shock (i.e., the event level of DO minus the ex-ante level 
of DO) will be positively correlated with abnormal announcement return, and 3) the ex-
ante level of DO will be negatively correlated with disagreement shock.  
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With theoretical guidance from dynamic models of DO, we use daily trading 
volume turnover, which is the basic ingredient for measuring disagreement. Following 
Garfinkel (2009), we estimate five volume-based measures of DO (VDO) including 
volume turnover itself in each trading day during both the pre-event and the event period, 
and extrapolate the ex-ante and the event level of DO from these daily estimates. 
Since volume turnover is widely regarded as an indicator of liquidity, and VDOs 
are constructed to isolate extra portion of volume turnover after controlling for its known 
determinants, we first substantiate proxies for the ex-ante level of DO or the ex-ante DO 
proxies for a sample firm as relevant and adequate measures for investor disagreement by 
comparing with the popular proxies for market liquidity of the firm in the literature 
(dollar trading volume, firm size, the effective spread, and the standard deviation of 
return residuals). We find that ex-ante DO proxies (except one based on daily turnover) 
are not correlated with these liquidity proxies. Interestingly, while the ex-ante DO based 
on volume turnover is positively associated with dollar trading volume and firm size, 
which is consistent as a liquidity proxy, it has also significantly positive correlations with 
the effective spread and the residual standard deviation, which is inconsistent as a 
liquidity proxy. Considering that the effective spread and the standard deviation of return 
residuals trace the market liquidity of a stock more closely, we conclude that the ex-ante 
DO proxies does not reflect liquidity. Further, we compare our DO proxies with the 
extant DO proxies (i.e., breadth of ownership by Chen et al., 2002; the dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts by Diether et al., 2002; and the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts on the long-term earnings growth by Moeller et al., 2007). We, however, find 
no significant relationship between them except the DO proxy measured with volume 
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turnover, which has a significant correlation with the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on 
the long-term earnings growth. Furthermore, we find that this DO proxy also has a 
significant negative correlation with the pricing indicators (i.e., book-to-market ratio and 
earning-to-price ratio). This is consistent with the prediction of Miller (1977)’s DO 
model, namely positive relation between trading volume and overpricing. Hence, our 
results overall indicate that ex-ante DO proxies for a sample firm seem to properly 
capture the degree of disagreement among investors about its value prior to the 
announcement of a spinoff. 
Our tests of the three hypotheses reveal the following results. We find that there is 
a sharp increase in the level of DO in the announcement period. For example, the means 
of ex-ante DO proxies are around zero, but those of event DO proxies, or the level of DO 
in the three-day period around the date of a spinoff announcement, surge up to around 0.6. 
This implies that the announcement is a significant information event that generates large 
disagreement among investors about the prospect of a sample firm following spinoff. In 
support of Hypothesis 2, we find that firms impacted by higher disagreement shocks—the 
difference between the ex-ante level of DO and the event level of DO—earn higher 
abnormal returns generated from their spinoff announcements. We argue that this 
evidence provides empirical support for the interpretation of a change in the level of DO 
as a shift in the slope of demand curve in the framework of Miller (1977)’s model. 
Furthermore, we find that the abnormal returns have a statistically significant positive 
correlation with the disagreement shocks  for all the VODs used to measure them 
including the one that control for information related trading volume in the 
announcement period. Finally, we find that firms characterized by low disagreement (i.e., 
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a lower level of ex-ante level of DO) in the pre-event period evoke higher disagreement 
(i.e. a higher event level of DO)—hence higher disagreement shock— upon a spinoff 
announcement than do firms with a higher level of ex-ante level of DO. This result is 
consistent with the idea of limited attention on the part of investors. This negative 
correlation between the ex-ante and the event level of DO further suggests a negative 
correlation between the ex-ante level of DO and the abnormal returns. We find the 
evidence in support of this implication. Therefore, the ex-ante levels of DO of the sample 
firms can be an important determinant helpful in understanding the cross-sectional 





A. Recapitulation. In Part One, we empirically investigate the effect of changes in 
the levels of differences of opinion (henceforth DO) on stock prices during the three-day 
period around the date of a spinoff announcement. Our sample consists of 202 corporate 
spinoffs that announced (during the period between 1964 and 2005) and successfully 
completed. Specifically, we combine analytical properties of Miller (1977)’s static DO 
model with those of Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic DO model, and propose and 
test three hypotheses. The nature of the hypotheses and our findings are:  
1) As prognosticated by Banerjee and Kremer’s (2010) dynamic model, the 
announcement of a spinoff sets off a sudden jump in the level of DO, which 
reflects widely differential interpretation about the news among investors 
(Hypothesis 1). 
2) Interpreting the observed sudden increase in the level of DO from a normal 
level in the framework of Miller (1977)’s model, we measure “disagreement 
shock.”  We find that there is a positive relationship between the disagreement 
shock abnormal return in the three-day period surrounding the announcement 
(Hypothesis 2). 
3) The Ex-ante levels of DO of sample firms, which we define as the normal 
levels of disagreement, or more specifically the levels of DO in a typical 
trading day—in contrast to the levels of DO in the announcement day or the 
event levels of DO—among investors about their values, are negatively 
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correlated with their disagreement shocks (Hypothesis 3). It is our contention 
that it is the relationship between the ex-ante levels of DO and the 
disagreement shocks that renders a negative correlation between the ex-ante 
levels of DO and the abnormal returns. 
In addition, we investigate the firm size effect on gains in the firm’s market value ex post 
and find that the pre-spinoff parent size is significantly inversely related to the market 
value gain from the spinoff. We also evaluate our ex-ante DO proxies as appropriate 
measures for investor disagreement by comparing our ex-ante DO proxies not only with 
several widely used liquidity proxies but also with the extant DO proxies in the form of 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and breadth of ownership. In summary, we 
demonstrate that our trading volume-based ex-ante DO proxies capture investor 
disagreement, and therefore are potentially cogent explanatory variables for the cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns observed immediately following the 
announcement of a spinoff. 
It should be noted that our analysis in Part 1 is based on comparative statistics in 
the form of behavioral equations that are both bivariate (see equation (1) and equation (6)) 
and partial multivariate (see equation (7) and Table 8)). Thus, we focus largely in Part 1 
on the statistical relationship between “disagreement proxies” and abnormal returns from 
spinoff announcements. In this respect, we may not sufficiently control for the effect of 





B. Purpose and Overview. The primary purpose of Part 2 is to broaden our 
investigation by extending the bivariate analyses in Part 1 to multiple regression analyses. 
We test whether the cross-sectional variation in  announcement abnormal returns can be 
accounted for with our key variable, the ex-ante level of DO, which we rename it as 
disagreement factor in Part 2, when controlling for other known sources for these returns 
reported in the literature. Our multivariate analyses set a stringent test for the ability of 
disagreement factor to explain the abnormal returns.   
Note that since spinoff announcements have shown to generate, on average, 
positive abnormal returns as we also verify this stylized fact in Part 1, it is often referred 
to as wealth gain or wealth effect in the literature. We select the following three 
determinants that have received strong empirical support as the sources for wealth gains 
or “announcement abnormal returns”: relative size which is the portion of a (parent) 
firm’s assets assigned to its spun-off subsidiary, the level of information asymmetry of 
the firm prior to a spinoff announcement, and focus factor which indicates whether the 
firm split up a related or unrelated subsidiary to its core business (i.e., the focus-
increasing or non-focus-increasing spinoff).  
Part 2 considers disparities in available evidence related to the effects of 
information asymmetry and focus factor on wealth gain. First, regarding information 
asymmetry, in their work on the information hypothesis, Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) postulate that information asymmetry between outside investors 
and managers can cause undervaluation of a firm. Management uses this valuation “error” 
as an opportunity to undertake a spin-off and correct for the valuation discrepancy, or 
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enhance the firm’s value. The authors find evidence for the hypothesis that firms with 
higher information asymmetry earn higher abnormal returns because investors rationally 
expect greater improvement in information asymmetry for these firms than firms with 
lower information asymmetry. Moreover, they show that there is a significant decline or 
improvement in information asymmetry after the completion of spinoffs. However, 
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) document that information asymmetry worsens after the 
completion of spinoff. Furthermore, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova’s (2004) study of 
spinoffs in the E.U also reach a similar conclusion in that they find no relation between 
information asymmetry and abnormal announcement return. 
It is also important to note that a majority of the empirical literature that analyzes 
the “focus factor” effect uses spinoffs that were undertaken in the U.S before the year of 
1992. These studies (e.g., Daley et al., 1997; Desai & Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami & 
Subramaniam, 1999) find that spinoffs which involve splitting up an unrelated subsidiary 
(i.e., improvement in industrial focus or focus-increasing spinoff) earns larger 
announcement abnormal returns than non-focus-increasing spinoffs. Moreover, this 
wealth gain is confined to focus-increasing spinoffs. However, a recent study by Veld 
and Veld-Merkoulova (2008) examines the U. S. spinoff experience from 1995 to 2002 
and does not find an association between wealth gain and either focus factor or 
information asymmetry. 
The apparent contradictory findings on information asymmetry effects and the 
inconsistency of findings related to the effect of focus factor on wealth gain warrant the 
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examination of these variables individually. Given the breadth and scope of our dataset1, 
it is our hope that we might shed some new light on these important empirical issues. 
First, our analysis of information asymmetry shows a significant deterioration in all 
proxies employed from the pre- to the post-spinoff period. Moreover, the observed 
deterioration displays two important characteristics; first, it is observed only in focus-
increasing firms, and second, it is observed to a high degree. These findings serve as a 
fundamental challenge to the underlying intuition of the information hypothesis, which 
clearly would expect that focus-increasing firms would experience diametrically opposite 
results. In other words, under the hypothesis, focus-increasing firms would achieve 
greater improvement in information asymmetry. 
For the effect of focus factor, we find that spin-off type (i.e., focus increasing or 
non-focus increasing spinoff) had no effect on announcement abnormal returns for the 
entire 41-year study period. However, for the first study period that include spinoff 
announcements made from 1964 to 1991, we find that only focus-increasing firms earn 
significantly positive abnormal returns, while non-focus increasing firms’ abnormal 
returns are, on average, not statistically different from zero. This finding corroborates the 
result of the prior studies that cover a similar time period. But, in the second study period 
from 1992 to 2005, we find no statistically significant differences in abnormal returns 
between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing firms. Investors’ responses appear to 
be equally positive to both types of spinoff. 
                                                            
1 The dataset (i.e., the sample size) which we use is approximately twice as large as those 
previously used in the literature. Further, our dataset covers a longer study period from 1964 and 




In a multiple regression analysis covering the entire study period, we find that 
announcement abnormal returns are strongly inversely related to disagreement factor 
after controlling for the known determinants for these returns. Moreover, disagreement 
factor adds explanatory power as large as that provided by all the control variables 
combined. This result confirms the significance of disagreement factor as our bivariate 
analysis in Part 1 indicates that this factor could serve as a potent explanatory variable for 
the abnormal returns. The economic effect of the relationship between disagreement 
factor and the abnormal return is substantial. For instance, when there is one standard 
deviation increase (from the mean) in disagreement factor, the abnormal return decreases 
roughly by 1.11%. Moreover, confirming the results of the preliminary analyses of 
information asymmetry and focus factor, we find that these determinants are no longer 
significantly correlated with the abnormal returns.  
Further, when disagreement shock is included in a regression, the coefficients of 
relative size and focus factor decrease monotonically. This indicates a dependence 
relationship between disagreement shock and these two variables. Analyzing 
relationships between disagreement shock and the other determinants (disagreement 
factor, information asymmetry, focus factor, and relative size), we find that disagreement 
shock is significantly negatively associated with disagreement factor. This result 
confirms our bivariate test result of Hypothesis 2 in Part 1. Furthermore, we find that 
disagreement shock is larger for a firm that has a lower level of information asymmetry, 
that engages in focus-increasing spinoff, and that splits up a larger portion of its assets to 
its spun-off subsidiary. In other words, if investors perceive that a firm is mired by a 
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higher level of information asymmetry (i.e., a firm with high information asymmetry 
prior to its spinoff announcement), they seem to inhibit expression of their disagreement 
about its spinoff decision and refrain from trading based on their own interpretations. 
Consequently, trading is less intensive compared to a firm with a lower level of 
information asymmetry. However, a firm implementing a focus-increasing spinoff and 
assigning a large fraction of its assets to its spun-off subsidiary incur a high degree of 
disagreement among investors. 
Finally, in the sub-period analysis, our regression results are considered in the 
light of previous studies’ findings that focus factor and relative size jointly explain the 
cross-sectional variation in announcement abnormal returns. Our regression results for 
the first study period from 1964 to 1991 did indeed support these earlier results. However, 
conducting the same analyses on the data from the period 1992-2005 produced results 
which disagree with the first period (and earlier studies) findings.  When analyzing the 
data from the later study period, we find that both focus factor and relative size become 
insignificant. More importantly, information asymmetry is not associated with the 
abnormal returns in both study periods. Across both study periods, only disagreement 
factor is consistently negatively related to the abnormal returns, and thus account for a 
significant faction of the cross-sectional variation in these returns.  
Control Variables: the Known Determinant of Spinoff Abnormal Returns 
A. Information Asymmetry. Based on the theoretical work of Nanda and Narayana 
(1997),2  Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue that for firms with multiple 
                                                            
2 Similarly, Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) show that the informativeness of price can 
be improved through a spinoff (i.e., splitting a parent firm into separately traded firms).  In turn, it 
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business units, information asymmetry between managers and investors arises because 
investors observe an aggregate cash flow to the entire firm while managers discern actual 
cash flows to individual divisions. Hence, if a firm is undervalued due to information 
asymmetry problem, then the management has an incentive to split up the firm into 
independently traded units through a spinoff to attain a fair market value. Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam propose the information hypothesis that there should a decline in 
information asymmetry after the completion of a spinoff, and abnormal returns during the 
spinoff-announcement period should be greater the higher the level of information 
asymmetry since investors anticipate a higher valuation of a firm as a result of reduction 
in information asymmetry. 
Using several proxies for information asymmetry based on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam document a significant decrease in those 
proxies from the pre-spinoff (i.e., the year-end month prior to the year in which a spinoff 
announced) to the post-spinoff period (i.e., a month after the ex-date of a spinoff). They 
also find that their sample firms have significantly larger values in those proxies than the 
control samples do. These results seem to clearly show that information asymmetry 
problem is motivation behind a decision to implement a spinoff. Furthermore, they find a 
significantly positive relationship between the level of information asymmetry and 
announcement abnormal returns.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
improves the quality of managers’ investment decisions and reducing uninformed investors’ 
uncertainty about asset values. An implication of their theoretical work is that a greater 





However, Huson and MacKinnon (2003) offer an opposite view. They argue that 
corporate spinoff will not improve information asymmetry problem, but rather to 
exacerbate it.  They contend that a spin-off can provide an informational advantage to 
informed investors who possess superior knowledge about either a parent firm or its 
subsidiary. For the parent firm prior to spinoff, there is no informational edge for the 
informed over the uninformed because the complexity of the parent’s operations may be 
equally daunting to both groups of investors. But a spinoff creates an opportunity to 
capitalize on the informed investors’ specialized knowledge on the parent or the 
subsidiary.3 This exposition contrasts the information hypothesis of Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999). 
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) use the residual standard deviation of stock returns 
as an indicator of information environment, and document a significant increase in the 
indicator from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period.4 Interestingly, they find that the 
significant increase in the indicator is only observed for the firms that engage in focus-
increasing spinoff. This evidence further supports their contention that the exploitation of 
informational advantage by the informed investors would be greater for focus-increasing 
spinoffs. Huson and MacKinnon characterize this evidence for the deterioration in 
information asymmetry as “reduction in any diversification effect.” In other words, a 
spinoff reduces the inherent diversification benefit, or the mitigation in the information 
                                                            
3 Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanya (1991) present models in which a 
basket security is less subject to information asymmetry than individual securities that constitute 
the basket security because aggregation cash flows for the basket security have an effect of 
diversifying information asymmetry across those individual securities.  
 
4 In contrast, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) document a significant decrease 
from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period for a sample of spinoffs from 1973 to 1993. 
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asymmetry engendered by having multiple business units within a firm (i.e. 
conglomerate). The authors also present the evidence for the deterioration in information 
asymmetry from the pre- to the post-spinoff using proxies derived from market 
microstructure theories (i.e., the effective spread and price impact), and show that the 
increase is restricted to focus-increasing firms.  
An out-of-sample test of the information hypothesis comes from Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004). For a sample of 156 spinoffs which occurred in 15 different 
European countries for the period 1987-2000, they find no evidence of a significant 
relationship between announcement abnormal returns and the levels of information 
asymmetry though they employ the same proxies for information asymmetry as 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use. 
With the conflicting evidence on the effect of information asymmetry on spinoff, 
we investigate whether the information hypothesis holds with our spinoff sample, which 
is larger in size and covers a longer period as compared to the studies by Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) and Huson and MacKinnon (2003).5  We use the following four 
proxies for information asymmetry which are measured in Part One: DISP1, DISP2, 
CSSPRD, and SIGMA (see Section 8 and 9 for the estimation details for these proxies). In 
addition, we include a measure of liquidity developed by Amihud (2002). It is defined as 
the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar trading volume, or ILLIQ. Since it 
measures a daily price change per dollar trading volume, it is in fact a measure of price 
impact or market illiquidity for a stock.  
                                                            
5Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) analyze 118 spinoffs from 1979 to 1993, while 
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) do 84 spinoffs from 1984 to 1994. 
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First, we test statistical significances of the differences in changes in those five 
proxies for information asymmetry from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period. Note 
that we examine changes in information asymmetry for the parent firms. To measure the 
proxies (DISP1, DISP2, , and SIGMA) in the post-spinoff period, we use 
the same length of the estimation period as the pre-spinoff (or pre-event) period. The 
post-spinoff period begins on the day following the ex-date and ends on the 250th-trading 
day or (ED+1, ED+250) in which ED stands for the ex-date of a spinoff. In this time 
window, we also calculate the mean of daily estimates of CSSPRD and ILLIQ, and 
estimate SIGMA for each sample firm. For DISP1 and DISP2, we compute the mean of 
monthly estimates of DISP1 and DISP2 based on the standard deviation of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts from the Unadjusted Summary File in the Institutional Broker Estimate 
System (IBES) database for a 12-month period, starting from a month after the ex-date 
month. 
Table 15 shows the sample mean and the median of each liquidity measures in the 
pre- and post-spinoff periods. In Panel 1, we group CSSPRD, ILLIQ, and SIGMA together, 
and label them as market-based liquidity. In Panel 2, we put DISP1 and DISP2 together 
since these measures are derived from the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Note that DISP1 
and DISP2 capture information asymmetry between insiders of a firm and analysts who 
follow the firm. It means that DISP1 and DISP2 reflect information asymmetry among a 





Table 15. Changes in Information Asymmetry from the Pre-Spinoff to the Post-Spinoff 
Period 
This table presents the means and the medians of the market-based proxies for 
information asymmetry and the proxies based on the analysts’ earnings forecasts in the 
pre-spinoff and the post-spinoff period. The sample consists of the U.S firms that 
engaged in a corporate spinoff during the period 1964-2005. The sample firms are 
required to have at least 80% of daily returns during the pre-event period. The pre-spinoff 
period is defined as a 250-trading day ending 10 days prior to the announcement date of a 
spinoff, (AD-260, AD-11). The post-spinoff period is defined as a 250-trading-day 
starting a day after the ex-date, (ED+1, ED+250). The market-based proxies are as 
follows: CSSPRD is the bid-ask (effective) spread estimated by the method proposed by 
Corwin and Schultz (2011). SIGMA is the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
market model of daily stock returns. ILLIQ is the ratio of absolute stock return to its 
dollar trading volume. In the pre- and post-spinoff period, daily estimates of CSSPRD 
and ILLIQ is measured and averaged over the respective period. For the proxies based on 
analysts’ forecasts, DISP1 is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on the current 
year's earnings divided by the average of forecast. DISP2 is the standard deviation of 
analysts' forecasts on the current fiscal year's earnings scaled by the average of the 
current and the previous month-end stock price. Over the pre-and the post-spinoff period 
(i.e., 12 months), monthly estimates of DISP1and DISP2 are averaged to calculate these 
proxies. A sample firm (i.e., parent) is classified as focus-increasing spinoff if its two-
digit primary SIC code is different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, it is classified 
as non-focus-increasing spinoff. The statistical significances are estimated using the 
parametric paired t-tests for the differences in the means and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests for the differences in the medians. a, b,and c indicate the 







    Mean  Median 
Obs Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff
Panel 1. Market-based liquidity 
 202 0.775 0.968 -0.193a 0.650 0.709 -0.058a
SIGMA 202 0.023 0.025 -0.002a 0.020 0.021 -0.001b
  (x 106) 202 0.145 0.311 -0.166a 0.008 0.009 -0.001a
Panel 2. Analysts' earnings forecasts 
DISP1 163 0.227 0.192 0.035s 0.051 0.074 -0.024a
DISP2 163 0.007 0.013 -0.005b 0.003 0.005 -0.001a
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Table 15. Changes in Information Asymmetry from the Pre-Spinoff to the Post-Spinoff 
Period, Continued 
 
the data generated from the market seem to be a better proxy for information asymmetry, 
since they reflect information asymmetry between the informed and the uninformed more 
broadly. 
As shown on Table 15, for all the proxies for information asymmetry, there is a 
significant deterioration from the pre-spinoff period to the post-spinoff period. The 
differences in the means (except DISP1) and the medians of all market-based liquidity 
measures are negative and significant at the 1% level. The cost of trading shares 
(CSSPRD) on average increases by 0.19% and the price impact of trading volume is also 
larger in the post-event period. The presence of the informed traders seems to be more 
    Mean  Median 
Obs Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
Panel 3. Focus-increasing and Non-Focus-increasing sample (market-based 
liquidity) 
Focus 134 
 0.725 0.939 -0.214a 0.600 0.658 -0.058a
SIGMA 0.022 0.025 -0.003a 0.019 0.020 -0.001a
 (x 106)  0.133 0.344 -0.211b 0.015 0.015 0.000a
Non-Focus 68 
 0.875 1.027 -0.152b 0.690 0.822 -0.133a
SIGMA 0.024 0.025 -0.001s 0.021 0.022 0.000s
 (x 106)  0.168 0.245 -0.077s 0.005 0.005 0.000s
Panel 4. Focus-increasing and Non-Focus-increasing sample (analysts' earnings 
forecasts) 
Focus 106 
DISP1 0.095 0.143 -0.047a 0.049 0.071 -0.021a
DISP2 0.007 0.013 -0.005c 0.003 0.005 -0.002a
Non-Focus 57 
DISP1 0.471 0.282 0.189s 0.054 0.081 -0.027c
DISP2   0.007 0.012 -0.005c  0.003 0.004 -0.001s
111 
 
intensified as it is indicated by the greater mean value of SIGMA in the post-spinoff 
period. In particular, even in DISP1 and DISP2, the worsening information environment 
after the completion of a spinoff is evident. Though DISP1 decreases in the post-event 
period, it is not significant.6  Yet, because of the high non-normality of DISP1 and DISP2, 
the test of the difference in the median of DISP1 and DISP2 is more reliable. We find the 
differences in the medians are significantly negative for both measures at the 1% level.  
Therefore, we find no support for the information hypothesis related to corporate 
spinoff. As our results show, there is no enhancement, but rather deterioration in 
information asymmetry. It also implies that a positive relation between spinoff 
announcement returns and information asymmetry might not be due to investors’ 
recognitions of expected improvement in a firm’s value through a spinoff. Perhaps, there 
is no relation at all between these two variables. In fact, none of the Spearman 
correlations between the liquidity proxies and announcement abnormal returns are 
significant except ILLIQ.  
In Panel 3, we examine whether the exacerbation of information asymmetry is 
confined to the sample firms that spin off unrelated subsidiaries (i.e., focus-increasing 
spinoff). We define a focus-increasing spinoff as a firm that creates a subsidiary whose 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the parent 
(Desai & Jain, 1999). Otherwise, we classify a firm as a non-focus-increasing spinoff. 
                                                            
6DIPS1 and DISP2 are not the exact replications of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999)’s measures. They use the standard deviation of the analysts’ earnings forecast as of the last 
month of the fiscal year prior to the announcement of a spinoff. Moreover, they do not scale those 
forecasts as we do either by stock price or the mean of forecasts. Scaling the dispersion by either 
the mean of forecasts or the price of a stock gives comparability of a measure based on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts across a sample of stocks.  
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Consistent with Huson and MacKinnon (2003), we find that all measures of market-based 
liquidity in the focus-increasing sample decreases significantly in the post-spinoff period, 
while those of the non-focus-increasing sample experiences no significant change from 
the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period (except CSSPRD, which increase on average by 
0.15%). For the focus-increasing firm, the differences in the means and the medians of all 
the market-based liquidity proxies between the pre-spinoff and the post-spinoff period are 
significant at the 1% level.  
In addition, in Panel 4 the same inference can be drawn from DISP1 and DISP2. 
A significant increase in both measures is consistently observed only in the focus-
increasing firms. Thus, the results in Panel 3 and 4 reinforce the finding in the Panel 1 
and 2. If the information hypothesis is valid, we should observe a greater improvement in 
information asymmetry for focus-increasing spinoffs than for non-focus-increasing 
spinoffs. Our findings here contradict the hypothesis. 
B. Industrial Focus. A conventional view in corporate finance is that the 
diversification of a firm’s business portfolio destroys shareholders’ value (see Martin & 
Sayrak, 2003 for a review on the topic). Under this view, the stocks of diversified firms 
are traded at a discount, which is commonly known as a conglomerate (diversification) 
discount. Originally, Berger and Ofek (1995) document that diversified firms (compared 
to the sum of imputed stand-alone values of their segments) are, on average, valued at a 
discount of 13% to 15% and that the extent of loss in value is less severe for a diversified 
firm composed of related business units. John and Ofek (1995) study the effect of 
corporate divesture in the form of sales of assets. They show that disposition of assets 
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leads to an increase in profitability of the remaining assets, and document that the 
improvement in profitability is generally limited to firms that sold off assets unrelated to 
their core business.  
Corporate spinoffs offer a relative simple way to eliminate diversification 
discount by providing a demonstrable mean for a firm to improve its business focus. 
Daley et al. (1997) initially find that significantly positive announcement abnormal 
returns are limited to focus-increasing spinoffs because investors rationally expect 
performance improvement only from these spinoffs. Desai and Jain (1999) examine the 
long-term performance of a sample of spinoffs from 1975 to 1991, and document that 
only focus-increasing firms earn significantly positive announcement and long-term 
abnormal returns.  
If one believes in the existence of diversification discount, the decision to reduce 
diversification obviously signals positive news to the market. Furthermore, the decision 
to divest non-core or unrelated business units will logically attract a more positive 
response from investors. Nevertheless, our result in the previous section may provide a 
somewhat nuanced view on the role of “focus factor” (i.e., whether a spinoff is focus-
increasing or not). As we show in the previous section, there are significant deteriorations 
across all the measures of information asymmetry only for focus-increasing firms. This 
result suggests that if investors expect reduction in information asymmetry only for 
focus-increasing spinoff, then this expectation might have a negative effect on the 
announcement returns of firms which implement a focus-increasing spinoff. However, 
given our strong evidence for the positive effect of focus factor on announcement returns, 
114 
 
we consider that the effect of focus factor dominates any negative effect of exacerbated 
information problem involving a spinoff. 
We also note that virtually all previous empirical works on the determinants of 
announcement abnormal returns study the corporate spinoffs undertaken in the United 
States before the year of 2000. In fact, a majority of these works collect a sample of 
spinoffs occurred prior to 1992.7  Moreover, a recent study of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2008) provide an interesting result: focus factor and information asymmetry do not have 
the expected significant positive relation with abnormal announcement returns for a 
sample of U.S. spinoffs from 1995 to 2002.  
Therefore, we reexamine the validity of the stylized fact: Only focus-increasing 
firms experience positive abnormal returns. Our analysis has the benefit of a sample that 
is both larger in number of spin-off events and also captures information from a longer 
time period, compared to the prior literature on this topic. To do so, we divide the entire 
study period (1964-2005) into two sub-periods: the first study period from 1964 to 1991 
and the second study period from 1992 to 2005. We intentionally segment the entire 
sample period into the two sub-periods around 1991 because, as we pointed out above, a 
majority of the evidence for a positive relation between focus factor and announcement 
abnormal return comes from this period.  
We define a focus-increasing spinoff as a firm that creates a subsidiary whose 
two-digit SIC code is different from that of its parent. Otherwise, we classify a firm as a 
non-focus-increasing spinoff.  In Table 16, we report the mean and the median of the 
                                                            
7See Table 1 of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2009). It documents the lists of empirical 
papers on the wealth effect of spinoff announcement including such information as research 
period and sample size, etc.   
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Table 16. Raw and Abnormal Returns During the Spinoff Announcements: the Entire 
Period and Two Sub-Periods 
This table reports the cumulative raw returns and the cumulative abnormal returns in the 
announcement period, (AD-1, AD+1), for a sample of spinoff. The sample consists of the 
U.S firms that engaged in a corporate spinoff during the period 1964-2005. The sample 
firms are required to have at least 80% of daily returns during the pre-event period. The 
pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading day ending 10 days prior to the 
announcement date of a spinoff, (AD-260, AD-11). A market model for daily returns is 
estimated over the pre-event period to compute a market-model adjusted abnormal return. 
The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of returns of all 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. A mean-adjusted abnormal return is calculated by 
subtracting the mean of daily returns during the pre-event period from a daily return. 
Each sample firm is classified as focus-increasing spinoff if a parent firm’s primary two 
digit of SIC code is identical to that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, it is classified as non-
focus-increasing spinoff. The means and the medians are tested against the null of zero 
cumulative raw and abnormal return, using the t-tests and the Wilcoxon sign rank tests 
respectively. Difference is the mean (the median) of the focus-increasing minus that of 
the non-focus-increasing sample. The statistical significances are estimated using the 
parametric t-tests for the differences in the means and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sum tests for the differences in the medians. a, b,and c indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 





adjusted (CAR1)   
Mean adjusted 
(CAR2) 
  Obs Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel 1. The entire study period, 1964 to 2005 
All sample 218 3.93a 2.76a 3.36a 2.58a 3.52a 2.59a 
     Focus 146 4.37a 2.76a 4.08a 2.50a 3.97a 2.69a 
     Non-focus 72 3.03a 2.76a 1.89b 2.72a 2.62a 2.39a 
     Difference 1.34d 0.00d 2.19c -0.22d 1.35d 0.30d 
Panel 2. The first study period, 1964 to 1991 
All sample 109 2.89a 2.53a 2.40a 2.46a 2.50a 2.37a 
   Focus 79 3.52a 2.67a 3.42a 2.71a 3.11a 2.52a 
   Non-focus 30 1.23d 0.84d -0.30dd 0.19d 0.89d 0.78d 
   Difference 2.29c 1.83c 3.72a 2.52a 2.22c 1.74c 
Panel 3. The second study period, 1992 to 2005 
All sample 109 4.97a 3.10a 4.32a 2.66a 4.55a 2.97a 
   Focus 67 5.38a 3.10a 4.86a 2.22a 4.98a 2.87a 
   Non-focus 42 4.31a 4.70a 3.46b 3.70a 3.86a 4.14a 




cumulated raw returns (RAW) and the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) over the three-
day event period, (AD-1, AD+1) for the entire study period (Panel1), for the first study 
period (Panel 2) and for the second study period (Panel 3). AD stands for the 
announcement date of a spinoff. In addition, in each panel we also report the mean and 
the median of the focus-increasing and the non-focus-increasing samples (See Section 10 
for the estimation details of announcement abnormal returns). 
In Panel 1 of Table 16, for the entire sample period, both the mean and the median 
of RAW and CAR are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. However, notice 
that for the focus-increasing as well as for the non-focus-increasing firms, the means and 
the medians are positive and significantly different from zero mostly at the 1% level, 
which indicates that abnormally positive price reaction is not merely confined to the 
focus-increasing samples. Furthermore, we find that the means and the medians of RAW 
and CAR for the non-focus-increasing sample do not differ significantly from those of 
the focus-increasing sample, except the mean of market-adjusted abnormal returns 
(significant at the 10% level). This result does not corroborate the stylized fact 
documented in the literature that the market reacts more positively to focus-increasing 
spinoffs or the notion that significantly positive abnormal returns are restricted to focus-
increasing spinoffs. Though in general the focus-increasing sample earns higher 
abnormal returns during the announcement period, there is no statistically significant 
differences in CAR between the focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing spinoffs. 
However, in Panel 2, for the first study period from 1964 to 1991, the result is 
consistent with the literature: The mean and the median CAR of the focus-increasing 
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sample are significantly positive, while those of the non-focus-increasing sample are not 
statistically different from zero. Moreover, the differences in RAW and CAR between the 
focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing firms are also statistically significant.  Hence, 
the results in Panel 2 confirm the differential market reaction to the announcement of a 
spinoff in which abnormal announcement return is much larger for the focus-increasing 
than the non-focus-increasing firms.  
Interestingly, in Panel 3, for the second study period from 1992 to 2005, the 
results found from the first study period do not hold. First, the sample firms in this period 
on average earn greater raw returns and abnormal returns in the announcement period 
than do those in the first study period. For instance, the firms in the second study period 
earn on average 1.92% of additional market-adjusted abnormal return (CAR 1) compared 
to the firms in the first study period.  Second, observe that there is overall increase in 
abnormal returns both for the focus-increasing and the non-focus-increasing firms, yet the 
increase is larger for the latter. For the focus-increasing firm, the mean CAR1 (CAR2) in 
the second study period increases by 1.44% (1.87%) from the first study period. Likewise, 
the mean CAR1 (CAR2) of the non-focus-increasing group rises by 3.76% (2.97%). Thus, 
our results show that market reactions to spinoff announcement are positively larger in 
the second study period, but this increase in the announcement abnormal return is much 
larger for the non-focus-increasing group. Consequently, in the second study period the 
mean and the median RAW, CAR1, and CAR2 of the non-focus-increasing firms are all 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, which is not the case in the 
first study period. Furthermore, even the tests for the difference in the mean and the 
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median RAW, CAR1, and CAR2 between the focus-increasing and the non-focus-
increasing groups give no statistical significance in the second study period.   
Therefore, a reason for no statistically significant difference in the abnormal 
announcement return between the two focus groups for the entire study period in Panel 
1can be attributed to the fact that the non-focus-increasing firms in the second study 
period receives as large positive market reactions as the focus-increasing firms do. At 
first glance, we suspect a possible effect of the bull market period from the late 1990s to 
the early 2000 for no difference in the announcement abnormal returns between the two 
focus groups. Perhaps, investors during the bull market might have reacted to the 
announcement of a non-focus-increasing spinoff as positively as for that of a focus-
increasing spinoff. But, we do not find a pattern such as a clustering of positive and large 
abnormal returns either for the focus-increasing or the non-focus-increasing firms during 
the bull market. At this point, we can only conjecture about possible explanations for 
overall increase in the wealth gain for both focus groups, especially for the non-focus-
increasing spinoffs. A further investigation of this result is beyond the scope of this paper. 
We leave it for a future research.  
C. Size of Spun-off Subsidiary. In corporate spinoffs, the proportion of a parent 
firm’s assets split to its subsidiary has been shown to be a strong explanatory variable for 
wealth effect (i.e., an on-average positive abnormal return) from spinoff announcements. 
We refer the variable as the relative size of a subsidiary (henceforth relative size), which 
is the ratio of the size of a parent to that of its spun-off unit. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 
show that large spinoffs (i.e., large values in relative size) earn significantly larger 
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positive abnormal returns than small-size spinoffs. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) with a sample of spinoffs in the U.S and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) with a 
similar sample in Europe confirm that relative size is an important determinant for the 
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns associated with spinoff.  
However, we note that the effect of relative size is a unique empirical 
phenomenon rather than a validation of a theoretical prediction. It lacks a prior reasoning 
as to why there is a negative correlation between relative size and announcement 
abnormal return. One possible link is advanced by Maxwell and Rao (2003).That link is 
the transfer of wealth from bondholders to stock holders, or the wealth transfer 
hypothesis. They note that while the prior literature on this topic (Hite & Owers, 1983; 
Schipper & Smith, 1983) finds no evidence for the hypothesis, these studies are 
constrained by the limited sample size and access to bond price data. They posit a 
specific source of the wealth transfer, namely collateral loss. The idea is that since a 
spinoff involves a transfer of a portion of a (parent) firm’s assets, the spinoff leads to a 
loss in collateral to the bondholders (Galai & Masulis, 1976). This is because the firm’s 
assets are served as collateral to current bondholders. An empirical implication of this 
theory is that the greater is the size of a subsidiary relative to its parent, the returns to the 
stockholders would be greater, but those to the bondholders would be lower. 
Using comprehensive bond price data for a sample of spinoffs from 1974 to 1997, 
Maxwell and Rao (2003) find that, on average, stockholders earn a positive abnormal 
return while bondholders earn a negative abnormal return. More importantly, using 
relative size as a proxy for the collateral loss, they find that stockholders in large 
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spinoffs—the percentage of the parent’s assets assigned to its spun-off subsidiary is 
greater than 20%—gain 2.06% more in abnormal stock returns than do those in small 
spinoffs, while bondholders in large spinoffs suffer 1.23% more loss in abnormal bond 
returns than those in small spinoffs. More importantly, in a pooled regression for bond 
and stock abnormal returns, they show that relative size enters negatively for bond 
abnormal returns, but positively for stock abnormal returns. Hence, the effect of relative 
size on announcement abnormal returns can be partially attributable to a transfer of 
wealth from bondholders to stock holders.  
Accordingly, we include “relative size” as a control variable in the regression 
analyses in the sections to follow. We define the relative size of a subsidiary as the ratio 
of its market capitalization at the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs to the 
market capitalization of its parent firm at the end of the month prior to a spinoff 
announcement month (Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999). We also add a proxy for 
financial risk8 to control variables. We measure a leverage ratio by dividing total debt 
with the market value of equity. For each sample, the data for the leverage ratio is 
collected from COMPUSTAT as of the fiscal year end prior to a spinoff announcement 
year. In addition, in Section 5.D, we find a negative correlation between firm size and 
announcement abnormal return, which is implied by the fact that small firms tend to split 
a larger percentage of their assets than large firms do. We referred to it as firm size effect. 
                                                            
8 Maxwell and Rao (2003) hypothesize that the riskier a firm’s debt, the greater the 
importance of collateral to bondholders. It implies that for a firm with greater financial risk, a 
spinoff will renders a larger loss to its bondholders, but a greater gain to stock holders. 
Accordingly, they find that a leverage ratio, which reflects financial risk of a sample firm, is 




Thus, we include the natural log of the market capitalization of a parent firm at the month 
end prior to the announcement month as an additional control variable in the expectation 
that it might add incremental explanatory power for the abnormal returns over relative 
size.    
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
A. Confirmation of the Prior Literature. In this section, before we evaluate 
disagreement factor and disagreement shock in multiple regressions, we examine whether 
the results reported in the literature on the relationship between each of the control 
variables (information asymmetry, focus factor, relative size, and leverage) and 
announcement abnormal returns hold with our extended sample of spinoffs. In Section 
14.A, we show that there is a statistically significant deterioration from the pre-spinoff to 
the post-spinoff period in all the measures of information asymmetry and that the 
deterioration is observed only for the focus-increasing spinoffs. This evidence is in direct 
contrast with the information asymmetry hypothesis, and hence casts doubt on a positive 
relation between announcement abnormal returns and the pre-spinoff level of information 
asymmetry. In addition, we show that the positive effect of focus factor on the 
announcement returns vanishes in the second study period from 1992 to 2005. 
Thus, we test the information hypothesis and the effect of focus factor with 
multiple regression analysis for our full-study period from 1964 to 2005. We begin by 
regressing CAR on a constant, a proxy for the pre-spinoff level of information (IA), a 
dummy variable for focus factor (Focus), and the relative size of a subsidiary (Relative 
size): Model 1. Because of extreme values in some of independent variables, we 
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Table 17. Cross-Sectional Regressions with Information Asymmetry for the Full Sample of Spinoffs, 1964-2005 
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the abnormal announcement returns. The sample consists of the 
U.S firms that engaged in a corporate spinoff during the period 1964-2005. The sample firms are required to have at least 80% 
of daily returns and trading volume during the pre-event period. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -day period 
over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). The dependent variable is the abnormal return cumulated over the 
three days surrounding the date of a spinoff announcement, (AD-1, AD+1).A market model for daily returns is estimated over 
the pre-event period to compute abnormal returns. The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of returns of all 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks.  is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the 
estimation method proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. DISP2 is the standard deviation of 
analysts' forecasts on the current fiscal year's earnings scaled by the average of the current and the previous month-end stock 
price. Over the pre-event period (i.e., 12 months), monthly estimates of DISP2 are averaged to calculate the proxy for 
information asymmetry. The value of 1 is assigned to a sample firm if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of 
its subsidiary (i.e., focus-increasing spinoff). Otherwise, zero is assigned to the firm (i.e., non-focus-increasing spinoff). The 
relative size of a subsidiary (Relative Size) as the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary measured by the end of the 
month in which the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the month prior to a spinoff 
announcement month (Size). Leverage is total debt divided by the market value of equity as of the end of fiscal-year end prior 
to a spinoff announcement year. Size, Relative size, and  are transformed by taking the natural logarithm. The p-values 
for the significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis. The adjusted R2 and the 
model F-statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values in bold indicate the 
significance at the minimum of the 10% level. 
  Panel 1. Information Asymmetry:   Panel 2. Information Asymmetry: DISP2 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.078 0.158 0.125 0.090  0.017 0.098 0.074 0.082
 (0.202) (0.035) (0.085) (0.100)  (0.490) (0.029) (0.114) (0.145)
IA 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011
(0.551) (0.624) (0.701) (0.382) (0.363) (0.135) (0.106) (0.067)
Focus 0.023 0.020 0.021 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.019





Table 17. Cross-Sectional Regressions with Information Asymmetry for the Full Sample of Spinoffs, 1964-2005, Continued 
  Panel 1. Information Asymmetry:   Panel 2. Information Asymmetry: DISP2 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
Relative size 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.006
(0.001) (0.009) (0.077) (0.005) (0.036) (0.205)
Size -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008
(0.024) (0.204) (0.845) (0.030) (0.153) (0.112)
Leverage 0.009 0.000
(0.489) 0.995
Obs 202 202 202 168  173 173 173 139
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.036 0.058 0.064  0.034 0.026 0.040 0.023 




transform IA and Relative size by taking the natural logarithm. We run the same 
regression for the various proxies of IA (market –based proxies: ,  and 
SIGMA; analysts’ earnings forecasts-based measure: 1and 2). Table 3 present 
the parameter estimates for and 2 with their heteroskedasticity adjusted p-
values in parenthesis. For the other proxies for IA, we omit their regression results since 
there is no material difference in the parameter estimates. 
As can be seen in Panel 1 of Table 3, none of the coefficient of  is 
significant in all regression models. In line with our findings in the bivariate analysis of 
information asymmetry in Section 14.A, we find no evidence for the information 
hypothesis. Our finding suggests that abnormal returns are not related to the pre-spinoff 
levels of information asymmetry of the sample firms. However, consistent with the prior 
literature, we find that the coefficient of Focus is significant at 10% level for all models 
except Model 4. Similarly, Relative size is significant at least at the 10% level for Model 
1, 3 and 4. In Model 2, we drop Relative size from Model 1 and include the pre-spinoff 
size of a parent firm (Size). In Section 5.D, we find that Size is negatively correlated with 
Relative size, which implies that smaller firms tend to spin off a larger fraction of assets 
to their subsidiaries. Because Relative size is positively correlated with CAR, we would 
expect the coefficient of Size to be negative. As expected, the coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 5 % level.  
In Model 3, we include both Relative size and Size to see whether Size can provide 
incremental power in explaining the cross-sectional variation in CARs. Regardless of a 
proxy of IA, Size still enters negatively, but its coefficient becomes insignificant. Hence, 
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a firm-size related variation in CARs seems to be captured by Relative size. Finally, in 
Model 4 we add Leverage9 to Model 3 to evaluate how financial risk affects the abnormal 
returns. According to Maxwell and Rao (2003), financial risk should be positively related 
to abnormal returns since there is a greater wealth transfer from bondholders from stock 
holders for a firm with greater financial risk. However, we do not find such relationship 
for our sample of spinoff firms.  
Therefore, the results of the regression analysis in Table 3 suggest that only 
Relative size and Focus are the significant determinants for the announcement abnormal 
returns. But, note that this is the case for the models with the market-based AI proxy for 
which the sample size is 202. Though our inference drawn from DISP2 (the IA proxy 
based on analysts’ earnings forecasts: Panel 2) are similar to those from  (the 
market-based IA proxies: Panel 1), in Panel 2 Focus is consistently insignificant for all 
the regression models. In fact, Focus also enters insignificantly in Model 4 in Panel.  
Notice that the sample firms included in Model 4 in Panel 1 requires 
COMPUSTAT data for the calculation of Leverage, which reduces the sample size from 
202 to 168. Likewise, for Panel 2 the sample firms must have analysts’ earnings forecasts 
data from IBES database to compute DISP2, which reduces the sample size further to 173. 
This may suggest that the effect of an approximate 15% reduction in the sample size is 
large enough to make the coefficient of Focus insignificant. It further casts doubt on the 
generality of the effect of Focus on the abnormal announcement returns or the notion that 
                                                            
9We also use a different definition of leverage as in Maxwell and Rao (2003); the ratio of 
total debt to the book value of equity. But, the result is identical. 
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concentrating on a firm’s core business by spinning off unrelated business increases the 
wealth of shareholders.  
B. Analysis of Outliers. In Section 11.C (Table 14), forming the quintile based on 
the ex-ante level of DO or disagreement factor, the difference in the mean CAR between 
the top and the bottom quintile is insignificant, though we find a significant correlation 
between disagreement factor and CAR. This suggests an extremely large CAR in the top 
quintile, which might weaken the strength of a negative relationship between 
disagreement factor and CAR. Thus, to confirm our bivariate results in Table 14 in which 
we find a negative correlation between disagreement factor and CAR, we regress 
disagreement factor ( , , , ,  ) on CAR without controlling 
for the other determinants: Model 0.  
Recall that the disagreement factor of a firm is the mean of daily estimates of a 
volume-based measure of DO (VDO) for the pre-event period, which is 250 trading days 
prior to the announcement of a spinoff. We estimate five different VDOs (LNTO, 
Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV) on each day in the pre-event period. As we show in 
Section 7, disagreement factor is measured as a proxy for the (normal or representative) 
level of disagreement among investors about a firm on the typical trading day, which thus 
can be reasonably considered as a firm characteristic prior to a spinoff announcement. In 
Table 18, we report the result for Model 0. To our surprise, we find that none of the 












Figure 2. Abnormal Return and Disagreement factor  
The three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the spinoff announcement 
dates are sorted in ascending order, and plot them with their corresponding values of the 
ex-ante level of DO ( ) or the disagreement factors for the U.S firms that engaged in 
corporate spinoff from 1964 to 2005. The bracket in both ends is set for observations 
below the 5th percentile of and above the 95th percentile of CAR.   
This result confirms our concern about a possible weakening effect of extreme 
announcement returns on the relation between disagreement factor and CAR. In Figure 2, 
we present the scatter plot of CAR and . 10  In particular, we plot CARs sorted in an 
ascending order and the corresponding . At first glance, a negative relation between 
CAR and   is quite visible. However, observe CAR and   within two 
bracketed areas that are set for observations below the 5th percentile and above the 95th 
                                                            
10We choose  among five proxies for disagreement factor ( , , 
 , ,  ) since there is no material difference in the plot with the other proxies for 
disagreement factor except . 
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percentile of CAR (10 firms in each bracket). Some of CARs with an extremely high 
(low) value are associated with an extremely high (low) value of  . 
Thus, it appears that the effect of a positive relationship between outliers of CAR 
and large values of  is disproportionally large so as to reduce a negative 
relationship between CAR and  observed for a majority of the sample, hence 
resulting in an insignificant coefficient in Model 0. Moreover, our inspection of the 
sample firms in the brackets reveals that among the firms above the 95th percentile of 
CAR, 9 out of 10 firms are focus-increasing spinoffs. Interestingly, all nine firms come 
from the second study period from 1992 to 2005 for which period we find no differences 
in the mean and median of CAR between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing 
spinoffs, shown in Table 16. For those below the 5th percentile of CAR, 5 out of 10 firms 
are non-focus-increasing spinoffs in which two firms have the lowest values of CAR (-35% 
and  -20% respectively). These observations suggest that a positive correlation between 
Focus and CAR reported in Panel 1 of Table 17 with the full sample might merely reflect 
a disproportionally strong effect of these outliers of CAR rather than that of a majority of 
the sample. In fact, these outliers explain why the coefficient of Focus in Panel 2 of Table 
17 is insignificant, as some of them are dropped from the sample due to the unavailability 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts data.  Moreover, notice that the distribution of CAR, 
though symmetrically distributed, has a heavy fat tails with the kurtosis of 6.30. But, 
excluding the outliers of CARs, the kurtosis reduces to -0.53. 
In sum, the outliers of CAR in Figure 2 have the following properties: i) the 
outliers of CAR are positively associated with disagreement factor, while the majority of 
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CAR exhibits a negative relationship; ii) They tend to belong to focus-increasing (at the 
positive-end of distribution of CAR) and non-focus-increasing (at the negative-end of 
distribution of CAR) spinoffs; iii) Their existence results in a highly non-normal 
distribution of CAR. Hence, to make sure that result in the following regression analyses 
are not driven by these outliers and in order to draw robust inferences, we exclude these 
outliers from the sample or include sample firms that lie between the 5thand the 95th 
percentiles of CAR. 
Cross-Sectional Tests for Disagreement Factor 
A. Full Study Period from 1964 to 2005. We evaluate the effect of disagreement 
factor on price reactions around the announcement of a spinoff by multiple regressions. 
In all regressions, we include entire control variables that are used in the estimation of a 
regression in Table 17 while excluding the proxy for financial risk.11  Including these 
variables in a regression sets a stage for a stringent test for the explanatory power of 
disagreement factor for announcement abnormal returns. Thus, we regress CAR on a 
constant, disagreement factor ( , , , ,  ) and control 
variables (IA, Focus, Relative size and Size).For a proxy for information asymmetry (IA), 
we choose  among the IA proxies we analyzed previously.12  In addition, as we 
discussed in the preceding section, we estimate a regression model with the sample firms  
                                                            
11 An incremental explanatory power gained by leverage is minimal or negative. 
Moreover, due to an issue of data availability for calculation of leverage, including this variable 
reduces the sample size from 187 to 135.  
 
12We estimate all OLS models in Table 4 with five different proxies for information 
asymmetry employed in Table 15 and find that there is no material differences in regression 
estimates regardless of the choice of a proxy for information asymmetry. 
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Table 18. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the abnormal announcement returns with the trimmed sample. The 
sample firms between the 95 and the 5 percentile of CAR are removed from the sample. The pre-event period is defined as a 
250-trading -day period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). The dependent variable (CAR) is the 
abnormal return cumulated over the three days surrounding the date of a spinoff announcement, (AD-1, AD+1). A market 
model for daily returns is estimated over the pre-event period to compute abnormal returns. The market returns are the CRSP 
value-weighted portfolio of returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. The ex-ante level of DO ( ) or 
disagreement factor is measured by averaging daily estimates of a volume-based measure of DO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, 
RESD and SUV)† over the pre-event period. Similarly, the event level of DO ( ) is the mean of daily VDO estimates in 
the announcement period from AD-1 to AD+1. Disagreement Shock (Shock) is calculated by  minus .  
 is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by Corwin 
and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. A dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to a parent firm (i.e., focus-increasing 
spinoff) if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, zero is assigned (i.e., non-focus-
increasing spinoff). The relative size of a subsidiary (Relative Size) is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary 
measured by the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the 
month prior to a spinoff announcement month (Size). Size, Relative size, and  are transformed by taking the natural 
logarithm. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis. 
The adjusted R2 and the model F-statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values 
in bold indicates the significance at the minimum of the 10% level. 


























Constant 0.034 0.030 0.049 0.052 0.035 0.031 0.048 0.056 0.034 0.030 0.046 0.052
(0.000) (0.000) (0.280) (0.236) (0.000) (0.000) (0.285) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.242)
Dis. Factor -0.04 -0.082 -0.063 -0.058 -0.026 -0.068 -0.052 -0.038 -0.035 -0.078 -0.059 -0.050
(0.408) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.555) (0.000) (0.003) (0.053) (0.483) (0.000) (0.003) (0.016)




Table 18. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns, Continued 


























 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.007
(0.724) (0.392) (0.687) (0.231) (0.781) (0.344)
Focus 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.005
(0.214) (0.465) (0.191) (0.419) (0.238) (0.531)
Relative size 0.009 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.004
(0.012) (0.265) (0.007) (0.149) (0.010) (0.248)
Size 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.917) (0.994) (0.824) (0.772) (0.911) (0.934)
Obs 202 183 183 183 202 183 183 183 202 183 183 183
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.076 0.107 0.169 -0.001 0.064 0.100 0.167 0.002 0.072 0.102 0.168









Table 18. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns, Continued 


















Constant 0.035 0.031 0.043 0.051 -0.06 0.020 0.059 0.067
(0.000) (0.000) (0.340) (0.273) (0.251) (0.477) (0.283) (0.240)
Dis. Factor -0.039 -0.050 -0.035 -0.030 -0.015 -0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.058) (0.000) (0.011) (0.035) (0.072) (0.673) (0.949) (0.865)
Shock 0.006 0.019
(0.257) (0.008)
 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.012
(0.786) (0.765) (0.586) (0.236)
Focus 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.007
(0.217) (0.248) (0.203) (0.393)
Relative size 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.008
(0.006) (0.023) (0.001) (0.035)
Size 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.804) (0.906) (0.805) (0.693)
Obs 202 183 183 183 202 183 183 183
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.051 0.086 0.090 0.025 -0.005 0.062 0.120
  (0.107) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.679) (0.006) (0.000)
133 
 
whose CAR is between the 5thand the 95th percentile. This reduces the size of the sample 
to 183 firms (the trimmed sample).  
Table 18 presents the parameter estimates for different OLS models and their 
heteroskedasticity adjusted p-values in parenthesis. First, to confirm the effect of the 
removal of the outliers from the full sample, we regress CAR on a constant and 
disagreement factor: Model 1. Note that Model 0 is estimated with the full sample (202 
firms). As can be seen in Table 18, for any proxy for disagreement factor (except ), 
it is significantly negatively related to CAR at the 1% level of significance. The 
insignificant relation between  and CAR can be attributed to an upward secular 
trend in trading activity in the U.S. stock market over the study period. Such trend is not 
observed for the other proxies for disagreement factor (See Section 6.A for a detailed 
discussion). Thus, it seems that the effect of a secular trend in  confounds  
the relationship between  and CAR. However, the coefficient of  is still 
negative, though insignificant. Given the effect of a secular trend in , our 
discussion will focus on the interpretation of the result from the other four proxies for 
disagreement factor , , ,  ).  
In Model 2, controlling for the known determinants of CAR, we find that the 
coefficient of disagreement factor, regardless of its proxy, is negative and significant at 
the 1% level though its magnitude declines slightly from Model 1. For instance, the 
coefficient of  is -0.063. To gauge the economic impact of  , we estimate the 
change in CAR when we increase  by one standard deviation (from the mean of 
). Given that the standard deviation of  is 0.176, one standard deviation 
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increase in  roughly corresponds to a decrease of 1.11% of CAR. In other words, 
the difference of one standard deviation in  is translated to the difference of 1.45% 
in CAR. 
For the information asymmetry proxy ( ), inconsistent with the 
information hypothesis, we do not find evidence for a positive association between CAR 
and  for all regressions in Table 18. As suggested by the results of the bivariate 
analysis of the information asymmetry in which we find a significant deterioration in the 
information asymmetry of the sample after the completion of a spinoff, there is no  
connection between the levels of information asymmetry ex ante and CARs. Under the 
information hypothesis as we discussed previously, firms with higher levels of 
information asymmetry is expected to earn higher abnormal returns because investors 
would rationally anticipate greater reductions in information asymmetry, hence higher 
valuations for these firms.13This evidence suggests further that there might be no 
empirical ground for the notion that it is undervalued firms with severe information 
problem that engage in a corporate spinoff.  
                                                            
13In a similar vein, Thomas (2002) takes an issue with the notion that corporate 
diversification strictly aggravates information asymmetry. He notes that if errors in forecasting 
segment cash flows are not perfectly correlated, consolidated forecasts for a diversified firm’s 
cash flow can be more accurate than forecasts for a focused firm, effectively a diversification of 
information asymmetry across business divisions. Empirically, he finds that firms with greater 
diversification are not associated with greater errors and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(i.e., information asymmetry). If diversification does exacerbate information problem, a reverse-
diversification should mitigate the problem, which is consistent with the information hypothesis 
for corporate spinoffs. However, if diversification does not lead to greater information asymmetry 
problem, then it is not clear how a reverse-diversification would affect the information 
environment of a firm.  Though our study of corporate spinoff is a subset of corporate reverse-
diversification, at least in the case of spinoffs the problem of information asymmetry appears to 
become more severe after the completion of spinoff. 
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In all the regressions in Table 18, inconsistent with the prior literature we find that 
focus factor is not significantly related to CAR. This result provides a support for the 
outlier analysis in the preceding section. That is, a significantly positive coefficient of 
Focus reported in Table 17 for the full sample (before trimming the outliers) seem to 
reflect the fact that extremely positive (negative) abnormal returns tend to be observed 
for focus-increasing (non-focus-increasing) firms. However, given that there is strong 
empirical support for the effect of Focus in the literature for the first study period from 
1964 to 1991, and that a majority of the outliers are observed in the second study period, 
we will implement a sub-period analysis to examine the stability of focus factor over the 
entire study period in the final section of Part Two. 
In Model 3, we add disagreement shock (Shock) to Model 2. In Section 11.B of 
Part one, our bivariate analysis shows that there is a strong positive correlation between 
Shock and announcement abnormal return. Recall that Shock is the magnitude of a change 
in the degree of disagreement from a normal level in the pre-event period (  or 
disagreement factor) to an event level in the announcement period ( ). This surge in 
the level of disagreement is caused by differential interpretation about the information 
content of a spinoff announcement among investors. Based on Miller (1977)’s model in 
which disagreement induces a downward-sloping demand curve, we interpret a change in 
the level of disagreement as a change in the slope of the demand curve of a firm. Thus, a 
firm with a greater change in the slope (or disagreement shock) should earn a higher 
abnormal return. On Model 3 in Table 18, we find that in all measure of Shock (
) except  , the coefficient of Shock is positive and significant at 
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the1% level, which confirms a positive relation between Shock and CAR found in the 
bivariate analysis in Part One.  
Notice that the coefficient of disagreement factor is still negatively significant 
while its size decreases slightly from Model 2. The relative size of a subsidiary (Relative 
size) is positively and significantly related to CAR in Model 2, consistent with the prior 
literature. But, when Shock is included (Model 3), it is no longer significant except . 
It appears that the effect of Relative size on CAR is captured by Shock. Moreover, the 
coefficient of Focus and Relative size also monotonically declines from Model 2 to 
Model 3in all measures of Shock. This suggests that disagreement shock itself might 
depend on these factors. Thus, we investigate possible linkages between Shock and these 
variables in the next section. 
B. Determinants of Disagreement Shock. In our model, disagreement shock 
(Shock) represents the magnitude of a change in the degree of disagreement, which is 
triggered by the announcement of a spinoff, from the normal level in the pre-event period 
to the event level. Then, such questions might follow: What do cause the change in the 
level of disagreement? To answer the question, we hypothesize that the information 
content in relative size (i.e., the portion of assets that a firm split up to its spun-off 
subsidiary) and focus factor (i.e., the type of a division that the firm spins off) could be 
sources of disagreement. We also hypothesize that investors’ perception regarding the 
level of information asymmetry about the firm would affect the degree of differential 
interpretations about the announcement. Therefore, we investigate how Shock is related 
to these variables. More specifically we want to examine the extent to which Shock is 
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Table 19. Determinants of Disagreement Shock 
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the disagreement shocks of the trimmed sample. The sample firms 
between the 95 and the 5 percentile of CAR are removed from the sample. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -
day period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). The dependent variable Disagreement Shock (Shock) is 
calculated by  minus . The ex-ante level of DO ( ) or disagreement factor is measured by averaging 
daily estimates of a volume-based measure of DO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the pre-event period. 
Similarly, the event level of DO ( ) is the mean of daily VDO estimates in the announcement period from AD-1 to AD+1. 
 is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by Corwin 
and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. A dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to a parent firm (i.e., focus-increasing 
spinoff) if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, zero is assigned (i.e., non-focus-
increasing spinoff). The relative size of a subsidiary (Relative Size) is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary 
measured by the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the 
month prior to a spinoff announcement month (Size). Size, Relative size, and  are transformed by taking the natural 
logarithm. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis. 
The adjusted R2 and the model F-statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values 
in bold indicates the significance at the minimum of the 10% level. 
   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.586 -0.148 0.619 -0.373 0.596 -0.261 0.655 -1.348 -0.189 -0.541
(0.000) (0.775) (0.000) (0.494) (0.000) (0.612) (0.000) (0.052) (0.640) (0.457)
Dis. Factor -0.781 -0.263 -1.125 -0.708 -0.889 -0.390 -0.979 -0.792 -0.128 -0.016
(0.008) (0.352) (0.000) (0.008) (0.002) (0.153) (0.001) (0.005) (0.042) (0.836)
 -0.173 -0.262 -0.214 -0.029 -0.254
(0.048) (0.005) (0.013) (0.799) (0.016)
Focus 0.202 0.199 0.212 0.136 0.170




Table 19. Determinants of Disagreement Shock, Continued 
   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Relative size 0.250 0.223 0.243 0.256 0.205
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.011 -0.007 0.003 0.154 0.001
(0.706) (0.822) (0.907) (0.000) (0.981)
Obs 183 183 183 183 183
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.192 0.080 0.218 0.046 0.211 0.058 0.167 0.017 0.131




capturing the information in these determinants for announcement abnormal returns. We 
regress Shock against disagreement factor and the control variables ((CSSPRD), Focus, 
Relative size, and Size). 
We present the results of regressions in Table 19. First, regressing Shock on a 
constant and disagreement factor: Model 1, we find that all the proxies for disagreement 
factor are negatively related to Shock at the 1% level of significance, confirming the 
result in Part One, specifically Hypothesis 2. In Part 1, we postulated that firms 
characterized by lower disagreement factor prior to spinoff announcements are expected 
to incur larger disagreement shock than firms with higher disagreement factor. We argue 
that this relationship occurs due to limited attention of investors. Because cognitively 
overloaded investors pay attention to only a subset of information most of time, a firm   
that is not frequently covered by the media would have a low value of disagreement 
factor. In other words, it is less susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations by investors. 
However, when a corporate spinoff is announced (i.e., a material news), which is very 
likely to receive a wide media coverage, the firm becomes susceptible to a high degree of 
differential interpretation among investors relative to its disagreement factor (i.e. the 
normal level of disagreement).  
Recall that the methodology in measuring any volume-based measure of DO 
(VDO) from which Shock is measured is essentially structured to estimate a portion of 
trading volume after controlling for the market-wide trading volume and the average 
level of firm-specific trading volume (i.e., idiosyncratic liquidity). Hence, one 
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interpretation is that firms with a lower level of information asymmetry seem to be more 
exposed to a higher level of disagreement triggered by spinoff announcements. 
Alternatively, trading activity is more intensive for these firms as compared to those with 
greater information asymmetry. Thus, investors’ perception about a firm’s information 
asymmetry problem appears to reduce or perhaps, inhibit differential interpretation 
among investors about the announcement, and consequently abates trading activity in the 
market in the announcement period.  
On the other hand, a firm’s decision to split an unrelated subsidiary from its main 
business (Focus) has a significantly positive effect on Shock.  The coefficient of Shock is 
positive for all measures of Shock and significant for , , and .Thus, a 
firm engaging in focus-increasing spinoff invites a greater level of disagreement about 
the prospect of the firm following a spinoff compared to a firm engaging in non-focus-
increasing spinoff. This result lends some support for the prediction of the dynamic 
disagreement model developed by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).  Specifically, they 
present a case in which the respective value of two subsidiaries—whose cash flows are 
perfectly negatively correlated— can exceed the value of a hypothetical parent firm, 
which consists of these two subsidiaries in the presence of heterogeneous belief among 
investors about these subsidiaries’ values. Moreover, their model predicts more intensive 
trading in a subsidiary than in the parent. While their model would be suitable for testing 
a case of corporate carve-outs rather than a corporate spinoff, the implication of their 
model can be applied to our analysis of corporate spinoff dealing with the announcement 
effect of a spinoff. That is, the announcement itself incurs excessive trading volume and 
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positive price reaction, which are shown to be more pronounced for focus-increasing 
spinoffs.  
C. Sub-Period Analysis. In Section 16.A, the cross-sectional regression (Model 3 
in Table 18) for the determinant of spinoff abnormal returns shows that the extant 
determinants found in the literature enters insignificantly for our full study period from 
1964 to 2005. We find that only disagreement factor and disagreement shock explain the 
variation in abnormal returns. Nevertheless, this finding does not necessarily refute the 
previous findings. As we addressed in Section 14.B, the majority of the literature on 
corporate spinoffs draw a sample of spinoffs (announcements) occurred in the U.S before 
the year of 1992.  
Thus, we examine the stability of the determinants for spinoff abnormal returns 
over the whole study period by segmenting the sample into two sub-periods: The first 
study period from 1964 to 1991 and the second study period from 1992 to 2005. Then, 
we estimate Model 3 in Table 18 for each study period. We omit disagreement shock 
from the regression because in this analysis we intend to confirm the findings in the 
previous literature. It should be recalled that we show in the preceding section that 
disagreement shock absorbs the variability in some of the determinants, namely, 
information asymmetry, Focus, and Relative size. 
In Table 20, we present the result of the regression for the first study period 
(Panel 1) and for the second study period (Panel 2). First, notice that consistent with the 
prior literature, the coefficient of Focus and Relative size is positive and significant for 
the sample firms in the first study period. For example, on average, focus-increasing
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Table 20. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns: Two Sub-Periods Analysis 
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the abnormal announcement returns with the trimmed sample for 
the first and the second sample period. The sample firms between the 95 and the 5 percentile of CAR are removed from the 
sample. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -day period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). 
The dependent variable (CAR) is the abnormal return cumulated over the three days surrounding the date of a spinoff 
announcement, (AD-1, AD+1). A market model for daily returns is estimated over the pre-event period to compute abnormal 
returns. The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. The ex-
ante level of DO ( ) or disagreement factor is measured by averaging daily estimates of a volume-based measure of 
DO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the pre-event period.  is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads 
(CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. A 
dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to a parent firm (i.e., focus-increasing spinoff) if its two-digit primary SIC code is 
different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, zero is assigned (i.e., non-focus-increasing spinoff). The relative size of a 
subsidiary (Relative Size) is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary measured by the end of the month in which 
the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the month prior to a spinoff announcement 
month (Size). Size, Relative size, and  are transformed by taking the natural logarithm. The p-values for the 
significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis. The adjusted R2 and the model F-
statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values in bold indicates the significance 
at the minimum of the 10% level.    
  Panel 1. The first sample period, 1964 to 1991 Panel 2. The second sample period, 1992 to 2005 
      
Constant -0.039 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.002 0.086 0.057 0.053 0.058 0.056
(0.670) (0.901) (0.866) (0.854) (0.972) (0.231) (0.369) (0.407) (0.362) (0.385)
Dis. Factor -0.006 -0.036 -0.044 -0.051 -0.030 0.003 -0.072 -0.067 -0.070 -0.042
(0.434) (0.092) (0.073) (0.045) (0.117) (0.675) (0.028) (0.053) (0.048) (0.042)
 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.949) (0.975) (0.940) (0.967) (0.930) (0.485) (0.707) (0.652) (0.700) (0.573)
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Table 20. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns: Two Sub-Periods Analysis, Continued 
  Panel 1. The first sample period, 1964 to 1991 Panel 2. The second sample period, 1992 to 2005 
      
Focus 0.024 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.895) (0.688) (0.681) (0.707) (0.687)
Relative size 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.016) (0.046) (0.056) (0.067) (0.051) (0.082) (0.213) (0.199) (0.196) (0.203)
Size 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.630) (0.840) (0.925) (0.925) (0.802) (0.302) (0.575) (0.560) (0.553) (0.494)
Obs 88 88 88 88 88 95 95 95 95 95
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.124 0.126 0.133 0.119 0.031 0.081 0.074 0.076 0.062
  (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.167) (0.027) (0.037) (0.033) (0.057)
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firms earns about 2.6% more announcement abnormal return than a non-focus-increasing 
firms. However, in the second study period, as can be seen from Panel 2, these factors 
become insignificant. Though the insignificance of Focus in the second study period as 
expected, given the result in the bivariate analysis of this variable in Section 14.B, the 
insignificance of Relative size is unexpected and striking. In the second study period, 
investors seem not to take these factors into consideration in their re- valuation of the 
sample firms upon the spinoff announcements as they did in the first study period. 
Furthermore, as we showed previously, there is no relationship between information 
asymmetry and abnormal returns in both sub-study periods. The only factor that remains 
significant in both sub-periods is disagreement factor. Consistent with the result for the 
full sample, it is significantly negatively associated with the abnormal returns in both 
sub-study periods.  
Therefore, the rationales that are hypothesized and tested by the prior literature 
for the implementation of a spinoff seem to lack generality, and these rational 
motivations apply for only a subset of corporate spinoffs, especially those occurred 
before 1992 for which period most of empirical studies on the wealth effect of spinoffs 
are done. However, our result shows that only the disagreement factor of a firm, or a 
firm’s characteristic inferred from the behaviors of investors who have heterogeneous 
beliefs and interpret public information differently, can consistently explain the abnormal 






In Part 2, we examine the significance of disagreement factor as the determinant 
for the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns days surrounding the announcement 
of a corporate spinoff.  The disagreement factor (i.e., the ex-ante level of DO in Part One) 
of a firm is defined as the level of disagreement among investors about its value in a 
normal trading day prior to a spinoff announcement. Therefore, it is reasonably 
considered as a firm-specific characteristic defined by investors who have heterogeneous 
beliefs and interpret information differently.  In Part 1, given a precipitous increase in the 
level of DO induced by the announcement of a spinoff, we show that firms with lower 
disagreement factors provoke more heterogeneous interpretations about their spinoff 
announcements (i.e., disagreement shock) than do firms with higher disagreement factors 
do. This result is consistent with the notion of limited attention hypothesis in the 
literature. Furthermore, the implication of this result is a negative correlation between 
abnormal announcement returns and disagreement factor. This implication renders 
disagreement factor as a potent variable that can be helpful in understanding price 
changes effected by spinoff announcements. Therefore, we intend to confirm that 
whether the negative relationship between disagreement factor and the announcement 
abnormal returns still remain significant after controlling for the known determinants 
identified in the extant literature for these returns.  
Among these determinants, or the sources of the abnormal returns, we choose 
information asymmetry ex ante, change in industrial focus (focus factor), and the ratio of 
the size of a spun-off to that of its parent (relative size), all of which have received strong 
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empirical supports in the prior studies. However, our review of the literature reveals that 
there is conflicting evidence for the effect of information asymmetry and that a majority 
of empirical papers that studied focus factor are concentrated on spinoff announcements 
occurred in the U.S before year 1992. Thus, we reexamine the validity of the information 
(asymmetry) hypothesis and the role of focus factor because our sample data is larger in 
size and cover a longer study period compared to the prior literature that examine these 
variables. 
Using a sample of spinoffs that were undertaken by the U.S publicly-traded firms 
from 1964 to 2005, we find that information asymmetry problem, regardless of a proxy 
for information asymmetry used, is aggravated after the completion of a spinoff. This is 
inconsistent with the information hypothesis, which states that information asymmetry 
should be improved following spinoff. Under this hypothesis, the undervaluation of a 
firm due to information asymmetry between outside investors and managers is the 
motivation for spinoff to gain a fair valuation by reducing information asymmetry. 
Moreover, the deterioration in information asymmetry is much larger for and limited to 
the sample firms engaged in focus-increasing spinoff. This result invalidates the 
information hypothesis further because the focus-increasing samples should achieve a 
greater improvement in information asymmetry according to the hypothesis.  
Regarding the effect of focus factor, we show that the focus-increasing firms earn 
significantly positively larger abnormal returns than the non-focus increasing firms only 
in our first study period from 1964 to 1991. This confirms the result of the extant 
literature that covered a similar time period. However, in our second study period from 
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1992 to 2005 there is no statistically significant difference in the abnormal returns 
between these two focus groups, and both groups, on average, earn significantly positive 
abnormal returns. 
In multiple regression analyses of the full sample, we find that disagreement 
factor explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in announcement 
abnormal returns after controlling for the other known determinants. This finding 
confirms the result of a bivariate test in Part 1 that firms with lower disagreement factors 
earn higher abnormal returns. However, information asymmetry and focus factor are not 
significantly related to the abnormal returns. Thus our full sample supports neither the 
information asymmetry nor the industrial-focus hypotheses.  
Furthermore, including disagreement shock in regression analyses, we find that 
while disagreement factor remains significant, disagreement shock also is significantly 
positively correlated to the abnormal returns. This result confirms Hypothesis 2 in Part 1. 
However, all the other determinants (i.e., focus factor and information asymmetry) 
including relative size become insignificant. This result suggests that the variations in 
these determinants are captured by disagreement shock. This implication is reasonable 
because the information content of these variables, which is known at the time of a 
spinoff announcement, is potentially a source for investor disagreement. Thus, relating 
these determinants with disagreement shock, we find that disagreement shock is smaller 
if a firm has higher level of information asymmetry ex ante, but the shock is larger if the 
firm implements a focus-increasing spinoff, and splits up a larger portion of its assets to 
its subsidiary. Given that our proxies for disagreement shock in effect represent abnormal 
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trading activity resulting from disagreement triggered by a spinoff announcement, 
investors refrain from trading based on their own interpretation for firms that they 
perceive to have high information asymmetry.  
Regarding our sub-period analyses, we confirm the finding in the literature that 
focus factor and relative size are indeed the sources of abnormal returns produced from 
spinoff announcements in the first study period from 1964 to 1991. However, in the 
second study period, we find that both focus factor and relative size no longer explain 
these returns. Moreover, the effect of information asymmetry remains insignificant for 
both sub-study periods. The only variable that can consistently explain the abnormal 
returns in both sub-periods is disagreement factor. 
In conclusion, we have combined Miller (1977)’s static DO model with Banerjee 
and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic DO model and investigated the effects of investor’s 
differential interpretations of spinoff announcements on price changes with the data on 
221 corporate spinoffs in the U.S from 1964 to 2005. Investors’ differential interpretation 
of corporate spinoff divestures is not a readily observable variable. Thus we have 
transformed trading volume into two comparative statistics (the ex-ante level of DO, or 
disagreement factor, and the event level of DO), and used them as the principal analytical 
variables for the examination of contradictory evidence centered on the validity of the 
three hypotheses for wealth gains prominently reported on the spinoff literature. The 
three hypotheses are (i) the information asymmetry, (ii) the industrial focus (focus-
increasing vs. non-focus increasing spinoffs), (iii) the wealth transfer (from bond holders 
to stockholders) hypothesis.   
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In Part 2, we have shown that when abnormal returns from spinoff (i.e., wealth 
gains) are analyzed in multiple regressions along with disagreement factor, the 
explanatory power of the four hypotheses is almost completely eclipsed by the robustness 
of disagreement factor. This finding sheds light to why there is the contradictory evidence 
from prior studies on the three hypotheses reported in the literature. 
Together with Part 1, we have validated the analytical properties of the combined 
models of Miller (1977) and Banerjee and Kremer (2010): Namely, Miller’s DO 
proposition that under short-sale constraints, optimistic investors overprice stock, which 
gives rise to a fleeting window of market anomaly, and Banerjee and Kremer’s model 
specifications that impound a surge in trading volume which peaks at the announcement 
date and then levels off after five to seven days.  We have demonstrated how the 
differential interpretation of firm-specific spinoff announcement by investors can be 
transformed from time-series of daily stock trading volume series into the two principal 
investigative variables: Disagreement factor and disagreement shock. By doing so, we 
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